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THE WEST CARIBBEAN CONUNDRUM:
THE UNITED STATES VERSUS FRANCE ON THE
AVAILABILITY OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS UNDER
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999
DAVID CLUXTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
ON AUGUST 16, 2005, West Caribbean Airways Flight 708(WCW-708) took off from Tocumen International Airport
in Panama set for Aimé Césaire International Airport in Fort-de-
France, the capital city of the French overseas region of Marti-
nique.1 A little over an hour later, it crashed near Machiques,
Venezuela, killing everyone on board.2 In addition to the 8 Co-
lombian crew members, WCW-708 was carrying 152 passengers,
mostly civil servants from Martinique and their families who had
been vacationing in Panama.3 The charter flight was operated by
a Colombian airline, West Caribbean Airways (WCW), which was
established in 1998 and ceased operations following the crash.4
* David Cluxton, B.C.L., LL.M., Ph.D. Having been awarded a Bachelor of
Civil Law (BCL) degree from University College Dublin, Ireland, David worked
for the Irish airline, Aer Lingus Ltd., for a number of years. In 2014, he was
awarded an LL.M. in Air and Space Law, and subsequently earned a Ph.D. in law
for his research on choice of forum in international aviation litigation. He is also
a former lecturer in aviation law and policy at Dublin City University, Ireland.
David would like to express his sincerest thanks to the editorial team at the
Journal of Air Law and Commerce for all their hard work and invaluable
assistance; as an author, one really appreciates the effort involved and how much
credit they truly deserve.
1 See Frances Fiorino, West Caribbean Crash Probe, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 22–29, 2005, at 50, 50.




4 See West Caribbean Airways Fleet Details and History, PLANESPOTTERS.NET, https:/
/www.planespotters.net/airline/West-Caribbean-Airways [https://perma.cc/
DA64-5D6Y] (last updated Jan. 4, 2020).
3
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The report of the Venezuelan accident investigation authority
concluded that the aircraft had been airworthy at the time.5 It
passed a complete inspection by Colombian authorities the
same week as the accident and was also subjected to two recent
inspections by French authorities in Martinique.6 WCW-708 was
the airline’s second fatal accident of 2005.7 The earlier crash
had occurred on March 26, 2005, in Colombia and resulted in
the deaths of six passengers and two crew.8 Three months prior,
the airline was fined by the Civil Aviation Authority of Colombia
for fourteen violations of airline regulations, including failures
to provide required pilot training.9 The financial situation of the
airline was dire, and the report concluded that this contributed
to the accident by generating an atmosphere of uncertainty and
stress for its employees.10 The pilots had not been paid in several
months, and the report even noted that the captain was moon-
lighting during his off hours by running a bar.11 These and vari-
ous other psycho-emotional factors were identified as
contributing negatively to the pilots’ performance.12
5 The summary account provided herein is taken (in the absence of other cita-
tion) from an unofficial French translation of the original report issued in Span-
ish. See generally BUREAU D’ENQUÊTES ET D’ANALYSES, RAPPORT FINAL: WEST
CARIBBEAN AIRWAYS DC-9-82 (MD-82) IMMATRICULE HK4374X, MACHIQUES, VENE-
ZUELA, 16 AOÛT 2005 (2005) (Fr.), https://www.bea.aero/fileadmin/docu-
ments/docspa/2005/hk-x050816/pdf/hk-x050816.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3U9Q-9U65] [hereinafter RAPPORT FINAL: WEST CARIBBEAN AIRWAYS]. For the
original report in Spanish, see MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA TRANSPORTE
Y COMUNICACIONES, INFORME FINAL: WEST CARIBBEAN AIRWAYS DC-9-82 (MD-82)
MATRÍCULA HK4374X, MACHIQUES, VENEZUELA, 16 DE AGOSTO DE 2005 (2005)
(Venez.), http://www.mppt.gob.ve/download/121864/ [https://perma.cc/
V9JM-3L4D]. See also JUNTA INVESTIGADORA DE ACCIDENTES DE AVIACIÓN CIVIL, EN-
GLISH TRANSLATION OF MAIN TEXT OF VENEZUELAN ACCIDENT REPORT, JIAAC-9-
058-2005, SKYBRARY, https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1930.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA84-4JE7] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (English translation of
the original report).
6 Grim Find at Venezuela Crash Site, supra note 2.
7 See Fiorino, supra note 1, at 50.
8 Id.
9 Brian Ellsworth & Juan Forero, 160 Die in Crash of Airliner in Venezuela, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/world/americas/
160-die-in-crash-of-airliner-in-venezuela.html [https://perma.cc/2ZX9-9AU9].
One month prior to the WCW-708 accident, Colombian authorities temporarily
grounded the airline because of noncompliance with an airworthiness directive.
Tom Hennigan, Holiday Jet Crashes After Engines Fail, Killing 160, TIMES (Aug. 17,
2005), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/holiday-jet-crashes-after-engines-fail-
killing-160-n9fthn6p0fm [https://perma.cc/PWZ7-GNAB].
10 RAPPORT FINAL: WEST CARIBBEAN AIRWAYS, supra note 5, at 94.
11 Id. at 109.
12 Id.
2020] FORUM NON CONVENIENS UNDER MC99 5
Given that WCW-708 was a flight between Panama and Marti-
nique, operated by a Colombian airline, which crashed in Vene-
zuela, with mostly French and Colombian nationals on board,13
where might one expect ensuing litigation to be pursued? Co-
lombia? Venezuela? Martinique? The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida?
A. THE WEST CARIBBEAN CONUNDRUM
Under the Montreal Convention of 1999 (MC99), the applica-
ble instrument governing the liability of the carrier for passen-
ger death or injury arising during most international carriage by
air, there exists a presumption of fault on the carrier in the
event of an accident.14 The burden of proof rests not on the
plaintiff to prove fault but on the carrier to prove the absence of
fault.15 Where a carrier can make out this defense, it is entitled
to limit the maximum extent of its liability.16 Otherwise, as in
WCW-708, the carrier faces unlimited liability. On the facts of
WCW-708’s crash, the negligence of the carrier was incontesta-
ble, and thus the question of liability was not truly at issue. In a
case like this, indeed in most aviation litigation—especially
under MC99—the real crux of the matter is the question of
damages. Plaintiff lawyers consider themselves duty bound to se-
cure for their clients the largest award possible. Since the ulti-
mate quantum recoverable is often dictated by the forum in
which one sues, it is not surprising that choice of forum is the
key factor in international aviation litigation. The quantum re-
coverable varies substantially from one forum to another. For
instance, one jurisdiction might allow for the determination of
damages by a jury rather than a judge. In addition, the recover-
able heads of damage may be broader in one forum than in the
other. These, and a variety of other factors, routinely differ
amongst the available forums and may have a major bearing on
the ultimate liability and recovery.
13 Of the 152 passengers aboard, all were residents of Martinique or France,
with the exception of one who was of Italian nationality. See, e.g., Defendants
Jacques Cimetier, Newvac Corp. Inc., & Go 2 Galaxy, Inc.’s Refiled Motion to
Dismiss on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens at 2 & n.3, In re West Caribbean
Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (No. 06–22748–CIV) [hereinafter
Defendants Refiled Motion to Dismiss].
14 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air art. 17, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,083, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [herein-
after MC99].
15 See id. art. 20.
16 See id. art. 22(1).
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Under MC99, plaintiffs do not have complete freedom of
choice but are constrained to bringing their complaint before
the courts of one of a limited number of specified forums.17
Under Article 33 of MC99,18 there are five grounds provided for
jurisdiction that, on application to a given case, will generally
yield a choice between the courts of two or three different
States.19 In the case of WCW-708, the choice of forums available
to the majority of the plaintiffs would have been between Co-
lombia, Martinique (i.e., France), and the United States. The
only reason the United States was available as a possible forum
was because a U.S. corporation by the name of Newvac was
deemed to be the “contracting carrier” for the purposes of
MC99 (as distinct from the actual carrier, i.e., West Caribbean
Airways).20
While the plaintiffs had overcome the initial hurdle of estab-
lishing jurisdiction in the United States under MC99, the de-
fendants had an ace up their sleeve in the form of the common
law doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC). Under this doctrine,
on the request of the defendant and at the discretion of the
court, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a dis-
pute, not for lack of competence but because an alternative fo-
rum is considered to be the more appropriate one for resolving
the dispute. Although a feature of the legal systems of many
common law States, the doctrine is virtually absent from civilian
legal systems, which generally view it with contempt.
The defendants’ motion for FNC dismissal emphasized the
preponderance of connecting factors between the case and Mar-
tinique while noting the relative poverty of the links to the
United States.21 In addition, the defendants were willing to
make the following concessions if dismissal was granted: they
would submit to the jurisdiction of the Martinique courts, con-
cede liability, waive any statute of limitations, and not invoke any
17 See id. art. 33(1).
18 See id. The jurisdictional regime of MC99 will be detailed and analyzed in
Parts II and III infra.
19 As this Article concerns international aviation litigation in national courts, the
following convention will be adopted with respect to the term “state.” Where re-
ferring to a nation-state, that is, the legal entity recognized as a State by public
international law, then the term “State” (i.e., with a capital “S”) shall be used.
The term “state” (i.e., with a lowercase “s”) shall be used to refer to political
subdivisions of a State.
20 For details of Newvac’s involvement, see In re West Caribbean Airways, 619 F.
Supp. 2d 1299, 1302–08 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
21 Defendants Refiled Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 3–4.
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defense under Article 21(2) of MC99.22 The plaintiffs sought to
resist dismissal, arguing inter alia that Article 33 of MC99 gives
the plaintiff an unqualified right to choose in which of the avail-
able forums to bring an action.23 They relied heavily on the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hosaka v.
United Airlines, Inc.24
The Hosaka court held that under the Warsaw Convention of
1929,25 the predecessor to MC99, a court has mandatory juris-
diction over a dispute properly brought before it and is pre-
cluded from declining jurisdiction on grounds of FNC.26
However, in In re West Caribbean Airways, Judge Ungaro deter-
mined that the Hosaka decision was of “limited precedential
value” because, in that case, the Ninth Circuit had specifically
stated that it was not expressing an opinion on the availability of
FNC under MC99, an entirely new treaty with its own drafting
history.27 For these reasons, although the text of Article 33 of
MC99 is very similar to that of Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, Judge Ungaro decided that the court was faced with resolv-
ing the availability of FNC under MC99, “apparently as a matter
of first impression.”28 The court concluded (for reasons ana-
lyzed below in part III.C.1.) that FNC is available under MC99
and consistent with its purpose and drafting history.29
With the question of the availability of FNC under MC99 re-
solved, the court next applied the doctrine to the case at hand.
Given the facts involved, Judge Ungaro’s decision to grant the
motion to dismiss did not come as a surprise.30 In 2009, the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the decision, and a petition for a writ of
certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010.31 Sur-
prisingly, the story did not end there. There was to be a twist in
22 Id. at 2–3.
23 See In re West Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
24 Id.
25 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
26 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). See infra
part II.C for further analysis.
27 In re West Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1328.
30 See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Forum
Non Conveniens at 15, In re West Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (No.
06–22748–CIV).
31 Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052, 1061–62 (11th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied sub nom. Bapte v. West Caribbean Airways, 560 U.S. 952 (2010).
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the tale that would see the plaintiffs back before Judge Ungaro
in 2012, seeking to have the 2007 FNC dismissal vacated.
Immediately after the 2007 FNC order, the plaintiffs com-
menced proceedings in Martinique against Newvac. Unexpect-
edly, the Newvac action was not commenced with a view to
resolve their claims for damages. Instead, the plaintiffs peti-
tioned the Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) in Fort-de-
France, Martinique, to declare itself without jurisdiction to hear
such a claim.32 The plaintiffs maintained that they had not cho-
sen Martinique as their forum and only appeared before it be-
cause they were forced to do so on account of the FNC dismissal
from the U.S. district court.33 It was their view, per Article 33(1)
of MC99, that jurisdiction could only vest in a court by an act of
the plaintiff’s choice, and regardless of Article 33(4), this choice
of forum cannot be nullified and substituted by a rule of inter-
nal procedural law such as FNC.34 In other words, the choice of
the U.S. district court effectively preempted and precluded the
TGI in Martinique from hearing the dispute. The TGI rejected
the plaintiffs’ petition, a decision upheld by the Fort-de-France
Cour d’Appel.35 As a last throw of the dice, the plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the Cour de Cassation in Paris, France.
On December 7, 2011, the Cour de Cassation found in favor
of the plaintiffs and quashed the decision of the cour d’appel.36
The Cour de Cassation concluded that it is the exclusive right of
the plaintiff to choose a forum from those available under MC99
and that an internal rule of procedure such as FNC cannot be
32 See Declaration of Maylis Casati-Ollier, Avocat in Support of Defendant,
Newvac Corporation’s Response in Opposition to Bapte Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6)
Motion to Vacate at 5, In re West Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (No.
06–22748–CIV) [hereinafter Declaration of Casati-Ollier].
33 Id. at 5–6.
34 Id. at 8.
35 Id. at 9–10. It held:
[G]iven that among the fora competent under the Montreal Con-
vention is the court of the place of destination of carriage, namely
that of Fort-de-France, the court can only record that the [TGI],
the competency of which could not be disputed under cover of lack
of jurisdictional power, is then the sole court with jurisdiction of
the dispute between the plaintiffs and the air carriers.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Fort-de-France–Martinique, June
25, 2010, 10/239 (Fr.), translated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32,
Ex. F, at 9.
36 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec.
7, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 1201 (Fr.), translated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra
note 32, Ex. H, at 5.
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invoked to disturb that choice.37 For the Cour de Cassation, this
interpretation was necessary to meet MC99’s objectives of pre-
dictability, certainty, and uniformity.38 Consequently, jurisdic-
tion of the chosen forum is mandatory under MC99. Once the
chosen forum is seized of the case, the courts of any other State
identified by Article 33 lose their jurisdiction over the dispute.
Seemingly vindicated by the Cour de Cassation, the plaintiffs
returned to Florida seeking to have the FNC order vacated.39
Judge Ungaro took an unsurprisingly dim view of what she de-
scribed as “the latest offensive in Plaintiffs’ four-year campaign
to subvert the forum non conveniens dismissal.”40 Unfazed, her
opinion voiced disagreement with the conclusion reached by
the Cour de Cassation, noting that a U.S. court was not bound
by the analysis of the French Court and need not blindly abide
by it.41 With a warning of possible sanctions should the plaintiffs
launch yet another assault on the FNC order,42 Judge Ungaro
denied the motion to vacate, stating:
[T]he Court can only marvel at their relentless four-year cam-
paign to subvert this Court’s order dismissing their case pursuant
to forum non conveniens. Although none are United States citizens,
what they hope to gain apparently is a more financially generous
forum. The . . . Plaintiffs are not content with receiving 100 per-
cent of their Montreal Convention damages from a French
court—they would rather play their hand here. But, their trans-
parent avarice hardly suffices as a fair, just or equitable reason to
vacate the earlier FNC Order.
. . . [T]o un-do the forum non conveniens dismissal would sanc-
tion Plaintiffs’ disrespect for the lawful order of this United
37 Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32, at 4. For further consideration
on the Court’s ruling, see infra part III.3.
38 Cour de cassation, 1e civ., Dec. 7, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 1201 (Fr.), translated
in Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32, Ex. H, at 4.
39 See Order on Motion to Vacate at *1, In re West Caribbean Airways, No.
06–22748–CIV (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2012), 2012 WL 1884684. Plaintiffs argued that
there existed no available alternative forum in Martinique, or indeed anywhere,
and because the existence of an available alternative forum is an essential re-
quirement of FNC dismissal, the order had to be vacated. Id. at *6.
40 Id. at *1.
41 Id. at *7. The court explained that “[c]omity ordinarily requires United
States courts to defer to foreign courts on the interpretation of their own jurisdic-
tional statutes,” but since the case in point involved denial of jurisdiction under
an international treaty, comity no longer required such deference. Id. (citing
Osario v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1325–26 (S.D. Fla. 2009)).
42 Id. at *12 n.15 (warning that “[i]f the Bapte Plaintiffs launch yet another
(fifth) assault on the FNC Order, the Court will consider sanctions.”).
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States court and encourage other litigants to engage in similar
conduct.43
In its 2011 annual report, the Cour de Cassation made the fol-
lowing statement in respect to its decision in the case: “[b]y
adopting [its] position, the Supreme Court of France brings
into the international legal order the ‘dialogue of judges’ re-
quired by the absence of an international jurisdiction capable of
securing a uniform interpretation of said Convention (between
all State Parties).”44 The French Court’s statement is open to
interpretation. It could be taken as an example of French judi-
cial chauvinism, a thinly veiled cliché aimed at implying that,
unlike U.S. courts, the French courts understand the value of
judicial cooperation. On the other hand, rather than just shield
itself behind an unequivocal statement as to the veracity of its
decision, the Court may have earnestly been leaving the door
open for further dialogue. To date, the U.S. courts have not
picked up the baton and responded to this invitation to parley.
Instead, they have continued to apply the doctrine of FNC to
dismiss cases under MC99.45
In Delgado v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the same Florida district
court in which Judge Ungaro sits accepted that the Cour de Cas-
sation’s decision had caused some doubt to arise regarding
MC99 and FNC.46 More recently, in Eldeeb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
43 Id. at *12.
44 Sandra Adeline, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine Put to the Test of Uniform
Private International Law in Relation to Air Carriers’ Liability: Lack of Harmony Between
US and French Decisional Outcomes, 18 UNIFORM L. REV. 313, 327 (2013).
45 See infra part III.C.2.
46 In Delgado, the plaintiff sued in Florida for the wrongful death of the dece-
dent passenger in an accident at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. See generally
Delgado v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2013). The defen-
dant airline sought FNC dismissal, which was resisted by the plaintiff on the
grounds, inter alia, that subsequent to the Cour de Cassation’s decision, a French
court would refuse to hear the case. Id. at 1265 (“By refusing to exercise jurisdic-
tion on the grounds that the plaintiffs initially selected the United States to liti-
gate their claims, the Cour de Cassation stands in direct conflict with the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This Court is bound by the decisions of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and will find the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to be applicable; however, in light of the Cour de Cassation’s position, this
Court expresses doubt as to the availability of an alternative forum in France after
a forum non conveniens dismissal.”). In Delgado, the court did not have to enter into
an examination of these questions because it determined that FNC dismissal was
not warranted on the basis of the private and public interest analyses. See id. at
1266–68. Strictly speaking, the doubt was expressed with regard to the availability
of France as an alternative forum. Id. at 1268. This is not irreconcilable with the
availability of FNC under MC99. It merely means that, in this instance, the doc-
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plaintiffs sought to resist FNC dismissal on the grounds that the
Cour de Cassation’s decision meant that France was not availa-
ble as an alternative forum;47 it is an essential requirement of
FNC dismissal that there should be an available alternative fo-
rum.48 The Minnesota district court was unconvinced by this ar-
gument, stating that “[t]he Cour de Cassation’s opinion, as
translated, declares ‘the present lack of availability of the French
venue’ based on complex facts and procedural circumstances
not presented here.”49 The district court’s analysis is weak; it
plays semantics by emphasizing the Cour de Cassation’s use of
the word “present,” and more significantly, it is mistaken to
think that the Cour de Cassation’s decision was specific to the
circumstances of the case. As we shall see, the Cour de Cassation
took a very principled position in rejecting FNC within the con-
text of MC99; the particular circumstances of the case were not
determinative. Eldeeb was dismissed on appeal to the Eighth
Circuit.50
B. OVERVIEW
The catalyst for this research was the compelling doctrinal co-
nundrum posed by the controversy surrounding the In re West
Caribbean Airways case. It is clearly a worrying and undesirable
state of affairs that a matter so essential as jurisdiction, under an
international treaty aimed at achieving uniformity of law, is the
subject of such radically opposed interpretations by two of its
most influential State parties. Nonetheless, the matter remains
in a juridical limbo while the deadlock persists. The goal of this
Article is to try and break the deadlock by determining what
place, if any, FNC has within the jurisdictional regime of MC99.
In the field of MC99 passenger-claims litigation, both the
plaintiff lawyers and defendant lawyers devote much time and
effort to jurisdictional strategizing. Because the United States is
currently the focal point for such litigation, a core pillar of that
trine would be applied, but that—without an available alternative forum—dismis-
sal would not be granted. However, it does raise questions about the legitimacy of
the French Court’s action and its consistency with MC99.
47 Eldeeb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 18-1128, 2018 WL 6435739, at *2 (D.
Minn. Dec. 7, 2018).
48 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (“[FNC] presupposes at
least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine
furnishes criteria for choice between them.”).
49 Eldeeb, 2018 WL 6435739, at *2.
50 Eldeeb, 2018 WL 6435739, appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 19-1069 (8th
Cir. June 6, 2019).
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strategy is FNC (whether as a question of securing dismissal or
resisting it). The determination of the jurisdictional question of
forum is, in many cases, the most important because it is often
outcome determinative. For this reason, both sides will employ
tactics that range from the ingenious to the utterly disingenu-
ous—often both—all in order to secure a jurisdictional advan-
tage that can ultimately be translated into a pecuniary gain. The
resulting litigation on the matter of jurisdiction is both time-
consuming and expensive.
That FNC motions are outcome determinative means that the
parties essentially agree on, or at least do not sufficiently dis-
pute, other matters, most notably the question of liability. The
irony is obvious. What this also demonstrates is that, by and
large, MC99 has been successful in lessening the amount of liti-
gation on the essential matter of liability. Much less litigation
over the question of liability is seen under MC99 than under its
predecessor, the Warsaw Convention System (WCS).51 The
51 The term Warsaw Convention System (WCS) refers to the Warsaw Conven-
tion and to the general body of instruments built around it. As such it consists of:
Warsaw Convention, supra note 25; Protocol to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at
Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Done at The Hague, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S.
371 (Hague Protocol); Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention,
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Performed by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 31 (Guadalajara Convention); Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed
at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague
on 28 September 1955, opened for signature Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613, ICAO Doc.
8932 (Guatemala City Protocol or GCP); Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, opened for signature Sept. 25,
1975, 2097 U.N.T.S. 23 (MAP1); Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at
The Hague on 28 September 1955, Sept. 25, 1975, 2097 U.N.T.S. 63 (MAP2);
Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 Octo-
ber 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September
1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March, 1971, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975,
ICAO Doc. 9147 (MAP3); Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed
at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague
on 28 September 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, 2145 U.N.T.S. 31
(MAP4). The intercarrier agreements include the Montreal Intercarrier Agree-
ment of 1966 and the IATA Intercarrier Agreements (1992–1995); the text of
these agreements and others are available in INT’L AIR TRANSPORT ASSOC. [IATA],
ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY (3d ed. 2012).
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changes made to the liability regime have undoubtedly benefit-
ted the plaintiff passenger and greatly reduced the amount of
litigation. This of course is not to say that MC99 is not without
its problems. For instance, non-recovery for pure mental injury
remains a bugbear for many a plaintiff lawyer. However, it is the
preponderance of litigation over the question of jurisdiction,
particularly the recurring incidence of FNC motions, that sets
the alarm bells ringing and strongly suggests that all is not well
with MC99. If only this jurisdictional predicament could be over-
come, then MC99 would surely become an even greater success.
Overcoming the stalemate reached in the In re West Caribbean
Airways case entails understanding the place of FNC within the
jurisdictional scheme of MC99. At its simplest, FNC is ultimately
just a doctrinal mechanism for resolving a dispute between the
litigants regarding choice of forum. It presupposes the existence
of concurrent jurisdiction. Where only a single forum is availa-
ble, then FNC has no part to play. However, once there is a
choice between available forums, then the space is created for
conflict between the interests of the litigants. Where the inter-
ests of the defendant are better served by trial in a foreign fo-
rum, then the doctrine provides an avenue by which the
defendant can petition the court to show preference for its
choice of forum. FNC thus provides the stage upon which the
drama arising from the conflicting interests of plaintiff and de-
fendant over choice of forum can be played out.
MC99 was preceded by almost ninety years’ worth of jurispru-
dence built up surrounding WCS, so it is apt to first address
what role FNC played under that system and to what extent its
availability was challenged. Such detailed consideration of WCS
is also justified for the purpose of establishing and appreciating
the policy objectives involved. This is the goal of Part II of this
Article. It provides some essential background to the Warsaw
Convention by pointing out some key details regarding the his-
torical context of its drafting in 1929 and by considering its gen-
eral purpose. Close attention is then paid to the Warsaw
Convention’s jurisdictional scheme (e.g., the four bases of juris-
diction provided therein) and its specific purpose. The resolu-
tion by the courts on the question of the availability of FNC
within the context of WCS will then be thoroughly explored and
analyzed, permitting us to reach a firm conclusion. The ap-
proach adopted in Part II will establish a foundation upon
which to conduct a similar analysis of MC99 in Part III.
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Again, background to the drafting of MC99 will be presented
and its purposes identified. It will also be essential to elucidate
how the Warsaw Convention retains relevance to MC99 and how
they interrelate. Although built upon the same jurisdictional
scheme as the Warsaw Convention, MC99 saw the introduction
of a new jurisdictional base, the so-called fifth jurisdiction. Aside
from completing the jurisdictional picture, attention to the fifth
jurisdiction is vital because the possibility of its introduction
gave rise to much controversy and debate at the Montreal Con-
ference in which the doctrine of FNC played a massive role. At-
tention is also merited because the fifth jurisdiction controversy
at the Montreal Conference predominantly played out between
the United States and France, which once again found them-
selves on opposing sides—mirroring the core conflict at issue in
In re West Caribbean Airways. Part III will then conclude by re-
turning to In re West Caribbean Airways and conducting an inten-
sive analysis of the court’s reasoning, as well as the response of
the French Cour de Cassation and other relevant authorities.
Conclusions on the availability of FNC within MC99 will then be
reached in Part IV and the way forward contemplated.
II. WARSAW CONVENTION AND FORUM NON
CONVENIENS
A. BACKGROUND TO AND PURPOSE OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
From early on, the international community was awake to the
issues of nonuniformity in aviation. Between 1922 and 1924,
against a backdrop of diverse national legislative efforts to regu-
late the area, resolutions were passed by at least three interna-
tional organizations calling for the formulation of a uniform
code for the regulation of private air law.52 The consensus was
clear—uniformity of certain rules relating to international car-
riage by air was a necessity, specifically those governing the legal
52 Latchford reported that “[t]he Advisory and Technical Committee on Com-
munications and Transit of the League of Nations in 1922, the International
Chamber of Commerce in 1923, and the International Aeronautic Federation in
1924 adopted resolutions recommending to the various governments that they
formulate a uniform system of private air law.” Stephen Latchford, The Growth of
Private International Air Law, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 276 (1945); see also John
Jay Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of
Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIR L. & COM. 27, 27 (1932); Alexander N.
Sack, International Unification of Private Law Rules on Air Transportation and the War-
saw Convention, 4 AIR L. REV. 345, 346 (1933).
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relationship between the carrier and shipper or passenger. On
August 17, 1923, France issued a diplomatic letter in which it
expressed its wish to convene an international conference with a
view to concluding a convention on the liability of the air car-
rier.53 The patchwork of divergent national laws necessitated the
conclusion of a treaty in order to avoid the conflict of laws that
would otherwise be inherent in the uncoordinated regulation by
individual countries of an international activity. The immediate
concern was to achieve a necessary measure of certainty for the
parties regarding the liability of the carrier by air.54
The intention was to convene the conference in late 1923, but
it was not until October 1925 that it eventually took place.55 This
conference was the First International Conference on Private
Air Law, and it considered a draft (the Avant Projet) on the lia-
bility of the air carrier in international transportation.56 The
Avant Projet was prepared by France, modeled on its own na-
tional legislation, i.e., the Air Navigation Law of 1924.57 The
Conference also led to the establishment of the Comité Interna-
tional Technique d’Experts Juridiques Aériens (CITEJA).58 One
of the CITEJA’s first tasks was to continue the work of the Con-
ference by further studying the draft and the general question
of the liability of the carrier.59 This work was carried out by the
Second Commission, which was composed of delegates from sev-
eral States, nearly all hailing from civil law legal systems.60 How-
53 See DANIEL GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIR LEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVEN-
TION 4 (1937); Ide, supra note 52, at 27–28.
54 For the introductory report attached to the Avant Projet, see CONFÉRENCE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PRIVÉ AÉRIEN 12–13 (Imprimerie Nationale 1926).
55 See, e.g., Ide, supra note 52, at 30.
56 See id.
57 Loi du 31 mai 1924 relative à la navigation aérienne [Law of May 31, 1924
regarding Air Navigation], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 3, 1924, p. 5046. For an English translation
of the relevant articles (Articles 41, 42, 43, and 48), see GOEDHUIS, supra note 53,
at 52. For history and commentary on the Act, see generally Lincoln H. Cha, The
Air Carrier’s Liability to Passengers in International Law, 7 AIR L. REV. 25 (1936);
Georges Ripert, Responsabilité du Transporteur Aérien [Liability of the Air Carrier],
7 REVUE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA LOCOMOTION AÉRIENNE [INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL REVIEW OF AIR LOCOMOTION] 353 (1923) (Fr.).
58 Stephen Latchford, The Warsaw Convention and the C.I.T.E.J.A., 6 J. AIR L. &
COM. 79, 84 (1935). The CITEJA’s role was to study relevant areas of private air
law with a view to producing instruments for codification. Id.
59 Id.
60 Cha lists the membership of the Second Commission as follows: Richter
(Germany); de Vos (Belgium); Dennis (U.K.); Moralès (Dominican Republic);
de Las Penas (Spain); Ripert (France); Figueroa (Guatemala); Cogliolo (Italy);
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ever, one common law State, the United Kingdom (U.K.), was
represented on the Commission.61 The Second Commission
conducted its work and produced a number of revisions before
submitting its final draft to the Second International Confer-
ence on Private Air Law, held in Warsaw in 1929, from which
would ultimately emerge the Warsaw Convention.62 A highly sig-
nificant point to note is that the United States did not officially
participate in the First or Second International Conferences on
Private Air Law, but it did send observers.63
1. Uniformity of Certain Rules
Uniformity is the most fundamental purpose one can define
for the Warsaw Convention.64 However, uniformity was not pur-
sued for its own ends but in order to provide a requisite level of
certainty and predictability to the interested parties in carriage
by air—namely the carrier, the passenger, and the shipper.
There was thus a limited scope to the goal of uniformity. It was
not the stated goal of the Convention to unify “all” rules relating
to carriage by air but only “certain rules.”65 It is clear that these
“certain rules” concerned travel documentation and liability of
the air carrier. This is borne out by its preamble, which recog-
nizes “the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the con-
ditions of international transportation by air in respect of the
documents used for such transportation and of the liability of
the carrier.”66 The latter was regarded as being of primary
importance.67
Gorski (Poland); Ibarra (Uruguay); and Akamine (Japan, although Cha lists his
position as “reserved”). Cha, supra note 57, at 32 & n.22.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 32–33.
63 Latchford, The Warsaw Convention and the C.I.T.E.J.A., supra note 58, at 87.
For a history of U.S. involvement in the CITEJA, see Ide supra note 52, at 40–44.
64 LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 5 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines Inc., 722 F.2d
256 (5th Cir. 1984); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977)).
65 Warsaw Convention, supra note 25.
66 Id. pmbl.
67 MICHAEL MILDE, ESSENTIAL AIR AND SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW AND
ICAO 283 (2d ed. 2012) (“Liability represents the core subject of the unification
of law by the Warsaw Convention . . . .”). For comments by Giannini, the Italian
Delegate at the Warsaw Conference, see SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, OCTOBER 4–12, 1929, WARSAW: MINUTES, at 205
(Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975) [hereinafter WARSAW MINUTES]
(stating of Chapter III of the Warsaw Convention, i.e., Articles 17– 30 on the
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By addressing only “certain rules,” the delegates intended to
limit the scope solely to matters strictly necessary for a conven-
tion on private air law. The minutes manifest a sensitivity on the
part of the drafters toward keeping the scope of the Conven-
tion’s uniformity tightly focused on issues of air law and a desire
to leave well alone questions of procedure and general matters
of private international law. For instance, at one point, there was
discussion about a provision aimed at excluding foreign plain-
tiffs from having to post a security bond when bringing a claim
abroad.68 The Italian Delegate (Mr. Giannini) stated: “We have
decided that we would put in our Convention only matters
strictly necessary for a convention on private aeronautical law.
For what reason should we make a particular rule here for the
security bond?”69 Sir Alfred Dennis (the U.K. Delegate) was
completely opposed to the provision because it conflicted with
U.K. procedural law, and he remarked that “[w]e have always
followed in this Convention the principle that questions of pro-
cedure would be left to national courts . . . .”70 Giannini im-
plored the Conference “to limit itself to a convention of private
aeronautical law.”71 The proposal was defeated (by a vote of
21–3), not because it was irrelevant, far from it, but because it
was not solely a matter of private air law but one of general or-
der.72 In addition, it was an area dealt with by the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, and it was thought it would
likely be impossible for the delegates in Warsaw to achieve una-
nimity on the matter.73 It was, in other words, not a matter
strictly necessary for a convention on private aeronautical law.
The same concerns were expressed in a discussion of a different
proposal aimed at including wording on the recognition of for-
eign judgments.74
Two points can be made at this point that must be kept in
mind moving forward. First, it is undoubtedly true that one of
the primary goals of the Warsaw Convention is uniformity of cer-
liability of the carrier: “As our colleagues certainly recall, these are perhaps the
most important articles of the Convention.”).
68 Id. at 172–73.
69 Id. at 173.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 174.
72 See id. at 173–75.
73 Id. at 173–74.
74 Id. at 116–25. During the discussion, the Brazilian Delegate stated, “we came
to this conference for questions concerning air carriage in itself, we must avoid
the other questions . . . .” Id. at 122.
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tain rules, but the scope of the Convention’s object of unifica-
tion was limited to rules of general order within the field of
private air law. We must be wary of overemphasizing the extent
to which uniformity was demanded by the drafters, and also
careful to avoid the supposition that absolute uniformity was be-
ing pursued.
The second point is that the delegates were firmly of the view
that the unification of rules of procedure did not fall within
their remit; it was a matter best pursued either by bilateral nego-
tiation or by the appropriate international body on private inter-
national law. However, we must qualify this point because the
drafters did address some questions of procedure in the Con-
vention.75 In fact, some of these procedural matters were specifi-
cally in the area of jurisdiction—with which we are specifically
concerned in this Article. Why were the delegates prepared to
deal with some questions of procedure but not others? If the
delegates perceived the execution of judgments and security
bonds as being matters of procedure outside the scope of their
work, would they have taken the same view of a procedural rule
for declining jurisdiction such as FNC?
2. Balancing Interests
From its earliest incarnation, the Warsaw Convention sought
to unify rules relating to the liability of the carrier because it was
deemed necessary to assure passengers and consignors of their
rights and the steps required to enforce them and to enable car-
riers to protect themselves through foreknowledge of the extent
of their liability. In order to achieve this, the drafters prohibited
exemption clauses76 and provided for a monetary limitation of
liability.77 The Convention’s monetary limitation of liability
proved to be its most controversial provision, but we must not
allow its notoriety to skew our understanding of the purpose of
the Convention generally.
75 Id. This was pointed out by the Luxembourg delegation (Arendt). He stated:
We are told that we are here to solve questions relating to carriage
and not procedure. But what do we do in this Convention if not to
solve certain questions of procedure when it is necessary to solve
them in accordance with the question of carriage? We have solved
them; we have several articles which are of pure procedure. Then
why, why not extend procedure to other cases?
Id.
76 Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, arts. 23, 25.
77 Id. art. 22.
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It is often said that the Warsaw Convention is a pro-carrier
instrument and that the main rationale for the monetary limita-
tion of liability was to protect the nascent aviation industry from
catastrophic losses, the burden of which it was not yet in the
position to shoulder.78 Unfortunately, this only tells part of the
story and may give rise to the misconception that the Conven-
tion protects the carrier at the expense of the passenger. It is
necessary to unpack the interests involved to better appreciate
how the balance was struck. The monetary limitation of liability
was necessary because the drafters chose to prohibit exemption
clauses, yet they needed to fix limits of liability in order to pro-
vide certainty and predictability to all parties and to facilitate the
practice of insurance.79 Too much has been made of the limita-
tion of liability with the result that the assumed purpose of the
Convention (i.e., protecting the carrier) has come to eclipse the
real principal purpose (i.e., uniformity). The exploration of the
actual rationale for the limitation of liability underlines the prin-
cipal goal of the Convention as achieving certainty and predict-
ability through uniform rules of liability. The limitation of
liability was, in the first place, introduced to quantify the risk in
order to facilitate the parties to take action to protect
themselves.
While the prohibition of exemption clauses was clearly in the
interests of passengers, the introduction of fixed limits—specifi-
cally low limits—was not. Indeed, on first impression, low limits
seem tailored solely toward the interests of carriers. However,
78 This view is commonly held. For example, Milde stated: “The most likely
reason for the introduction of the limits of liability was the protection of the
infant industry that could not sustain its development without such protection
. . . .” MILDE, supra note 67, at 284. Likewise, Videla Escalada stated:
The main [reason favoring limitation] is the protection of the
carrier. . . .
. . . .
In fact, a quantitative limitation of the carrier’s liability has a
common welfare purpose: the encouragement of aviation, which is
an extraordinary contribution of our time to the progress of man-
kind and, more specifically, of air carriage, a means of communica-
tion whose benefits, with respect to the human race, it is redundant
to underline.
FEDERICO N. VIDELA ESCALADA, AERONAUTICAL LAW 565 (1979) (footnote omit-
ted); see also ALEKSANDER TOBOLEWSKI, MONETARY LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY IN AIR
LAW 110 (1986) (“[T]he most important rationale for the limitation of liability
. . . is the protection of the aviation industry.”).
79 See CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PRIVÉ AÉRIEN, supra note 54, at
56; see also GOEDHUIS, supra note 53, at 256.
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the fixing of low limits of liability indicate the service of another
interest. Low limits of liability were set for an economic reason
that was counterbalanced—to a lesser degree—by a moral con-
sideration. The economic justification is that the stakeholders in
air transport had an interest in seeing the cost kept down and
that this could be achieved by allocating a lower proportion of
risk to the carrier. The imposition of unlimited liability or of a
high limitation would increase the insurance premiums of the
carriers (assuming coverage could be found), which would
trickle down to the passenger and shipper in the form of higher
fares and rates.80 It was also in the general public’s interest to
have a low limit of liability, not just for the carrier. The public
interest in seeing this new means of transportation develop and
mature demanded it be given the room to grow without the
threat of massive liability claims, which could wipe out carriers
and deter the capital investment the industry so desperately
needed. The opposing moral consideration was the minimum
level of protection to be afforded to victims (specifically those
without insurance).
By setting relatively low limits of liability, it is clear that the
delegates were also seeking to aid the development of air trans-
port. This was not, as is so often assumed, done solely for the
benefit of the carrier but primarily in the interests of the gen-
eral public. Therefore, when one talks of the balance of interests
in the context of the Warsaw Convention, it is not a simple op-
position of carrier versus passenger; it is actually a balance be-
tween, on the one side, the carrier and the general public and,
on the other side, the plaintiff seeking compensation. At that
time, the public interest was aligned more closely with the inter-
ests of the carrier, and thus the resulting regime had a de facto
pro-carrier slant, but it was not directly intended as such. The
drafters were aware of this and made concessions to potential
plaintiffs in an effort to reach an equitable balance (e.g., prohi-
bition of exclusion clauses, reversed burden of proof, etc.).81
However, the fact is that the scales were undoubtedly tipped in
favor of the carrier over the general public, with the plaintiff
drawing the shortest straw.
80 See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
81 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, arts. 19–21 (establishing that the car-
rier has the burden of proof).
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3. Conclusions
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to establish a uni-
form legal regime consisting of certain rules relating to travel
documentation and the liability of the air carrier that would give
sufficient certainty and predictability to assure passengers of
their rights and to empower the carrier to protect itself through
foreknowledge of the extent of its liability. The regime ulti-
mately sought to achieve this principal objective whilst also pur-
suing a complementary goal of promoting the public interest in
the development of international air transport, striking an equi-
table balance between various interests.82 In conclusion, the au-
thor proposes that the purpose of the Warsaw Convention is
twofold, consisting of a cardinal purpose and a supplementary
purpose:
1. Avoidance of conflict of laws through unification of cer-
tain rules relating to carriage documentation and air car-
rier liability; and
2. Furtherance of the public interest in the development of
air transport whilst striking an equitable balance of inter-
ests between carriers, users, and plaintiffs.
While it is convenient to speak of the Warsaw Convention as a
pro-carrier instrument, it is more accurate to define it as an in-
strument whose paramount interest was that of the general pub-
lic’s in fostering the development of air transport. The regime
was not intended to protect the carrier per se but only to the
extent that it served the public interest. This conclusion necessi-
tates reframing the understanding of the purposes of the Con-
vention, especially as they are employed in its interpretation. We
must recognize the inaccuracies inherent in the reductionist un-
derstanding of the Warsaw Convention as a pro-carrier
instrument.
82 This is a point recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991) (“Whatever may be the current view among Con-
vention signatories, in 1929 the parties were more concerned with protecting air
carriers and fostering a new industry than providing full recovery to injured pas-
sengers, and we read ‘leésion corporelle’ in a way that respects that legislative
choice.”). In the Canadian case of Connaught, the court declared, in regard to the
adoption of a limitation of liability, that “[t]his result is a clear balancing of inter-
ests based on policy considerations, the delegates having chosen to ‘protect the
larger public interest’ by keeping down the cost of international air carriage,
‘even at the expense of the relatively small number injured.’” Connaught Labs.
Ltd. v. British Airways (2002), 61 O.R. 3d 204, para. 48 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
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B. THE WARSAW CONVENTION’S JURISDICTIONAL REGIME
In the previous part, the general purpose of the Warsaw Con-
vention was identified. In this part, the jurisdictional regime of
the Convention will be examined. Given that this Article is pri-
marily concerned with jurisdictional subject matter and the
manner of its interpretation by the courts, it is especially impor-
tant to consider the policy objectives underpinning the Conven-
tion’s jurisdictional regime. Clearly, that regime is consonant
with the general purposes of the Convention, but there is also
some specificity of purpose to it which we must identify.
1. The Four Warsaw Jurisdictions
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides four bases
for identifying the States’ courts in which an action for damages
under the Convention may be brought, i.e., the potential fo-
rums. These are: (1) the place where the carrier is ordinarily a
resident; (2) the principal place of business of the carrier; (3)
the place where the carrier has a place of business (un établisse-
ment) through which the contract has been made; and (4) the
place of destination.83 In all cases, the place must be within the
territory of a Contracting State, and where there is more than
one possible forum, the choice lies with the plaintiff.84 The juris-
diction of these forums is mandatory and exclusive.85 In most
cases, a plaintiff is likely to have the choice of only two forums.
In some cases, the plaintiff may have no choice at all, i.e., where
all the bases point to the same place.86 What does this scheme
and the specific choice of places tell us about the drafters’ inten-
tions for the Warsaw Convention’s jurisdictional regime?
83 Article 28(1) provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place
of destination.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, art. 28(1).
84 Id.
85 See Rothmans of Pall Mall (Overseas) Ltd. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp.
[1981] QB 368 at 385 (CA) (Eng.) (Roskill LJ describing Article 28 as creating a
“self-contained code within the limits of which a plaintiff must found his
jurisdiction.”).
86 See, e.g., Roberts v. Guyana Airways Corp. (1998), 41 O.R. 3d 653 (Can. Ont.
Gen. Div.) (identifying Guyana as a forum under all four bases).
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The four chosen jurisdictions make it clear that the drafters
intended to ensure, as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, that there
would exist a strong connecting factor between the carrier and
the jurisdiction in question. This requirement was clearly satis-
fied by the first two jurisdictions as places where the carrier gen-
erally has its closest links.87 These would have provoked little
controversy, since they conform with a fundamental principle of
jurisdiction, i.e., actor sequitur forum rei. The contractual nexus
upon which the third jurisdiction was founded is obvious, and
there was a clear attempt to ensure that there exists a significant
business nexus between the place and the carrier through the
requirement of “un établissement.”88 The contractual nexus also
firmly underpins the fourth jurisdiction (i.e., the place of desti-
nation), since it is the contract of carriage that is decisive for
identifying this place.89 Anchoring jurisdiction to places inti-
mately connected to the contract of carriage promotes certainty
and predictability precisely because these places would have
been within the contemplation of the parties and can be objec-
tively established.
We can also tell much about the drafters’ intentions from the
places they did not choose to bestow jurisdiction upon. The
1925 Avant Projet included the place of the accident as one of
the bases for jurisdiction.90 Although its removal was proposed
at the CITEJA’s Second Commission (in April 1927),91 it re-
87 Indeed, in most cases these two jurisdictions coincide. A carrier’s principal
place of business will usually be in the same place as its place of incorporation or
domicile. Under the CITEJA final draft, there was a provision for jurisdiction at
the principal place of business (“le siège principal de l’exploitation”). See WARSAW
MINUTES, supra note 67, at 266. Czechoslovakia observed that this presupposed
the existence of the carrier as a company or corporation, and that it would not
cover those instances where a natural person provided carriage. Id. at 169. It was
for this reason that jurisdiction at the place of the domicile (ordinary residence)
of the carrier was provided. Id.
88 The meaning of “un établissement” has proven controversial in practice, and
there are diverging opinions between U.S. and French courts. For some discus-
sion, see GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 64, at 184–85.
89 Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, art. 1(2) (defining international carriage
as “any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination,” regardless of any breaks in
carriage, are located in the territories of two Contracting States).
90 CONFÉRENCE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PRIVÉ AÉRIEN, supra note 54, at 13.
91 At the second CITEJA session in April 1927, the report of the Second Com-
mission on the jurisdiction article of the draft convention explained that several
States had made observations with regard to jurisdiction, and that during the
deliberations, it had been agreed that the place of the accident seemed to be
unnecessary because it was only of interest to third parties. COMITÉ INTERNA-
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mained in the CITEJA final draft considered at Warsaw in 1929.
In the U.K.’s written submission to the Conference, it called for
removal of the place of the accident, arguing that it bore no
relationship to the contract of carriage, that it would not have
been contemplated by the parties as the place for litigation of
claims, and that it could not be presumed that the carrier would
have a business presence there.92 The U.K. also perceived a risk
of “blackmail”—a plaintiff could opt for the place of accident in
order to vex or harass the carrier into settling rather than face
the difficulties and expense of answering a claim in a distant
forum.93 During the Conference, the rapporteur explained that
the CITEJA had elected for the place of the accident because it
would provide a convenient forum from the perspective of es-
tablishing the circumstances of the accident (such as access to
evidence).94 The U.K. Delegate referred to the points raised in
its submission and elaborated by pointing out the fortuitous na-
ture of the location of the accident, indicating that it could re-
sult in a case being heard before courts that were “not at all
organized.”95 The Polish and Greek Delegates opposed the dele-
tion.96 For them, the place of the accident was a natural choice
of forum, and they supposed that, since the possible drawbacks
of some forums would also be detrimental to plaintiffs, this
would discourage them from pursuing litigation there in order
to vex the carrier.97 Speaking in support of the U.K. proposal,
the French Delegate opined that the place of the accident
would be justifiable in the case of a third party but not where a
contractual relationship existed between the parties.98 The Swiss
Delegate was also in support of removing the place of the acci-
dent, pointing out that where one is dealing with an organized
State, then reliance could be placed on the local authorities to
establish the circumstances of the accident, whereas if the State
is disorganized, then its forum would be objectionable in any
TIONAL TECHNIQUE D’EXPERTS JURIDIQUES AÉRIENS, COMPTE-RENDU DE LA DEUX-
IEME SESSION (5 AVRIL), at 65 (1927).
92 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 67, at 298.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 113.
95 Id. at 113–14.
96 Id. at 114–15.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 115.
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case.99 The British proposal was adopted, and the place of the
accident was removed from the Convention.100
What is noteworthy in this exchange is the recognition by the
other delegates that considerations of convenience and predict-
ability were controlling. As to the possibility of forum shopping,
this was neither expressly rejected nor accepted as a considera-
tion. The Polish and Greek Delegates instead regarded it as not
really being at issue. The main reason that the place of the acci-
dent was removed was because its raison d’être had been dimin-
ished by the observations of the Swiss Delegate. This is striking
given that the convenience posed by the location of evidence is
so frequently cited in FNC motions in aviation litigation.101 Yet
in 1929, the delegates had not felt that this convenience was
strong enough to guarantee jurisdiction at the place of the
accident.
The essential object being pursued via the jurisdictional
scheme was the same as the Warsaw Convention’s cardinal pur-
pose, i.e., to avoid conflict of laws though unification of certain
rules. The drafters chose to establish harmonized rules of juris-
diction. The key features of the scheme were: the guarantee of a
forum in a Contracting State, the centrality of the contract of
carriage, the requirement that the forum have a substantial busi-
ness connection to the carrier, and the limited number of possi-
ble forums. These key features reflected two core policy
considerations: first, the need to ensure legal certainty and pre-
dictability; and second, the desire to accommodate the interests
and convenience of the parties.
While certainty and predictability were of paramount impor-
tance, the drafters were keenly aware of the interests of the par-
ties, and this can be seen in the selection of the four
jurisdictions. It has been said that the four jurisdictions are car-
rier oriented and focus on the convenience of the carrier and
not the plaintiff.102 It is submitted that this is inaccurate. A bal-
99 Id. at 115–16.
100 Id. at 116.
101 See, e.g., King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir. 2007);
Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Air Crash
Over the South Indian Ocean, 352 F. Supp. 3d 19, 51 (D.D.C. 2018); Nolan v.
Boeing Co., 762 F. Supp. 680, 683 (E.D. La. 1989).
102 For instance, Mendelsohn and Lieux state:
Article 28 limits the fora in which the plaintiff may bring a cause of
action to the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. The
plaintiff may select the initial forum for the action, but is limited to
the four fora listed. These sites are all carrier-oriented, rather than
26 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
anced approach was taken that weighed the competing interests
of both carriers and plaintiff passengers (and shippers) against
the desire to secure the overriding goal of certainty and predict-
ability. The general scheme itself inherently benefits plaintiffs
because it grants them the initiative in choosing their forum (at
least where a choice exists). In addition, the third and fourth
jurisdictions are more beneficial to the plaintiff than they are to
the carrier. Carriers are disadvantaged because the place of des-
tination is more likely to expose them to litigation in a foreign
forum,103 whereas the fourth jurisdiction clearly benefits plain-
tiffs because it generally will coincide with their home forums.
It is safe to conclude that convenience and fairness to the par-
ties to litigation was an influential factor in the determination of
the Warsaw Convention’s jurisdictional scheme. However, its sig-
nificance should not be overstated. First, the third and fourth
plaintiff-oriented. The domicile or principal place of business of
the carrier, where the carrier has a place of business at which the
contract was made, or the place of destination, all focus primarily
upon the convenience of the carrier.
Allan I. Mendelsohn & Renée Lieux, The Warsaw Convention Article 28, the Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens, and the Foreign Plaintiff, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 75, 79
(2003).
103 This is also clear from a comparison between the Warsaw Convention’s
scheme and that of the contemporary international transport conventions: CIM
of 1890, CIM of 1924, and CIV of 1924. See Convention Internationale Con-
cernant le Transport des Marchandises par Chemins de Fer [International Con-
vention Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail], Oct. 14, 1890, 82 BSP 771
[hereinafter CIM 1890] (the CIM of 1890); Convention Internationale Con-
cernant le Transport des Marchandises par Chemins de Fer [International Con-
vention Concerning the Traffic of Goods by Rail], Oct. 23, 1924, 77 L.N.T.S. 367
[hereinafter CIM 1924] (the CIM of 1924); Convention Internationale Con-
cernant le Transport des Voyageurs et des Bagages par Chemins de Fer [Interna-
tional Convention Concerning the Transport of Passengers and Baggage by Rail],
Oct. 23, 1924, 78 L.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter CIV 1924] (the CIV of 1924). While
the Hague Conference on Private International Law on did not provide rules for
jurisdiction, the CIM and CIV of 1924 did. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 67, at
119–20 (explaining that the Hague Conference omitted questions of procedure).
Both the CIM and CIV of 1924 were based on the scheme provided under the
CIM of 1890, which gave a right of action to the plaintiff against either the first
carrier, the last carrier, or the intermediate carrier upon whose network the dam-
age was caused. See CIM 1890, supra, art. XXVII; CIM 1924, supra, art. 42(3); CIV
1924, supra, art. 42(2). The competent court was identified as the domicile of the
chosen defendant railway. CIM 1924, supra, art. 42(4); CIV 1924, supra, art. 42(3).
Therefore, the CIM and CIV both adhered to the classical position of actor se-
quitur forum rei. They provided the plaintiff with a choice of which defendant to
sue but not a choice of forum against that chosen defendant; the carrier always
had to be sued at its place of domicile. The Warsaw Convention was thus less
carrier oriented than the CIM or CIV.
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jurisdictions clearly contemplated exposing carriers to litigation
in foreign forums, which the drafters understood would entail
some inconvenience to carriers. Second, while the drafters em-
phasized the need to reflect the expectations of the parties to
the contract, the test employed to determine said expectations
was objective in nature. It looked to the contract of carriage and
not to the subjective intentions of the parties.104 This evidences
a preference for legal certainty over the flexibility afforded by a
subjective assessment. Third, the potential forums were limited
to a small number. More forums to choose from would have
offered the plaintiff a greater chance of a convenient forum, but
the drafters wisely opted for fewer. Nor was any rule for priority
between the four jurisdictions defined, from which it can be in-
ferred that relative convenience of the forums was not a consid-
eration. More likely, the drafters would have regarded each as
presumptively convenient and left prioritization to the plaintiff’s
choice. Lastly, in removing the place of the accident, the draft-
ers opted for predictability over convenience. Overall, the juris-
dictional scheme of the Warsaw Convention displays a strong
civilian sensibility as to the nomination of forums. Primacy was
given to legal certainty and predictability throughout, balanced
against the secondary concern for the interests of the parties.
2. Rules of Procedure
Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides: “Questions
of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which
the case is submitted.”105 That the forum legitimately selected by
the plaintiff from the choices available under Article 28(1)
should apply its own rules of procedure to the running of pro-
ceedings for a claim under the Convention would seem uncon-
troversial. However, this seemingly innocuous provision has
proved itself a source of controversy with respect to the availabil-
ity of FNC under both the Warsaw Convention and MC99. The
fundamental question asked has been whether the rules of pro-
104 In the Australian case of Gulf Air v. Fattouh, Judge Allsop (President of the
Court) explained that “the enquiry is as to what is the contractual place of desti-
nation, not as to what is, or would be, a place that a traveller might call his or her
destination, and not by reference to the individual subjective intention or pur-
pose of the passenger . . . .” Gulf Air Co GSC v Fattouh [2008] NSWCA 225 ¶ 62
(Court of Appeal) (Austl.); see also Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d
387, 389 (5th Cir. 1992); Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int’l Airlines, 211 N.Y.S.2d 208,
209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
105 Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, art. 28(2).
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cedure contemplated by Article 28(2) should be interpreted as
including the doctrine of FNC or should the plaintiff’s choice of
forum under Article 28(1) be preemptive and inviolable? In-
deed, this is the key issue to be examined in this Article.
There is no specific mention of FNC in the drafting history of
the Warsaw Convention, but there is a very brief mention of the
judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction. Commenting on the
CITEJA final draft, the U.K. made a proposal to include an addi-
tional paragraph in what would become Article 28, part of which
would state:
None of the stipulations of this Article shall be deemed to bind
any court whatsoever to hear a complaint which it would con-
sider, according to the principles of law and procedure in force
in the country to which the said court belongs, as contrary to the
rules of justice, or as irrelevant to be submitted to it.106
That the U.K. had the discretionary power to decline jurisdic-
tion in mind is clear from its commentary attached to the propo-
sal. It explained, “[a] stipulation of this nature would avoid all
interference in the discretionary power of courts, and would
give them more latitude to repress vexatious litigation, as in the
case where the ‘forum’ of another country would be naturally
indicated as being that where the debates should take place.”107
Had this proposal been adopted, there would be little doubt
that it would cover the doctrine of FNC. However, it was not
included in the final text of the Convention. All the minutes tell
us is that the British Delegate “did not insist” on the proposal;
his reasons for doing so were not revealed.108 Its noninclusion
has been taken as support for the argument that the drafters
intended that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be final, but
as shall be discussed below,109 it is ultimately inconclusive.
C. THE AVAILABILITY OF FNC WITHIN THE WARSAW
CONVENTION SYSTEM
Surprisingly, it was only in 1984 that the question of the availa-
bility of FNC under the Warsaw Convention first arose for con-
sideration by the courts. In Irish National Insurance Co. v. Aer
106 WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 67, at 298–99.
107 Id. at 299. In relation to a separate element of the proposed Article 26
(later Warsaw Article 28), the British voiced opposition to a provision that, in its
view, “would constitute . . . an interference with the discretionary powers of
courts in matters of procedure.” Id.
108 See id. at 169.
109 See infra notes 141–46, 189–91 and accompanying text.
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Lingus Teoranta, the question was asked whether a court was em-
powered to dismiss a case on FNC grounds under the Warsaw
Convention.110 On that occasion, the court in question was not
required to decide the matter.111 However, U.S. courts would
later make determinations on the question on three occasions:
(1) in a 1987 decision in the case of In re Air Crash Disaster Near
New Orleans;112 (2) in a 1999 decision in the case of In re Air
Crash Off Long Island;113 and (3) in 2002, in the case of Hosaka v.
United Airlines, Inc.114 In England, the Court of Appeal would
offer its perspective in 1996 in Milor Srl. v. British Airways Plc.115 It
is proposed to treat these cases by placing each of them into one
of two categories that correspond to the nature of the approach
to interpretation adopted, i.e., the literal approach or the com-
prehensive approach.
1. The Literal Approach
Under customary international law,116 the general rule is that
courts ought to approach the interpretation of a treaty’s provi-
sions by starting with its text.117 In so doing, a court must en-
deavor to give to the text its natural and ordinary meaning
within its context and in light of the treaty’s object and pur-
110 Irish Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 91 (2d Cir. 1984).
111 Id. (“Although amici curiae would have us hold that the district court could
not invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens to deprive appellant of this right
to litigate in the United States, we see no need to decide that issue in the instant
case.”).
112 821 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1987).
113 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
114 305 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2002).
115 [1996] QB 702 (CA) (Eng.).
116 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies
the general rule. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
117 When a court is faced with interpreting a provision of a treaty, it must first
start with the text; this is because, as the International Law Commission (ILC)
stated, “the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the inten-
tions of the parties . . . .” Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second
Part of Its Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1
(1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 220, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1966/Add.l [hereinafter Reports of the ILC]. As articulated by Jennings: “It
is the intention of the parties as expressed in the actual words agreed by them at
the moment of concluding the treaty that is in point. . . . The basic intention of
the parties is always to agree a text, and the text is therefore the only proper
approach to the intention of the parties.” R.Y. Jennings, General Course on Princi-
ples of International Law, in 121 RECUEIL DES COURS 323, 545 (1967).
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pose.118 As will now be shown, when it came to the interpreta-
tion of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, the courts in In re
Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans and In re Air Crash Off Long
Island began their analyses with the text of the Convention but
never strayed too far from there, taking an overly literal ap-
proach that failed to adequately consider the text in its context
and in light of the object and purpose of the Convention.
The plaintiffs in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans were
the families of Uruguayan passengers killed when Pan Am Flight
759 crashed shortly after takeoff from New Orleans.119 The
plaintiffs sought to resist the defendant’s motion for FNC dis-
missal, arguing that the phrase in Article 28, “at the option of
the plaintiff,” meant they were granted “the absolute and inal-
terable right to choose the national forum in which their claims
will be litigated.”120 The question, therefore, turned on the in-
terpretation to be given to that provision of the Warsaw
Convention.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made the following
statement defining the intention behind the drafting of Article
28(1):
Commentators are in general agreement that the delegates to
the Convention were concerned with limiting the locations in
which an air carrier would have to defend an action, with ensur-
ing that an injured party have an available forum in which to
redress his injuries, and with allowing the suit to be heard in a
forum that had some interest in the dispute.121
118 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) summarized the approach in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya case:
[I]n accordance with customary international law, reflected in Arti-
cle 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the or-
dinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. Interpretation must be based above
all upon the text of the treaty. As a supplementary measure re-
course may be had to means of interpretation such as the prepara-
tory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep.
6, ¶ 41 (Feb. 3). This was affirmed by the ICJ in Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 625, ¶ 37 (Dec. 17).
See also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶¶ 30–31 (Feb. 15).
119 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1150–51 (5th Cir.
1987).
120 Id. at 1161.
121 Id. (citing Carl E.B. McKenry, Jr., Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Con-
vention, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 205 (1963); Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendel-
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We will assess this below,122 but it is worth noting here that the
court’s assessment fails to mention the overarching goal of en-
suring certainty and predictability and makes no reference to
the interests of the carrier. With respect to Article 28(2), the
court was less concerned with the reasons for its inclusion, satis-
fied—without citing any authority—that it was included because
the delegates understood that the provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention would be “applied and adopted to a variety of legal sys-
tems.”123 The court understood this to mean that Article 28(2)
manifested the delegates’ intention not to interfere with the in-
ternal workings of the States’ legal systems on procedural mat-
ters. The interpretation of the text adopted by the court was that
Article 28(1) grants the plaintiff a choice of forum, with Article
28(2) making that choice subject to the procedural rules of the
chosen forum.124 In the court’s view, FNC is a procedural rule of
the legal system of the United States; therefore, it is available
under the Convention.125 The court might have left it there, but
instead, it stated: “We simply do not believe that the United States
through adherence to the Convention has meant to forfeit such
a valuable procedural tool as the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.”126
The significance attached by the court to the United States’
adherence is predicated on a number of assumptions. First, the
court assumed that FNC was a valuable procedural tool in 1934.
Second, in adhering to the Convention, the United States gave
consideration to, and had an understanding of, the status of
FNC therein. Third, even presupposing that the United States
understood that FNC would not be available, explanations none-
theless justifying U.S. adherence could not be found. However,
FNC was not the valuable procedural tool in 1934 that the court
sohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967);
Charles E. Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9 MCGILL
L.J. 352 (1963); Note, Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention: A Suggested Analysis, 50
MINN. L. REV. 697 (1966)).
122 See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
123 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1161.
124 The court stated: “The party initiating the action enjoys the perogative of
choosing between these possible national forums but that selection is not invio-
late. That choice is then subject to the procedural requirements and devices that
are part of that forum’s internal laws.” Id. The court cited a number of authori-
ties in support of this point, none of which involved FNC. See id. at 1161 & n.22.
The court felt these cases demonstrated the reluctance of U.S. courts to hold
national rules of procedure as unavailable under the Convention. Id.
125 Id. at 1161–62.
126 Id. at 1162 (first emphasis added).
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assumed it to be. In all likelihood, the United States gave no
consideration to its availability when adhering to the Conven-
tion, and even if it had, there are many compelling reasons why
it might have justified forfeiting it solely for Convention
claims.127
The second ground for the court’s decision was that ac-
cepting the plaintiffs’ interpretation of Article 28 would under-
mine the purpose of the Warsaw Convention’s provisions on
jurisdiction by allowing cases to be heard in forums without an
interest in the matter.128 This is dubious in the extreme. As
shown above,129 there is no evidence supporting the court’s view
that the forums were so chosen.130 They were not chosen for the
purpose of ensuring that the forum itself had an interest in the
dispute. Had the drafters had such a purpose in mind, then they
would surely have adopted the place of the accident as a possi-
ble forum. What the court’s approach amounted to was a read-
ing of Article 28 from a U.S. common law perspective,131
importing considerations of the relative appropriateness of the
available forums.132 Such an approach is inconsistent with the
text of the Convention, which imposes no hierarchy on the fo-
rums and explicitly grants the plaintiff a free choice.
127 Indeed, precedent for the U.S. Legislature excluding the option of FNC
exists. See United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 585–90 (1948).
128 The court opined that “[i]f we were to adopt the plaintiffs’ construction of
article 28(1) and ignore the language of article 28(2), American courts could
become the forums for litigation that has little or no relationship with this coun-
try.” In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1162.
129 See supra part II.B.1.
130 The court’s only support was a general reference to McKenry’s article on
Article 28. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1162. However,
what McKenry’s article shows is that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention chose
forums that would ensure a connection to the carrier and that would be within
the territory of a Contracting Party. McKenry, supra note 121, at 208–09, 217.
McKenry stated, of Article 28, that “[t]he main intent of this Article is to set forth
the courts which are competent forums for actions under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Four specific jurisdictional contacts are provided, three relating to the car-
rier, and the last based on place of destination.” Id. at 208.
131 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1160–61, 1161 n.21.
The court’s argumentation displays a distinct common law bias. Civilian law
courts exercise their jurisdiction on the fact of it having been vested in them by
the relevant legislative or constitutional instrument. The appropriateness of the
forum is not contemplated by the court itself, but if anything, it is presumed from
the fact of its vestiture. It is a feature of the common law that the relative appro-
priateness of the forums is considered, i.e., forum conveniens. See id. at 1158.
132 Id. at 1154, 1162. This is clear from the factual scenario the court provided
as illustration. See id. at 1162 n.23.
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Once the fact of U.S. adherence is dismissed and the dubious
account of the purposes of Article 28 exposed, the decision of
the Fifth Circuit in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans effec-
tively boils down to little more than a purely literal interpreta-
tion of Article 28. Although ultimately resting its decision on the
same grounds, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York in In re Air Crash Off Long Island did engage in a
somewhat broader interpretative analysis.133 The litigation in
that case had been initiated by the relatives of forty-five French
passengers who had died in the 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800.134
The defendants’ FNC motion was ultimately denied but not
before the question was raised regarding the availability of
FNC.135
The court summarized the plaintiffs’ contention as follows:
“the language of Article 28(1), considered in the context of the
Convention as a whole and of its drafting history, prohibits a
court from declining to exercise its jurisdiction in a case prop-
erly brought under Article 28(1).”136 The plaintiffs presented a
number of arguments to support their contention, one of which
was the precedent of United States v. National City Lines, a case in
which the U.S. Supreme Court considered the special jurisdic-
tion provisions of a federal act that prohibited a court from in-
terfering with the plaintiff’s choice of forum through the
application of FNC.137 The Long Island plaintiffs sought to draw
an analogy from that act to the Warsaw Convention, arguing
that it too established special jurisdiction rules that could not be
displaced by FNC.138 The court distinguished National City Lines
because, in that case, the Legislature had expressed a clear legis-
lative intent to preclude interference with the plaintiff’s choice
of forum.139 It held that the mere fact that the Warsaw Conven-
133 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 212–15 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
134 Id. at 209.
135 See id. at 218.
136 Id. at 213.
137 Id. at 213–14; see United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 587–89
(1948). Under the act in question, in addition to the general jurisdiction of the
court of the residence of the corporation, the plaintiff was given the choice of
pursuing the defendant corporation within any jurisdiction where the defendant
transacted business. See Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. at 579–80.
138 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
139 Id. at 213 (citing Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank
PLC, 155 F.3d 603, 608 (2d Cir. 1998); Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944
(1st Cir. 1991); Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam)).
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tion contains a special jurisdiction provision is not enough to
conclude that dismissal on grounds of FNC is precluded.140
Something more was required.
The missing element of the plaintiffs’ argument was the mani-
fest intention that a plaintiff’s choice of forum be inviolable
under the Warsaw Convention. They sought to supply this by
reference to the drafting history.141 In particular, the plaintiffs
relied on the lack of insistence by the British Delegate for inclu-
sion of the U.K.’s proposal for judicial discretion to decline ju-
risdiction.142 For the plaintiffs, this was proof that the delegates
had intended the choice of forum under Article 28(1) to be fi-
nal.143 The court, however, found the drafting history to be in-
conclusive.144 The court opined that the U.K.’s withdrawal of the
proposal may simply have been because it did not wish to im-
pose the procedural device on other signatories, understanding
that the U.K. and other States in which an FNC-like doctrine is a
feature could continue to apply it based on Article 28(2).145 It
did not “necessarily signify an intention by the drafters to pro-
hibit signatory nations for which the [FNC] doctrine was part of
[their] procedural law from employing that doctrine in a Con-
vention case.”146
The court’s reading of the drafting history led it to conclude
that “[n]othing in the discussion indicates a desire to restrict
defendant carriers to the fora listed in Article 28(1).”147 The
court meant that there was no suggestion that once a forum was
chosen, that choice was inviolable. In any case, the court’s obser-
vations on the drafting history were purely obiter dictum be-
cause the court based its finding on the literal interpretation of
Article 28. The language of Article 28(2) was clear; the court
determined that “[FNC] is a procedural tool available to U.S.
courts and thus squarely falls within the literal language of Arti-
140 Id. (“The fact that the Warsaw Convention has a special venue provision
does not, by itself, preclude the possibility of dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds.”).
141 Id. at 214.
142 Id.; see also infra part II.B.2.
143 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
144 Id.
145 Id. Likewise, the civil law drafters may have adopted Article 28(2) precisely
because they recognized that there were procedural rules in other systems with
which they were unfamiliar and did not wish to interfere. Id. at 214–15.
146 Id. at 214.
147 Id.
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cle 28(2).”148 Like in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, the
court argued that Article 28(1) had to be read in conjunction
with Article 28(2) and that the plaintiff’s choice of forum was
subject to the forum’s rules of procedure, which in the United
States includes FNC.149
The approach to treaty interpretation adopted by the two
courts might have been justified by a restrictive reading of the
Supreme Court’s judgment in Chan v. Korean Air Lines,150 but it
does not pass muster under the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.151 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides
that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”152
The context considered by the two courts in reaching their de-
terminations did not go beyond Article 28. Even in In re Air
Crash Off Long Island, where the plaintiffs asked the court to con-
sider the jurisdictional scheme in the context of the Warsaw
Convention as a whole and in light of its object and purpose, the
court did not do so and contained itself to the immediate con-
text of Article 28.153 In so doing, the courts failed to consider
the meaning of Article 28 in light of the Convention’s dual pur-
poses. Had the courts asked themselves how compatible FNC is
148 Id.
149 Id.; see supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
150 The court in In re Air Crash Off Long Island followed the precedent of a case
in its own district that had itself followed Chan to limit its interpretation to the
treaty’s text. In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (citing Am.
Home Assurance Co. v. Jacky Maeder (H.K.) Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 184, 188 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989);
Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1990))).
151 It is arguable however that the courts’ approach was not consistent with
contemporary Supreme Court authority on treaty interpretation in Chan. The
Supreme Court stated that in interpreting a treaty:
[A court] must thus be governed by the text—solemnly adopted by
the governments of many separate nations—whatever conclusions
might be drawn from the intricate drafting history that petitioners
and the United States have brought to our attention. The latter
may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous.
But where the text is clear, as it is here, we have no power to insert
an amendment.
Chan, 490 U.S. at 134 (citation omitted) (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392
(1985)). Even solely based on the strength of Chan’s rule, the courts in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans and In re Air Crash Off Long Island should have
adopted a broader approach to treaty interpretation.
152 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 31(1).
153 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 212–15.
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with the Warsaw Convention’s cardinal purpose of uniformity
and the supplementary purpose that involves the balancing of
interests between carriers, users, and plaintiffs, then their ability
to adopt the stance that the meaning of Article 28 is clear and
unambiguous would surely have been upset. Even the limited
context of Article 28 itself should have given the courts pause
for thought, but there the courts still failed to identify the pri-
mary purpose of the jurisdictional scheme, i.e., certainty and
predictability.
2. The Comprehensive Approach
The courts in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans and In re
Air Crash Off Long Island probably felt satisfied that, since the
ordinary meaning of the terms was clear, recourse to supple-
mentary means of interpretation, such as the drafting history
and background circumstances, was not required. In the context
of the Vienna Convention, it could be said that the courts did
not see any requirement to go beyond the general rule of inter-
pretation in Vienna Convention Article 31(1). On the face of it,
this seems plausible. Under Article 32 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, a court may have recourse to supplementary means of in-
terpretation in two defined circumstances: first, to “confirm the
meaning resulting from the application” of the general rule in
Article 31; and second, to “determine the meaning” where the
application of the general rule fails to produce an acceptable
meaning.154 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in an
advisory opinion in Admission of a State to the United Nations that
“there is no occasion to resort to preparatory work if the text of
a convention is sufficiently clear in itself.”155 This might have
given the courts in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans and In
re Air Crash Off Long Island a sense of vindication for their inat-
tentiveness to supplementary means of interpretation.
Even so, the courts would nevertheless have been permitted
by Vienna Convention Article 32 to have recourse to supplemen-
tary means of interpretation for the purpose of “confirming” the
meaning arrived at from the operation of the general rule in
154 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 32.
155 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations
(Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 57, at 63 (May 28).
In 1952, the ICJ maintained this position by claiming that “[i]f the relevant words
in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end
of the matter.” Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State
to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 8 (Mar. 3).
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Article 31—a paradoxical position confirmed by the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC).156 The courts elected not to do
so, and given that this recourse is couched in permissive rather
than mandatory terms, their decision to do so is defensible.
However, in the second set of circumstances, where the applica-
tion of the general rule leaves the meaning “ambiguous or ob-
scure” or where it “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd
or unreasonable,”157 supplementary means of interpretation
may be used to determine the meaning. This second scenario is
a strictly limited exception to the general rule of interpreta-
tion158 whereby the supplementary means play a more signifi-
cant role than that of mere confirmation; they may be used to
determine the meaning. As argued above,159 if properly applied,
the general rule of interpretation would result in the conclusion
that the meaning of Warsaw Convention Article 28 is ambigu-
ous. Therefore, recourse to supplementary means of interpreta-
tion was both valid and necessary. These means include the
travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the treaty’s conclu-
sion. It is not clear what is meant by the latter, but the ILC Spe-
cial Rapporteur understood it to mean “both the contemporary
156 The ILC justified this apparent contradiction between these above noted
precedents and Article 32 by arguing that the ICJ (and the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ)) had on numerous occasions referred to the travaux
préparatoires for confirmation of meaning and that not allowing recourse to these
sources “would be unrealistic and inappropriate.” Reports of the ILC, supra note
117, at 223. The ILC only cites one authority that clearly supports this view, in
which the PCIJ stated: “The preparatory work thus confirms the conclusion
reached on a study of the text of the Convention that there is no good reason for
interpreting Article 3 otherwise than in accordance with the natural meaning of
the words.” Id. (quoting Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning
Employment of Women During the Night, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 50, at 380 (Nov. 15)). The other authority cited by the ILC is not so
unequivocal, where the PCIJ stated: “As the bonds themselves are not ambiguous,
there is no occasion for reference to the preliminary documents. But if these are
examined, it will appear that they tend to confirm the agreement for gold pay-
ments.” Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr./Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, at 30 (July
12).
157 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 32.
158 “The Court has recognized this exception to the rule that the ordinary
meaning of the terms must prevail.” Reports of the ILC, supra note 117, at 223
(citing Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 11, at 39 (May 16); Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission
of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. at 8).
159 See supra part II.C.1.
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circumstances and the historical context in which the treaty was
concluded.”160
How then would a more complete application of the general
rule of treaty interpretation and recourse to supplementary
means of interpretation resolve the critical question of the appli-
cability of FNC within the Warsaw Convention? The English
Court of Appeal wrestled with this question in Milor.161
Plaintiff Milor sought to resist an FNC stay, arguing that War-
saw Article 28 gave plaintiffs “the right to select within which of
the competent jurisdictions their claim will be tried, and that
accordingly there is no scope for the application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.”162 Much of the argument turned on
the meaning to be given to the word “bring” in the context of
Article 28.163 Did it merely mean the right to initiate proceed-
ings in the forum, or did its meaning cover both initiation and
resolution of proceedings? Making reference to the French text
of Article 28, Lord Justice Phillips (later President of the Su-
preme Court of the United Kingdom) noted that the word used
is “portée,” and he contrasted this with the use of the word “in-
tentée” in Article 29—both translated into English as
“brought.”164 For Lord Justice Phillips, this was significant; in his
view, intentée carried the restrictive meaning of merely initiating
proceedings, whereas portée carried the meaning of commencing
and pursuing.165 Lord Justice Phillips favored the latter mean-
ing, stating:
To give a plaintiff the option to chose in which of a number of
competent jurisdictions to commence his suit is to give him noth-
ing. . . . If the option granted by article 28 is to have value, it must
be an option to the plaintiff to decide in which forum his claim is
to be resolved.166
The operation of FNC would be inconsistent with this right.
There is much to commend in this line of argument, even if
160 Third Report on the Law of Treaties, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167 (1964),
reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 5, 59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/
ADD.1 (footnote omitted). The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case is cited by Harris as an
example. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 842 (6th ed.
2004) (citing Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93
(July 22)).
161 Milor Srl. v. British Airways Plc. [1996] QB 702 (CA) (Eng.).
162 Id. at 706.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 707.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 706–07.
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there is also some hyperbole to suggesting that plaintiffs are
given nothing because their choice may be subject to a rule of
procedure. For Lord Justice Phillips, the crux of the matter was
whether the drafters intended to bestow a substantive right on
plaintiffs to absolutely determine the forum for resolution of
their claims under the Convention.
The court thought the natural meaning of Article 28 was not
so unambiguous that reference to extrinsic considerations need
not be made.167 So, it looked beyond the natural meaning of the
text in its context and examined the object of the Convention,
its drafting history, and historical background. Agreement was
expressed with the trial judge’s opinion that the object of the
Convention, as far as jurisdiction was concerned, was to harmo-
nize national views on jurisdiction, i.e., to establish uniform-
ity.168 Support for this position was found in Rothmans, where
the court described Article 28 as creating a “self-contained
code.”169 Lord Justice Phillips understood this to mean that the
object of the Convention’s jurisdictional provisions was to estab-
lish a uniform regime that would be self-reliant and indepen-
dent of the substantive law of the individual national legal
systems. On this view, if the parties had intended FNC to apply
within this “self-contained code,” then they would surely have
made express provision for it. That they did not do so not only
reflected the desire for uniformity but also the fact that FNC was
not an established doctrine in all common law countries in
1929, and it would have been unknown to many civilian jurists.
In light of its purpose and in the context of its historical back-
ground, the following conclusions were reached:
I think it would be surprising if the high contracting parties had
preserved to that small minority of countries which applied the
doctrine of forum non conveniens a power to affect the choice of
the forum in which a dispute should be tried by a process un-
known to the majority of the parties. It seems to me that the juris-
dictional code that was agreed in the form of article 28 aimed at
providing the plaintiff with a limited choice of competent juris-
dictions, each of which to a greater or lesser degree was likely to
be appropriate for the bringing of a claim. It was implicit that the
court of the chosen forum would remain seised of the matter,
trying it in accordance with its own rules of procedure, and there
167 Id. at 707.
168 Id. at 707–08.
169 Id. at 708 (citing Rothmans of Pall Mall (Overseas) Ltd. v. Saudi Arabian
Airlines Corp. [1981] QB 368, 385 (CA) (Eng.)).
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was no scope for an individual court to impose a venue that con-
flicted with the plaintiff’s choice.170
The U.S. authorities supporting the availability of the doctrine
were very briefly considered, but their reasoning was not
thought compelling.171 The conclusion thus reached by the
Court of Appeal was that FNC is not available under the Warsaw
Convention; a plaintiff’s choice of forum under Article 28 is
absolute.172
Lord Justice Phillips’s concept of a “self-contained code” on
jurisdiction appears to be at variance with the text of Article
28(2), which provides that matters of procedure will be deter-
mined by the procedural law of the chosen forum.173 As far as
procedural law is concerned, the code is not at all self-con-
tained. Lord Justice Phillips was clearly aware of this. This appar-
ent inconsistency is reconcilable once it is understood that his
essential point was that the drafters intended to bestow upon
the plaintiff a substantive right to choose a forum and have the
dispute determined there. Yes, Article 28(2) provides for the ap-
plication of the forum’s rules of procedure, but in light of the
Convention’s cardinal purpose of achieving uniformity, it would
be inconsistent to allow such a rule of procedure to undermine
the substantive right of Article 28(1). The validity of the deci-
sion in Milor rests entirely on the nature of the substantive right
intended under Article 28(1). Was that right limited to the
choice of forum, or did it also include the right to have the dis-
pute resolved in that forum? If it is the latter, then the reference
to national rules of procedure in Article 28(2) must be inter-
preted as precluding FNC; otherwise, Article 29(2) would con-
flict with the substantive provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Decided in 2002, Hosaka concerned claims made by forty-six
Japanese tourists for injuries (as well as one fatality) suffered
during severe turbulence encountered while traveling with
United Airlines from Tokyo to Hawaii.174 The trial court dis-
170 Id. at 708–09.
171 Id. at 709–10. The court also referred to a case of the Singapore Court of
Appeal, which had applied the doctrine in a Warsaw Convention case. Id. at 710
(citing Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR
776 (CA) (Sing.)).
172 Id. (stating that Lord Justice Phillips considered “that article 28 of the War-
saw Convention leaves no scope for a challenge to the jurisdiction on the
grounds of forum non conveniens . . . .”).
173 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 25, art. 28(2).
174 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2002).
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missed on grounds of FNC, giving the Ninth Circuit the oppor-
tunity to weigh in on the question of the availability of FNC.175
Starting with the text of Article 28, Judge Fisher concluded
that the text was ambiguous; the fact that two plausible interpre-
tations were possible, as illustrated by the conflicting positions
between the U.S. courts176 and the English court in Milor,177 was
proof enough for Judge Fisher.178
With the text alone not being sufficient to provide the answer,
the court turned to Supreme Court precedent from Tseng, Chan,
and Saks to guide its interpretation of the Warsaw Conven-
tion,179 and it looked to other sources to discover the meaning
of Article 28. This involved looking to the purposes of the Con-
vention, its drafting history, and the post-ratification under-
standing of the parties whilst attempting “to give the specific
words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expec-
tations of the contracting parties.”180
Following precedent, the court identified the two purposes of
the Warsaw Convention as: (1) “uniformity of rules governing
claims arising from international air transportation”;181 and (2)
balance between the interests of air carriers and those of passen-
gers.182 This sought after uniformity extended to matters of ju-
risdiction; the court opined that “[b]y including an article
addressing jurisdiction, the signatories manifested their intent
to create not just uniform rules of liability, but also uniform
rules of jurisdiction.”183 Quoting approvingly from Milor, Judge
Fisher identified the purpose of the jurisdictional rules con-
175 Id.
176 Id. at 995 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147,
1161 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
177 Id. at 994. Judge Fisher regarded Milor as being entitled to considerable
weight. Id. at 995 n.5. However, he declined to adopt the Milor textual analysis of
the authentic French version that distinguished between the terms portée and in-
tentée. Id. at 995–96. Judge Fisher’s reading of the French–English dictionary en-
tries for portée and intentée did not yield the same conclusion. Id. at 996. He
doubted the meaning attributed to portée as requiring “that the action must be
litigated to conclusion in the forum selected by the plaintiff.” Id.
178 Id. at 994–96.
179 Id. at 993–94 (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167
(1999); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989); Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
180 Id. at 994 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 399).
181 Id. at 996 (quoting Tseng, 525 U.S. at 169).
182 Id. at 997 (citing Tseng, 525 U.S. at 170).
183 Id. at 996.
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tained in Article 28(1) as being aimed at creating a “self-con-
tained code on jurisdiction” that sought to harmonize the rules
of jurisdiction.184 FNC would undermine this harmony and uni-
formity because plaintiffs could find their right to choose their
forum denied before the courts of one Contracting State yet rec-
ognized in another.185 Additionally, the doctrine of FNC is itself
“vague and discretionary” and therefore “unlikely to produce
uniform results.”186
In light of the dual purpose of the Warsaw Convention, the
court took the view that by limiting the number of forums availa-
ble to a plaintiff and balancing that against the plaintiff’s right
to choose, the drafters were conferring a benefit on the passen-
ger (echoing the view of Lord Justice Phillips in Milor).187 This
benefit was to be understood as part of the balance struck be-
tween passenger and carrier. The court reached the view that
“[p]ermitting defendants to utilize forum non conveniens to
cancel out the plaintiff’s choice would undermine this balance
just as it would undermine uniformity,” concluding that “[t]he
doctrine of forum non conveniens is inconsistent with the Con-
vention’s dual purposes of uniformity and balance.”188
Moving then to the drafting history, the court considered the
U.K. proposal to include wording relating to discretion to de-
cline jurisdiction.189 Like the court in In re Air Crash Off Long
Island, it considered the possible reasons for not including the
U.K. proposal in the final draft of the Convention, but it deter-
mined that nothing conclusive could be established.190 How-
ever, the court stopped short of dismissing the U.K. proposal as
irrelevant. Instead, it determined that the proposal suggested
that the delegates at the Warsaw Conference were aware of FNC
and that they did not see Article 28(2) as silently incorporating
nor acquiescing to it.191 When further considered against the
historical context of the Convention’s drafting, implicit incorpo-
ration of FNC under Article 28(2) was even more difficult to
accept because, with the exception of the U.K., the drafters
184 Id. at 997 (quoting Milor Srl. v. British Airways Plc. [1996] QB 702 at 707
(CA) (Eng.)).
185 Id.
186 Id. (first quoting United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 581
(1948); and then quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 997–98.
190 Id. at 998.
191 Id.
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hailed from predominantly civilian legal systems where FNC was
unknown.192 Judge Fisher thought it would be unreasonable and
unlikely to assume that the majority of drafters would have ac-
quiesced to the application of FNC under Article 28(2).193 He
thought that if the drafters intended this doctrine to apply, then
they would surely have made express provision for it.194 Faced
with a choice between interpretations that would either permit
or prohibit FNC in circumstances where the majority of the
drafters hailed from jurisdictions where such a doctrine was all
but unknown, Judge Fisher was not prepared to adopt a con-
struction of Article 28(2) that “would be controversial for most
signatory countries.”195
The next port of call for the consideration of extrinsic means
of interpretation was the post-ratification understanding of the
parties and any decisions of other courts.196 Judge Fisher did not
think the travaux of MC99 was helpful for discerning the inten-
tions of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention.197 He was not
persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in In re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near New Orleans precisely because that court did not have
the benefit of the Milor decision nor had it considered the pur-
pose, drafting history, and post-ratification understanding of the
parties.198 Having completed the consideration of extrinsic
guides to interpretation, the court came to the same conclusion
as Milor, i.e., FNC is not available under the Warsaw Conven-
192 Id. at 999.
193 Id. (“Following these rules of construction, we do not infer from the treaty’s
incorporation of local procedural law that the drafters acquiesced in the applica-
tion of forum non conveniens, a concept that was (and is) both alien to and
unwelcome by the majority of the contracting parties.”).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 998 (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552
(1991)). Judge Fisher cited Zicherman and Floyd, noting that the Supreme Court
had refused to adopt interpretations of the Warsaw Convention that would have
been “discordant or offensive to the majority of signatories.” Id. (citing
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 223 (1996); Floyd, 499 U.S. at
540).
196 See id. at 999–1002.
197 Id. at 1001.
198 Id. at 1002.
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tion.199 The Supreme Court declined to review Hosaka on
appeal.200
3. Concluding Remarks
Should the plaintiff’s choice of forum be conditioned on the
application of local rules of procedure? Or should those local
rules of procedure be constrained by the jurisdictional scheme
providing the plaintiff the choice of forum? To put this another
way, must Article 28(2) be read as constrained by the jurisdic-
tional scheme provided by Article 28(1)? These are questions
for which we are now in a position to provide some answers.
Although the general rule of interpretation under the Vienna
Convention requires a court to start with the text, the court is
not permitted to limit itself solely to the terms of the provision
in question. It must consider context and purpose. If one took
Article 28(2) in isolation, then it could be logically concluded
that FNC is available where it forms part of the procedural law
of the forum seized of an action under the Warsaw Convention.
However, even the most immediate context of Article 28(2), i.e.,
that provided by Article 28(1), must raise a doubt as to the ex-
tent to which rules of procedure may be relied upon to disturb
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
These doubts are only intensified by consideration of the ob-
ject and purpose, not only of the jurisdictional provisions them-
selves but also of the Convention as a whole. As defined
earlier,201 the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention is the
avoidance of conflict of laws through unification of certain rules
relating to carriage documentation and air carrier liability; let us
refer to this as the uniformity goal. This purpose is confirmed by
the historical context that shows that the legal status of the air
carrier within the existing regimes of le droit commun was uncer-
tain, and the introduction of statutory solutions by various States
produced substantial nonuniformity. The supplementary pur-
pose of the Convention was the furtherance of the public inter-
est in the development of air transport while striking an
equitable balance of interests between carriers, users, and plain-
199 Id. at 1003–04. (Judge Fisher concluded: “[T]he contracting parties did not
intend to permit the plaintiff’s choice of national forum to be negated by the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. We therefore hold that Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention precludes a federal court from dismissing an action on the
ground of forum non conveniens.”).
200 United Airlines, Inc. v. Hosaka, 537 U.S. 1227 (2003).
201 See supra part II.A.3.
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tiffs;202 let us refer to this as the balance-of-interests goal. To-
gether these can be understood as providing the general
purposes of the Warsaw Convention. The jurisdictional scheme
of the Convention also serves specific purposes, primarily, the
harmonization of jurisdictional rules. Supplementary to which,
the drafters, in defining the jurisdictional scheme, gave primacy
to legal certainty and predictability, but they balanced this with
regard to the interests of the parties to litigation. With the for-
mer (harmonization), the drafters followed the Convention’s
cardinal purpose. With the latter (certainty and predictability),
the jurisdictional scheme explicitly followed the supplementary
purpose of the Convention by ensuring an equitable balance of
interests.
The application of a discretionary doctrine that operates to
displace the plaintiff’s choice of forum in preference for the de-
fendant’s choice of forum, on the face of it, offends both the
uniformity goal and the balance-of-interests goal as well as the
specific purposes of the jurisdictional scheme. However, it is im-
portant not to overestimate the reach of uniformity in the con-
text of the Warsaw Convention. How exactly does FNC offend
uniformity? In one obvious way, FNC means the treatment of
jurisdiction in a Warsaw Convention case will be different de-
pending on whether the court seized applies FNC or not. In this
sense, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is worth less and therefore
does not carry a uniform value amongst the courts of Con-
tracting States. But that can be said for any rule of substance or
procedure that differs from one jurisdiction to the next. For ex-
ample, the Warsaw Convention does not define damages. For
the most part, it is left to le droit commun to determine the recov-
erable heads of damage.203 As a consequence, a plaintiff who
sues under Swedish law will not be able to recover the same
range of heads of damage available under U.S. law. But we do
not impugn this lack of uniformity as a breach of the Conven-
tion’s goals and purpose. This is because one must show that the
uniformity that is being undermined by le droit commun is one
which the Convention intended to establish. Uniformity in the
context of the Warsaw Convention was pursued to ensure legal
certainty and predictability. Undoubtedly, FNC disturbs legal
certainty and predictability. But the extent of this disturbance is
greatly mitigated by the Warsaw Convention’s limited number of
202 See supra part II.A.2.
203 See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 170 (1999).
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possible forums. While plaintiffs are deprived of the certainty of
knowing that their own choice of forum is final, they are assured
that their cases will be heard in one of the other forums availa-
ble under the Warsaw Convention. This is because even in the
case of FNC dismissal, the alternative forum must be one of
those identified by Article 28.204
From the other point of view, the strongest argument against
the inconsistency of FNC within the Warsaw Convention is the
literal interpretation of Article 28(2). Another argument is that
the goal of uniformity pursued by the Warsaw Convention is
only partial. Clearly, the Warsaw Convention did not seek to se-
cure absolute uniformity of rules; the drafters sought only to
unify “certain rules.” They maintained throughout that only
matters essential to a treaty on private aeronautical law should
be within its scope, and that they did not wish to encroach on
matters of general private international law or questions of pro-
cedure.205 Read in this light, Article 28(2) appears as an affirma-
tion of that intention. However, by including a bespoke
jurisdictional scheme, the drafters undoubtedly intended to reg-
ulate this area of law within the context of international carriage
by air. Thus, the question still remains as to what extent they
intended to regulate jurisdiction.
The drafters were conscious that the adoption of a fault-based
theory of liability with a low limitation of liability was fundamen-
tally pro-carrier.206 However, contrary to what is often assumed,
this was not done in order to directly protect the interests of
carriers but rather in furtherance of the public interest in the
development of air transport. The purpose of the Convention
was not only to protect the carrier per se but also to promote the
public interest in air transport to the extent necessary.207 The
drafters were keenly aware that the basic regime favored carriers
at the expense of plaintiffs, and they made a number of conces-
sions to the latter in order to provide for an equitable balancing
of interests. The jurisdictional scheme of the Warsaw Conven-
tion must be examined in light of this context. Having estab-
lished the basic liability regime, the drafters were of a mindset to
make concessions to the plaintiff. The jurisdictional scheme is
reflective of this mindset, and it is submitted that the drafters
204 See infra note 432 and accompanying text.
205 See supra part II.A.1.
206 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 499–500.
207 See id.
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would have looked dimly on granting further benefits to the car-
rier at the expense of the plaintiff where not justified by the
public interest.
The drafters of the Warsaw Convention hailed almost entirely
from civilian law jurisdictions for which the competence of a
court was obligatory, and thus, where the concept of judicial dis-
cretion to decline jurisdiction did not exist. Generally speaking,
FNC is anathema to the civilian lawyer. Bearing this historical
context in mind, it is eminently more likely that the drafters
would have intended that the right to choose the forum in
which to bring an action against a carrier would amount to a
substantive right for plaintiffs to determine the forum in which
their claims would be settled. The possible forums ensured a
significant business connection to the carrier in whichever fo-
rum it was sued, whereas the convenience of the plaintiff was
principally served by having the initiative in choosing the forum.
FNC would upset this balance of interests in favor of the defen-
dant carrier. The desire to secure legal certainty and predictabil-
ity for the parties outweighed considerations of convenience,
and no effort was made by the drafters to inject considerations
of relative convenience into their jurisdictional scheme. The
idea that the choice of forum provided under Article 28(1)
could be disturbed by a discretionary rule for declining jurisdic-
tion, whose sine qua non is relative convenience, would not have
been within the contemplation of the drafters.
The issue ultimately boils down to a simple question: Would
the drafters have considered FNC, as invoked per Article 28(2),
to be inconsistent with the right granted under Article 28(1)? It
is submitted that the answer to this question is yes. The drafters
intended to grant plaintiffs a substantive right to choose the fo-
rum in which their actions would be resolved and that this right
should be inviolable. The employment of a rule of procedure by
which the chosen forum exercises its discretion to decline the
jurisdiction granted to it under the Convention is inconsistent
with that right.
As codified by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, customary
international law provides that a contracting party to a conven-
tion is under a duty to perform its obligations thereunder in
good faith, and as codified by Article 27 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, a State may not invoke provisions of its internal law as justi-
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fication for its failure to perform.208 The rule of Article 26 is also
referred to as “pacta sunt servanda.”209 In the simplest of terms,
this means that the parties to a treaty are obliged not to defeat
the object and purpose of that treaty.210 In the context of the
Warsaw Convention, a Contracting State would, as a matter of
good faith, be precluded from applying a doctrinal principle
such as FNC in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under
the Convention. Given that Article 28(1) must be interpreted as
giving plaintiffs the absolute right to choose the forum for the
resolution of their claims, Article 28(2) must be read as preclud-
ing the application of FNC. Indeed, this has been the position
reached by the stronger judicial authorities, i.e., Milor and
Hosaka.211
Hosaka spelled the death knell for FNC under the Warsaw
Convention within the Ninth Circuit, and it seriously under-
mined its continued availability for Warsaw claims in other U.S.
circuits. The great irony of the Hosaka decision was that it came
just two years after the U.S. Delegate at the Montreal Confer-
ence in 1999 had been allaying the fears of other States (regard-
ing the fifth jurisdiction), stating that the application of the
doctrine of FNC by U.S. courts would continue to restrict forum
shopping.212 The irony is that while the U.S. Delegate was hold-
ing up FNC as the saving grace for what was the most hotly de-
bated issue at the Montreal Conference, one of the United
States’ own courts was in the process of whipping it away. Even
208 See MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 124–25 (5th ed. 2003); see also
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 20–21 (Apr. 6); Treat-
ment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the
Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 23–24
(Feb. 4).
209 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 26. There are, in fact, two interre-
lated principles: first, that a treaty must be followed, and second, that it must be
performed in good faith. Id. Strictly speaking, the former is the rule of pacta sunt
servanda.
210 See Manfred Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in
Our Time, in 168 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 190–91 (1980). “As the guarantor of pacta
sunt servanda, good faith impregnates every treaty with sense and value, and may
even overcome any formal deficiencies to preserve the intended utility of an in-
strument.” Id. at 198 (footnote omitted).
211 See Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2002);
Milor Srl. v. British Airways Plc. [1996] QB 702 (CA) (Eng.).
212 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Commis-
sion of the Whole, at 11 (May 17, 1999), in I INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR
LAW (CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE BY AIR), MONTREAL: MINUTES 98, 108, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2 (1999)
[hereinafter MC99 MINUTES].
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before MC99 came into effect, the Hosaka decision had effec-
tively undermined one of the key components that had paved
the way for MC99’s agreement. The question that was inevitably
going to arise therefore was whether or not FNC would be avail-
able under MC99.
III. MONTREAL: NEW DEAL, SAME OLE PROBLEM
A. THE NEW DEAL
Time inevitably pulled at the loose threads of WCS, and ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction with the regime became more fre-
quent and vociferous, especially from within the United States.
As air transport blossomed, the underlying policy justifications
for protecting the industry ebbed away, and the balance of inter-
ests agreed to in 1929 became harder and harder to justify. This
was exacerbated by the low limits of liability, which had been
eaten away by inflation. Discontent led to attempts to remedy
the situation, and the Warsaw Convention evolved into WCS.
However, the result was a system which was fragmented, disuni-
fied, and the subject of conflicting jurisprudence.213 With the
emergence of private intercarrier agreements and other re-
gional initiatives,214 this disunification was on the verge of caus-
ing the disintegration of WCS.215 The time had come for the
international community to take collective and decisive action,
and it was decided that concerted action should be taken
through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
with the aim of producing a new instrument in order to ensure
worldwide uniformity.
1. Background
The drafting history of MC99 followed a rather convoluted
and unorthodox course.216 On November 15, 1995, the ICAO
213 See P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE
72–74 (2003).
214 The private law instruments of the Japanese initiative and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Intercarrier Agreements
threatened the global reach of WCS. Id. at 73. As Haanappel observed, MC99 was,
at least in part, an attempt to officialize and globalize the Japanese and IATA
initiatives. Id. at 74.
215 See id. at 72–73.
216 So unprecedented was it that Milde and Dempsey claim that the established
procedures for the preparation of a draft convention were jettisoned by ICAO for
the first time, with the result that “the procedure became far less transparent and
representative, did not offer to all ICAO member States an opportunity to voice
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Council decided to amend the General Work Programme of the
Legal Committee to provide for the modernization of WCS and
to allow for a Secretariat Study Group (SSG) to be established to
assist the Legal Bureau in developing a mechanism by which
such modernization could be accelerated.217 The SSG met in
February 1996, and submitted a report to the Council that rec-
ommended the development of a new instrument to consolidate
and modernize WCS.218 The Warsaw Convention was to be taken
as the starting point, and useful elements of the various subse-
quent instruments of WCS were to be incorporated.219 The
hoped for result would be a consolidation and modernization of
WCS.220
In early 1996, the ICAO Council considered the recommen-
dations of the SSG and referred them to the Legal Committee
that was to have the Legal Bureau (with the assistance of the
SSG) develop a draft.221 The Council referred the draft to the
Legal Committee, which appointed a rapporteur to review and
revise it.222 The Rapporteur’s report detailed the need for a new
deal to replace the one struck in Warsaw in 1929.223 It was gener-
their views, and was heavily subject to the ‘discretion’ of the President of the
Council.” PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER
LIABILITY: THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999, at 38 (2005).
217 See ICAO, Council Decision C-DEC 146/3 (Nov. 15, 1995), in III INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW (CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN
RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR), MONTREAL: PREPARATORY MATERIAL
129, 129, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2 (1999) [hereinafter MC99 PREPARATORY
MATERIAL].
218 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Report on Modernization of the “Warsaw
System,” at 1–2, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10381 (Mar. 5, 1996), in MC99 PREPARATORY
MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 1, 1–2.
219 Id. at 1 app. at A-10, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 16.
220 This was the first of the goals of MC99, as recognized by its preamble, which
expressly states the need “to modernise and consolidate” WCS. See Bin Cheng,
The 1999 Montreal Convention on International Carriage by Air Concluded on the Seven-
tieth Anniversary of the 1929 Warsaw Convention (Part I), 49 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR LUFT-
UND WELTRAUMRECHT [ZLW] 287, 292 (2000). For an excellent account of the
manner in which MC99 modernized WCS, see generally id.
221 See ICAO, Council Decision C-DEC 147/15, at 1 (Mar. 15, 1996), in MC99
PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 131, 131.
222 See id.
223 The Rapporteur’s new deal would seek to “marry desirability and accepta-
bility” and follow a guiding principle of “fairness, not only to consumers but also
as between them and the carriers and the Governments which will be called upon
to endorse any new Convention.” ICAO, Modernization of the “Warsaw System” –
Rapporteur’s Report and Matters Relating to the 30th Session of the Legal Committee, at 1
app. at A-15, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10576 (Mar. 7, 1997), in MC99 PREPARATORY MA-
TERIAL, supra note 217, at 49, 67.
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ally accepted that the need to protect an infant industry was no
longer a legitimate justification and that the applicable limits
were indefensibly low for many jurisdictions.224 However, some
key issues were still hotly contested within the Legal Committee,
and this dissuaded the ICAO Council from calling a diplomatic
conference.225 Instead, the Council circulated the latest draft to
States and international organizations for comment.226 Prefer-
ring to have these outstanding matters resolved prior to conven-
ing a conference, the ICAO Secretariat recommended not only
further sessions of the SSG but also the establishment of an ex-
pert panel.227 This panel was created by the Council and named
the Special Group on the Modernization and Consolidation of
the “Warsaw System” (SGMW).228
The SGMW convened April 14–18, 1998.229 The hope was that
by having the “flexibility to consider the political, economic and
legal aspects of the problems at hand,”230 the SGMW would be
able to resolve the outstanding issues.231 The conclusions or rec-
ommendations of the SGMW would not be final but would be
presented to the Council for a final decision.232 The SGMW re-
fined the text on several points.233 A report234 and an approved
224 Id. at A-7, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 59.
225 See ICAO, Modernization of the “Warsaw System,” at 2, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10688
(Nov. 24, 1997), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 105, 106.
226 Id. at 1, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 105.
227 The rationale given was that the outstanding issues were not solely legal but
also ones of policy and that the input of such a panel “may add an element of
governmental representation to the process, without unduly delaying the comple-
tion of a refined draft.” Id. at 2, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217,
at 106.
228 ICAO, Modernization of the “Warsaw System,” at 1, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10862
(May 27, 1998), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 109, 109. The
SGMW consisted of thirty-nine delegates from eighteen Contracting States, five
members of the SSG (who attended as advisors), seven observers from four Con-
tracting States, and three international organizations. Id. at 2, in MC99 PREPARA-
TORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 110.
229 Id.
230 ICAO, Council Decision C-DEC 152/8, at 1 (Nov. 27, 1997), in MC99 PREPARA-
TORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 141, 141.
231 See ICAO, Modernization of the “Warsaw System,” supra note 228, at 1–2, in
MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 109–10.
232 ICAO, Council Decision C-DEC 152/8, supra note 230, at 1, in MC99 PREPARA-
TORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 141.
233 For a summary of these points, see ICAO, Final Report of the Special Group on
the Modernization and Consolidation of the “Warsaw System” (SGMW/1), at 2-1 to 2-20
(May 27, 1998), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 225, 237–56.
234 See generally id. at i-1 to A6-3, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note
217, at 233–89.
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text of the Convention235 were sent to the ICAO Council, which
then took the decision to convene the Diplomatic Conference
in Montreal in May 1999.236
It was clear from early on in the Conference that “[S]tates
were not prepared to commit themselves on particular key is-
sues until the central matters of the passenger liability regime
and the ‘fifth’ jurisdiction had been resolved.”237 In order to
achieve that, it was acknowledged that a smaller, dedicated
group should be created to deal with the matters that could not
be resolved by the Commission of the Whole.238 This group, the
Friends of the Chairman’s Group (FCG), was to conduct a care-
ful and thorough analysis of the issues with a view toward find-
ing common ground on key liability issues upon which a
consensus could be built.239 The FCG produced a consensus
package that was subsequently adopted by the Conference and
formed the heart of MC99.240
Regarding the liability regime for passenger death and bodily
injury, MC99 consists of a two-tier system: strict liability for the
carrier, up to 128,821 Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and pre-
sumed-fault liability for claims in excess of that amount.241 In
235 ICAO, Modernization of the “Warsaw System,” supra note 228, at 1 app. at A-1
to A-16, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 113–28 (approved
text entitled Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air).
236 ICAO, Council Decision C-DEC 154/7, at 1–2 (June 4, 1998), in MC99 PREPAR-
ATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 143, 143–44.
237 Anthony G. Mercer, The 1999 Montreal Convention: An Airline Perspective, 27
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 451, 457–58 (2002). For the account of Mercer, a member
of New Zealand’s Delegation at Montreal, see generally id.
238 See id. at 458, 474.
239 ICAO, Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, at 1
(May 25, 1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 199. This core package
consisted of the key liability provisions governing death and injury to passengers,
exoneration, compensation in case of death or injury of passengers, limits of lia-
bility, freedom to contract, jurisdiction, and advance payments. See Int’l Civil Avi-
ation Org. [ICAO], Consensus Package (Presented by the President of the Conference), at
1–4, DCW Doc. No. 50 (May 25, 1999), in II INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR
LAW (CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE BY AIR), MONTREAL: DOCUMENTS 271, 271–74, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2
(1999) [hereinafter MC99 DOCUMENTS].
240 See ICAO, Consensus Package (Presented by the President of the Conference), supra
note 239, at 1–4, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 271–74.
241 MC99, supra note 14, art. 21. The limit was originally SDR 100,000, but this
figure was raised in 2009 to SDR 113,000 and then again in 2019 to SDR 128,821,
pursuant to Article 24 of MC99. See id. art. 24.; Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO],
2019 Revised Limits of Liability Under the Montreal Convention of 1999, https://
www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/2019_Re-
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respect of both tiers, the carrier can invoke the defense of con-
tributory negligence.242 For second-tier liability, the carrier can
exonerate itself by proving the absence of fault,243 rather than
the previous “all necessary measures” defense from the Warsaw
Convention.244 An additional ground for exoneration was intro-
duced that released the carrier from liability under the second
tier where it could prove that the damage was solely due to the
negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party.245
The new regime is very beneficial for the plaintiff passenger
because unlimited recovery is available without a prima facie ob-
ligation to prove fault of the carrier. Indeed, once a plaintiff has
proved recoverable damages in excess of the first-tier limit, this
limit will only come into play where the carrier elects and suc-
cessfully raises one of the available defenses. Given that the
great majority of aviation disasters will involve some element of
carrier negligence, the likelihood of the carrier even deciding to
raise a defense, let alone prove it, is rare.246
MC99 is not without its critics.247 However, in terms of ratifica-
tion, it has been an overwhelming success.248 It was hoped that
MC99 would result in a reduction in the amount of litigation
and a speedier resolution of claims. Again, the consensus
amongst carrier and plaintiff lawyers is that MC99 has been suc-
cessful in this regard. An MC99 claim is usually regarded as a
vised_Limits_of_Liability_Under_the_Montreal_Convention_1999.aspx [https://
perma.cc/4XSK-WQ99] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
242 MC99, supra note 14, art. 20.
243 Id. art. 21(2)(a).
244 Mercer, supra note 237, at 459. Some suggest this could be viewed as a lesser
burden on the carrier. Id. at 459–60.
245 MC99, supra note 14, art. 21(2)(b).
246 See, e.g., VII SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT: AIR LAW § 505, at 247–49 (J. David
McClean et al. eds., 169th ed. Jan 2020) (1997) (discussing Wright v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., No. 08-CV-660, 2010 WL 446077 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2010)); Thomas J.
Whalen, The New Warsaw Convention: The Montreal Convention, 25 AIR & SPACE L.
12, 19 (2000).
247 While admiring the progress made, Milde and Dempsey lament the paucity
of creative ideas, the scarcity of substantive enhancements to the unification of
law, and the glaring lack of clarification of several features of the system that
fueled practical difficulties for decades. DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 216, at 39.
248 Having entered into force on November 4, 2003, MC99 currently has 136
Contracting Parties. Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Current Lists of Parties to Mul-
tilateral Air Law Treaties: Montreal Convention (1999), at 1, ICAO Doc. 9740, https:/
/www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/lists/current lists of parties/allitems.aspx
(search “9740” in the “Find an item” field; then select “English” under “Status
(EN)”) [https://perma.cc/8JRR-EUMN] (last visited May 26, 2020).
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“slam dunk” by plaintiffs’ lawyers.249 In fact, they are more likely
to complain about the loss of work they have incurred from
MC99 than they are to complain of its substantive provisions.
Nevertheless, MC99’s success is conditional on it offering plain-
tiffs their desired choice of forum. Therefore, it is the evolution
of MC99’s jurisdictional provisions from those provided under
WCS that must be analyzed. First, however, a few words are nec-
essary on the general purpose of MC99.
2. Purpose
Unlike the Warsaw Convention of 1929, MC99 did not spring
into existence from within a vacuum of international private air
law. By 1999, the Warsaw Convention was itself seventy years old
and had developed into a system (i.e., WCS) comprising amend-
ing protocols, a supplementary convention, and several intercar-
rier agreements. Surrounding this system was a huge body of
jurisprudence and commentary. The juristic landscape of pri-
vate international air law was infinitely richer and more devel-
oped in 1999 than it had been in 1929.250 MC99 is a
modernization and a consolidation of WCS. This requires the
appreciation of two key factors regarding its purpose: (1) the
continuing relevance of WCS; and (2) the extent to which MC99
diverges in purpose from WCS.
a. Enduring Relevance of WCS
As between Contracting States, MC99 completely replaces
WCS.251 It is a new convention, neither supplemental to nor an
amendment of WCS.252 However, this does not render WCS an
irrelevancy. It retains relevance. First, it continues to govern cer-
tain international air transportation involving Contracting States
of that system where one (or both) of those States have not rati-
fied MC99. Second, it lives on through its jurisprudence. Much
of the wording for the provisions of MC99 was directly trans-
249 See Whalen, supra note 246, at 15.
250 The industry itself had evolved further than even the most prescient ob-
server could have predicted, and as ICAO President Assad Koitaite explained in
the opening address to the Montreal Conference, “the present-day aviation in-
dustry bears little resemblance to its precursor.” See ICAO, Minutes of the First Ple-
nary Meeting, at 2 (May 10, 1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 36, 37.
251 This supremacy is provided for under Article 55. MC99, supra note 14, art.
55.
252 As recognized by the U.S. courts, see for example Schopenhauer v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 255 F. Supp. 2d 81, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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ferred from WCS. It is abundantly clear that the drafters of
MC99 did not intend to throw out the baby with the bathwater
but wished instead to hold onto the valuable jurisprudence that
had built up through applying and interpreting WCS.253 Courts
have since relied on the jurisprudence of WCS to assist in inter-
preting MC99.254
b. At Cross-Purposes?
When it comes to defining the purpose of MC99, new consid-
erations arise that were not at play in 1929 with the Warsaw Con-
vention. Likewise, other considerations have fallen away as they
lost import with the passage of time and the progress of air
transport.255 The recognition by the preamble of the need to
modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Convention is the first clear
indication of one of MC99’s purposes.256 In modernizing and
253 During a meeting of the SSG, “[i]t was stressed that for the sake of uniform-
ity, certain concepts in the Warsaw Convention should be retained since these
had been subjected to decades of judicial interpretation.” Report on the Moderniza-
tion of the “Warsaw System,” supra note 218, at 1 app. at A-6, in MC99 PREPARATORY
MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 12. Tompkins (a member of the U.S. Delegation)
states that MC99 “was drafted and adopted to replace the Warsaw System, the
drafters and the States Party fully intended to preserve the seventy years of judi-
cial decisions interpreting and applying the liability rules of the Warsaw System to
be used in interpreting and applying the MC99 liability rules.” George N.
Tompkins, Jr., Are the Objectives of the 1999 Montreal Convention in Danger of Failure?,
39 AIR & SPACE L. 203, 204 (2014).
254 E.g., Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190, 205 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (alterations in original) (“Although the Convention ‘unifie[d] and re-
place[d] the system of liability that derives’ from its predecessor, the Warsaw
Convention, the Convention still retains many of its original provisions and terms
and thus courts have continued to rely on cases interpreting equivalent provi-
sions in the Warsaw Convention.”); see also Baah v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.,
473 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators
Ltd. [2014] UKSC 15 [23]–[26], [2014] AC 1347 [1359] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K).
255 An extremely clear statement of the objects of the Conference was given by
the President of the Conference at the final plenary session. See ICAO, Minutes of
the Seventh Plenary Meeting, at 2 (May 28, 1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212,
at 244, 245.
256 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described
MC99 as having been passed to “‘harmonize the hodgepodge of supplementary
amendments and intercarrier agreements’ of which the Warsaw Convention sys-
tem of liability consists.” Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Carl E. Fumarola, Note, Stratospheric Recovery: Recent and Forth-
coming Changes in International Air Disaster Law and Its Effect on Air Terrorism Recov-
ery, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 821, 835 (2003)); see also Sompo Japan Ins. v. Nippon
Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2008); Weiss v. El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 364–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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consolidating aspects of WCS, MC99 was also (at least partially)
reaffirming them. Therefore, the denomination of the objects
and purposes of MC99 must begin with the objects and purposes
of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent instruments.257
The courts have generally supported the view that there exists
great commonality of purpose between the Warsaw Convention
and MC99.258 However, equating the purpose of MC99 with that
of the Warsaw Convention requires qualification in order to ac-
commodate the effects and changes of the process of moderni-
zation and consolidation.
In part II.A., the object and purpose of the Warsaw Conven-
tion was defined in twofold form, the first part of which was the
cardinal purpose of avoiding conflict of laws through the unifi-
cation of certain rules, and this remains the case with MC99 and
is regarded as such by the courts.259 Indeed, the mere act of
modernization and consolidation is itself a poignant and power-
ful reaffirmation by the drafters of MC99 of this cardinal
purpose.
A supplementary objective to the Warsaw Convention was also
identified, i.e., the desire to further the public interest in the
development of air transport while striking an equitable balance
of interests. While the development of air transport remains a
257 As recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Thibodeau v. Air Canada,
2014 SCC 67, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 340, 363 (Can.), “[t]o understand the purposes of
the Montreal Convention, we therefore must go back to its predecessor, the Warsaw
Convention . . . .”
258 The U.K. Supreme Court noted in Stott:
One of the original purposes of the Warsaw Convention was to
bring some order to a fragmented international aviation system by
partial harmonisation of the applicable law and to provide benefit
to both prospective passengers and to the airlines in reaching an
equitable balance of interests; the same purpose applies to the
Montreal Convention.
Stott, [2014] AC at 1359; see also Matz v. Nw. Airlines, No. 07-13447, 2008 WL
2064800, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 13, 2008).
259 Allianz Glob. Corp. & Specialty v. EMO Trans Calif. Inc., No. C 09-4893
MPH, 2010 WL 2594360, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010) (“The goal of the Mon-
treal Convention was to create an international unified system of rules and proce-
dures to alleviate the uncertainty of operating under a diverse set of legal
systems.”); see also Brauner v. British Airways PLC, No. 12-CV-343, 2012 WL
1229507, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169–70 (1999)). In Thibodeau, the Supreme Court of Canada
observed that “two of the main purposes of the Warsaw Convention, and hence of
the Montreal Convention, are to achieve a uniform set of rules governing damages
liability of international air carriers and to provide limitation of carrier liability.”
Thibodeau, [2014] 3 S.C.R. at 370.
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fundamental objective under MC99, there has been a substantial
shift in the balance of interests. What was new about the ap-
proach taken in Montreal was the weight given to protecting the
interests of consumers.260 Thus the preamble of MC99 specifi-
cally recognizes the importance of ensuring protection for con-
sumers. Both the courts261 and commentators262 have echoed
the centrality of this objective.
At the same time, the preamble also notes the need for an
equitable balance of interests. Just as it would be unjust to claim
that the Warsaw Convention was drafted with only the carriers’
interests in mind, so too it would be unjust to claim that MC99
had only the consumers’ interests in mind. The interests of the
carrier, in particular those of the small- to medium-sized airlines
(especially from developing nations), were strongly advocated at
the Conference with several States raising concerns about the
260 See Bin Cheng, The 1999 Montreal Convention on International Carriage by Air
Concluded on the Seventieth Anniversary of the 1929 Warsaw Convention (Part II), 49
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT [ZLW] 484, 497 (2000) (“In drawing
up the new Convention [MC99], it was constantly being emphasized that the
interests of the consumer are paramount.”). Ensuring the protection of the inter-
ests of consumers in international carriage by air has been described by Cheng as
a “new objective.” Bin Cheng, A New Era in the Law of International Carriage by Air:
From Warsaw (1929) to Montreal (1999), 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 833, 848 (2004).
261 See Sompo Japan Ins., 522 F.3d at 780–81 (“The new treaty ‘unifies and re-
places the system of liability that derives from the Warsaw Convention,’ explicitly
recognizing ‘the importance of ensuring protection of the interests of consumers
in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compensation based
on the principle of restitution.’. . . This Convention seems to have reversed one
of the premises of the original Warsaw Convention, which favored the airlines at
the expense of consumers. Nevertheless, the Montreal Convention did not alter
the original Warsaw Convention goal of maintaining limited and predictable
damage amounts for airlines.” (citations omitted) (first quoting MC99, supra note
14, pmbl.; and then citing Ehrlich, 360 F.3d at 371 n.4)); Weiss, 433 F. Supp. 2d at
365 (“[T]he Montreal Convention represents a significant shift away from a
treaty that primarily favored airlines to one that continues to protect airlines
from crippling liability, but shows increased concern for the rights of passengers
and shippers.”); see also Bassam v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 287 F. App’x 309, 312 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Even though the Montreal Convention is directed
more at consumers, it does not alter the original goal of the Warsaw Convention
of maintaining limited and predictable damage amounts for airlines.”).
262 See, e.g., Whalen, supra note 246, at 14. Whalen noted the shift in policy
away from the interests of the carriers to those of the consumer–passenger. Id.;
see also GEORGE N. TOMPKINS, JR., LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION AS DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
WARSAW 1929 TO MONTREAL 1999, at 33–34 (2010); Cheng, A New Era, supra note
260, at 844–45.
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negative impact of being too pro-consumer.263 Under both Con-
ventions, it was a question of achieving an equitable balance be-
tween the interests of all parties.264 Without a doubt, there was a
shift in the balance of interests; MC99 was to be a new deal.
There was to be better protection of the interests of consumers
and equitable compensation secured for victims and their fami-
lies.265 Thus, the carriers and the traveling public were expected
to carry more of the burden of the fewer risks inherent to air
transportation.
In light of the above, MC99 retains the twofold purpose of its
predecessor, consisting of a cardinal purpose and a supplemen-
tary purpose. The former remains unchanged, whereas the lat-
ter has undergone significant recalibration in light of the
changing circumstances of the industry and socioeconomic con-
ditions. This is underlined by the forceful declarations made by
the Contracting Parties in the preamble and as reflected in the
substance of the provisions contained within the Convention it-
self. Thus, the object and purpose of MC99 can be defined as
follows:
1. Avoidance of conflict of laws through unification of cer-
tain rules relating to travel documentation and air carrier
liability; and
2. Assurance of an equitable balance between the interests
of consumers in international carriage by air, the need for
equitable compensation based on the principle of restitu-
tion, and the orderly development of international air
transport.
263 For comments made by Algeria, India, Canada, China, Madagascar, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, and Egypt in the general observations on the draft Convention,
see ICAO, Minutes of the Second Plenary Meeting, at 1–7 (May 10, 1999), in MC99
MINUTES, supra note 212, at 45, 45–51.
264 As Mercer states of MC99, “‘equity’ and ‘balance’ were cardinal guiding
considerations in the crafting of the new Convention.” Mercer, supra note 237, at
457.
265 This is evidenced by two of the clauses to MC99’s preamble:
Recognizing the importance of ensuring protection of the interests
of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equi-
table compensation based on the principle of restitution; . . .
. . . .
Convinced that collective State action for further harmonization
and codification of certain rules governing international carriage
by air through a new Convention is the most adequate means of
achieving an equitable balance of interests.
MC99, supra note 14, pmbl.
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B. THE LONG PATH TO THE FIFTH JURISDICTION
The plaintiffs in Osborne v. British Airways PLC were two Ameri-
can missionaries working in Nairobi, Kenya.266 Wishing to travel
home for Christmas, they had purchased return tickets in Kenya
for carriage by air between Nairobi and Orlando (via London)
with British Airways.267 Alleging injury arising during interna-
tional carriage by air, the plaintiffs brought proceedings in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.268 In Horn-
sby v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the plaintiff was an American
citizen living and working in Kaiserslautern, Germany.269 She
had purchased a return ticket in Germany for carriage by air
between Frankfurt and Los Angeles.270 Her action was brought
against Lufthansa in the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California.271 In Osborne, the court declared itself to be
without jurisdiction and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims,272
whereas in Hornsby, the court assumed jurisdiction.273 What dif-
ferentiated the cases?
In neither case was the domicile of the carrier, the principal
place of business of the carrier, or the place of destination lo-
cated within the United States, and in both cases, the ticket in
question had been purchased outside the United States.274
Thus, under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, grounds
for a U.S. forum did not exist under the four possible jurisdic-
tions available; indeed, this had been the very reason for the
district court’s dismissal in the case of Osborne.275 The difference
in the case of Hornsby was that the plaintiff’s claim had not been
brought under the Warsaw Convention but under MC99.276 The
specific advantage of MC99 was the addition of the fifth jurisdic-
tion, which grants the plaintiff the option to bring an action
against the carrier before the courts of the plaintiff’s home fo-
rum, provided the carrier has a sufficient business connection
266 Osborne v. British Airways PLC, 198 F. Supp. 2d 901, 903 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
267 Id.
268 Id.




272 Osborne, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
273 Hornsby, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
274 See id. at 1133–36, 1136 n.3; Osborne, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 904–06.
275 Osborne, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 904–06.
276 See Hornsby, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
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there.277 Although first made effective through MC99, the fifth
jurisdiction’s history stretches much further back.
1. Guatemala City and the Impetus for a Fifth Jurisdiction
The impetus for a fifth jurisdiction arose from U.S. dissatisfac-
tion with WCS.278 While the low limits of liability were its chief
complaint, the United States was also concerned with the ab-
sence of a choice of law provision for establishing and quanti-
fying damages.279 This raised the risk that the forum hearing the
claim of a foreign plaintiff may apply rules that result in plain-
tiffs receiving a level or scope of compensation that is inade-
quate in comparison to that which they might have received in
their home forum.280 Aside from choice of law issues, the per-
ception in U.S. quarters was that foreign courts would prove less
favorable to American plaintiffs, and this would prejudice the
interests of the U.S. expat community working or traveling
throughout the world.281 The solution preferred by the United
States to the problems described above was to guarantee to
plaintiffs jurisdiction in their home forum.
The possible amendment of the Warsaw Convention to make
provision for a fifth jurisdiction—in response to U.S. insis-
tence—was raised at the Seventeenth Session of the ICAO Legal
Committee in 1970, which agreed to a draft proposal.282 This
proposal was considered at the Diplomatic Conference at Guate-
mala City in 1971 where there was considerable support for it.283
277 See id. at 1136.
278 See Mercer, supra note 237, at 463.
279 See Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra note 212,
at 11, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 108.
280 See id. at 7–8, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 104–05.
281 See id. at 12, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 109.
282 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Minutes of the Second Meeting, at 16 (Feb. 9,
1971), in I INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW–GUATEMALA CITY, FEBRU-
ARY–MARCH 1971: MINUTES 13, 16, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) [hereinafter
GUATEMALA CITY MINUTES]. New Zealand, in collaboration with several western
European States and a number of Commonwealth States, had put together a
draft package of proposals regarding possible revision of the Warsaw Convention
that included, in response to U.S. insistence, the addition of a fifth jurisdiction.
See Gerald F. FitzGerald, The Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 8 CANADIAN Y.B.
INT’L L. 284, 291, 302 (1970).
283 Mexico, Ireland, Argentina, the Netherlands, Spain, China, and Japan all
assented to its introduction, albeit without any great passion or conviction. See
ICAO, Tenth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole (Feb. 16, 1971), in GUATEMALA
CITY MINUTES, supra note 282, at 107, 112–15; ICAO, Eleventh Meeting of the Com-
mission of the Whole (Feb. 17, 1971), in GUATEMALA CITY MINUTES, supra note 282,
at 117, 117–19. IATA similarly spoke in sober terms that suggested indifference
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The only opposition to the fifth jurisdiction came from behind
the Iron Curtain, from Czechoslovakia,284 the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.),285 and Poland.286 The main sub-
stantive issue that caused problems was the meaning to be
ascribed to the term “establishment,” as it was to be a require-
ment of the fifth jurisdiction that the carrier have an “establish-
ment” in the forum State.287 Particularly noteworthy was the
minimal concern expressed with respect to the risk of forum
shopping posed by the addition of the fifth jurisdiction;288 the
situation would be totally different in Montreal in 1999. Ulti-
on the matter. See Eleventh Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra, at 119. The
IATA Observer said that “he had no objection to the proposal for an additional
forum, which merely restored the jurisdiction which the court would otherwise
clearly have had over the person of the carrier.” Id. Even the French, although
“not enthusiastic” about the fifth jurisdiction, were prepared to accept it in the
spirit of international cooperation and “in an effort to achieve a widely accept-
able agreement.” Tenth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra, at 114. The
Federal Republic of Germany was likewise unenthusiastic but was prepared to
accept it as part of what Germany referred to as the New Zealand “package.”
Eleventh Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra, at 118.
284 See Eleventh Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra note 283, at 113.
285 The Delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics indicated:
[This] Delegation could not support the proposed new Article
28(2) for two reasons. The first was that the additional forum would
not be available to passengers using the services of small carriers
that had an establishment only in the territory of the State where
they were registered. Such discrimination was inadmissible, espe-
cially in the matter of jurisdiction, which was of great practical im-
portance. The second reason for their objection to it was that the
forum it provided was a place with no link with the place where the
contract of carriage had been made. This was contrary to an old
and important rule of both international and domestic law gov-
erning transportation, a rule to be found in many international
conventions on carriage, including the Warsaw Convention itself in
the existing Article 28.
Id.
286 See id. at 113–14.
287 For discussion of this point, see id. at 114.
288 Only the Jamaican Delegate noted the greater possibility of forum shop-
ping with a fifth jurisdiction, but even so, he was satisfied that the general scheme
provided sufficient counterbalancing benefits, e.g., strict liability with an un-
breakable limit. Id. at 115–16. The Delegate from Poland may have had forum
shopping in mind when expressing the fear that providing claimants with a fo-
rum in their home country might encourage litigation, and since the objective of
the new instrument was to reduce litigation, the fifth jurisdiction could therefore
be counterproductive. Id. at 113–14. The lack of objections to forum shopping is
partially explained by the proposed liability scheme of the Guatemala City Proto-
col (GCP). It would have provided for strict liability with an unbreakable limit. As
such, the incentive to forum shop would have been greatly reduced.
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mately, although the text of the Guatemala City Protocol (GCP)
would have granted a fifth jurisdiction,289 it failed to achieve the
necessary number of ratifications and has not come into ef-
fect.290 The attempts by the United States to secure the fifth ju-
risdiction were thus ultimately unsuccessful, but as momentum
built for the conclusion of a new convention to replace WCS,
the opportunity reemerged in the late 1990s.
2. Second Chance at a Fifth Jurisdiction
From the very start, the fifth jurisdiction featured prominently
in MC99’s long drafting history.291 From early on, there was a
strong divergence of opinion on the matter. The United States
thought its inclusion in the new Convention was essential. How-
ever, many other States were keenly opposed to it.292 Neverthe-
less, a draft article for a fifth jurisdiction was produced and
provisionally approved by the ICAO Legal Committee at its Thir-
tieth Session in 1997. Even so, the fifth jurisdiction remained
deeply unpopular amongst most of the participating States.293
However, it became apparent that the United States viewed the
fifth jurisdiction as a deal-breaker, and it was clear to all con-
cerned that U.S. ratification without its inclusion would be
“highly unlikely.”294 The mindset thus appeared to turn toward
finding an acceptable formulation that would allow for its inclu-
289 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO] Protocol to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air art. XII,
ICAO Doc. 8932, Mar. 8, 1971, 101 I.L.M. 613.
290 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Current Lists of Parties to Multilateral Air Law
Treaties: Guatemala City Protocol (1971), at 1, ICAO Doc. 8932, https://
www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/lists/current lists of parties/allitems.aspx (search
“8932” in the “Find an item” field; then select “English” under “Status (EN)”)
[https://perma.cc/Z948-DMJM] (last visited May 27, 2020).
291 At the first meeting of the SSG in early 1996, the possibility of a fifth juris-
diction was discussed. See ICAO, Report on the Modernization of the “Warsaw System,”
supra note 218, at 1 app. at A-8 to A-9, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra
note 217, at 14–15.
292 ICAO, Report of the 30th Session of the Legal Committee, at 4-19 to 4-20, ICAO
Doc. 9693-LC/190 (1997), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at
145, 177–78.
293 A good sense of the opposition can be found in the Report of the Thirtieth
Session of the Legal Committee. See generally id. at i to D-18, in MC99 PREPARA-
TORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 145–224.
294 ICAO, Report of the Third Meeting of the Secretariat Study Group on the Moderniza-
tion of the “Warsaw System,” at 6, ICAO Doc. SGMW/1-WP/4 (Mar. 10, 1998), in
MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 303, 310.
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sion, with several alternatives being proposed.295 Eventually, at
the Fourth Meeting of the SSG in late January 1999, a recom-
mended wording was adopted and submitted to the SGMW for
further consideration.296
During the meeting of the SGMW, opposition to the fifth ju-
risdiction was still in the majority.297 However, an implicit ulti-
matum was issued when the United States reiterated that its
ratification of a convention was dependent on its inclusion.298 A
compromise proposal was agreed to that was hoped to be uni-
versally acceptable and promote uniformity.299 Satisfied that it
had completed its task, the SGMW forwarded its approved draft
convention300 to the ICAO Council, which subsequently took
the decision to convene a diplomatic conference.
a. Opening Positions
As champion of the fifth jurisdiction, the United States had
submitted a comprehensive paper to the Montreal Conference
reiterating why its inclusion represented an essential element of
any revision to WCS.301 The U.S. position remained fundamen-
tally premised on the same policy considerations as voiced at
295 For instance, at the end of the SSG’s Third Session, a document was pro-
duced with five alternative proposals for a jurisdiction clause, the wording of
which can be found in Attachment E, see id. at 14–15, in MC99 PREPARATORY
MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 318–19.
296 For the text, see ICAO, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Secretariat Study
Group on the Modernization of the “Warsaw System,” at 16, ICAO Doc. SGMW/1-WP/
5 (Mar. 10, 1998), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 321, 338.
297 Five delegations were opposed to its inclusion, whereas only three delega-
tions were in support. Final Report of the Special Group on the Modernization and
Consolidation of the “Warsaw System,” supra note 233, at 2-6 to 2-7, in MC99 PREPARA-
TORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 242–43.
298 See id. at 2-7, MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 243.
299 See id. at 2-13 to 2-14, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at
249–50. The compromise proposal consisted of refined text of the key articles
under consideration. For the text of the articles included in the compromise
package, see ICAO, Revised Draft of Articles 16, 20 and 27, at 1–2, ICAO Doc.
SGMW/1-WP/26 (Apr. 17, 1998), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note
217, at 385, 385–86.
300 For the draft text attached as Appendix 5 to the Final Report, see ICAO,
Final Report of the Special Group on the Modernization and Consolidation of the “Warsaw
System,” supra note 233, at A5-1 to A5-16, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra
note 217, at 271–86.
301 See generally ICAO, Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Inter-
national Carriage by Air: Article 27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by United States of
America), at 1–9, DCW Doc. No. 12 (May 4, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra
note 239, at 101, 101–09 [hereinafter ICAO, Article 27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented
by United States of America)].
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Guatemala City: first and foremost, that justice and fairness re-
quires that passengers and their heirs should be able to bring a
claim to the courts of their home State, provided the carrier
conducted business there;302 second, that a plaintiff’s home fo-
rum is generally the most appropriate forum (at least for the
plaintiff);303 and third, that developments in the industry since
1929 also make the inclusion of a fifth jurisdiction desirable.304
Support came from Japan, Colombia, and Panama, which re-
garded it as desirable (“vital” in the case of Japan) for the pro-
motion of consumer interests.305 Norway was also in support,306
as was the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission
(LACAC).307
Opposition to the fifth jurisdiction was led by France, which
presented a paper containing three arguments.308 The French
view was endorsed by India, Korea, and China,309 as well as the
fifty-three African Contracting States310 and the members of the
Arab Civil Aviation Commission (ACAC).311
302 Id. at 2, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 102.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 See ICAO, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra
note 212, at 9, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 106.
306 Norway had undergone a change of mind; it had been aligned to the
French point of view in the past, but it had now come around to the fifth jurisdic-
tion because the current draft included prerequisites to its coming into play that
sufficiently protected the interests of carriers. Id. at 10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra
note 212, at 107.
307 LACAC endorsed the inclusion of a fifth jurisdiction, noting that one of the
advantages was that the claimant’s home forum would usually be the jurisdiction
best placed to determine the amount of compensation. See ICAO, Comments from
the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) on the Draft Convention, at 2,
DCW Doc. No. 14 (May 6, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 115,
116. LACAC consists of Argentina, Aruba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. Id. at 1, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 115.
308 See generally ICAO, Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Inter-
national Carriage by Air: Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France), at 1–4,
DCW Doc. No. 33 (May 17, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 195,
195–98 [hereinafter ICAO, Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France)].
309 ICAO, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra note
212, at 8, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 105.
310 See ICAO, Comments on Article 27 – Jurisdiction (Presented by 53 African Con-
tracting States), at 1–2, DCW Doc No. 23 (May 12, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS,
supra note 239, at 143, 143–44.
311 See ICAO, Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air: Comments on Articles 20 and 27 (Submitted by Member States of the Arab
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The first argument made by France was that the fifth jurisdic-
tion was not necessary to ensure the protection of passengers
because the existing four bases would provide satisfactory resolu-
tion of the vast majority of cases.312 Indeed, this point had been
made by a number of States at different points during the draft-
ing process.313
France’s second argument fell within a category of objections
that were economic in nature. States were concerned about the
financial impact of the fifth jurisdiction, particularly on insur-
ance premiums and the resulting effect on fares.314 This was
thought particularly worrisome for small to medium carriers, es-
pecially from developing nations.315 Another aspect of the eco-
nomic argument against the fifth jurisdiction was that it would
be largely detrimental to the interests of passengers.316 This was
allegedly on account of the fact that the States advocating its
inclusion were mostly very high damage awards jurisdictions.317
The burden of higher fares would fall disproportionally on con-
Civil Aviation Commission), at 2, DCW Doc. No. 29 (May 14, 1999), in MC99 DOCU-
MENTS, supra note 239, at 161, 162.
312 ICAO, Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France), supra note 308, at 1,
in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 195. In the conclusion to its paper,
France declared: “Not desired by international air transport professionals and
not conducive to its growth, the creation of a fifth jurisdiction would thus be less
favourable than expected for passengers.” Id. at 4, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra
note 239, at 198. This was repeated by France during the Conference. See ICAO,
Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra note 212, at 8, in
MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 105. That the industry (by which the Commis-
sion meant IATA) did not want the fifth jurisdiction is hardly surprising. See id. at
7, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 104. IATA represents carriers and not the
passengers who were to be the beneficiaries of the fifth jurisdiction.
313 See ICAO, Report of the 30th Session of the Legal Committee, supra note 292, at 4-
19 to 4-20, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 177–78 (one dele-
gate observing that if the new instrument “was going to provide for unlimited
liability, it would not matter where one obtained the compensation.”); see also
ICAO, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Secretariat Study Group on the Modernization of
the “Warsaw System,” supra note 296, at 3, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra
note 217, at 325.
314 See ICAO, Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France), supra note 308, at
2, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 196.
315 This was a view voiced by many States. For example, the Delegate of India
stated that inclusion of the fifth jurisdiction would have “far-reaching implica-
tions for small and medium sized airlines, especially, of the developing world,
which would be extremely serious both from the point of view of logistics as well
as financial costs.” ICAO, Jurisdiction – Article 27 (Presented by India), at 2, DCW
Doc. No. 20 (May 11, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 135, 136.
316 ICAO, Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France), supra note 308, at 2,
in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 196.
317 See id. at 1, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 195.
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sumers from developing countries, who would, in essence, be
subsidizing high awards for plaintiff passengers from developed
countries.318 This is unquestionably a valid concern but one that
was totally overblown by France in the context of the fifth juris-
diction. It was based on two erroneous assumptions:319 first, that
the fifth jurisdiction was to be one based on nationality alone
(addressed below);320 and second, leading on from the first, that
the fifth jurisdiction would be frequently invoked.321 Both were
wrong. Litigators on both sides recognize that, in practice, the
fifth jurisdiction is very seldom invoked,322 and it has only a very
modest impact on the global recoveries for aviation accidents, a
fact accepted by aviation insurers.
The third argument was that the fifth jurisdiction would cre-
ate a regrettable precedent that would be inconsistent with the
development of contemporary law because, in France’s view, the
fifth jurisdiction would expose carriers to litigation in a forum to
which they had no real connection.323 This line of argument was
318 See id. at 2, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 196.
319 France was not alone in this erroneous viewpoint. In its paper, the Interna-
tional Union of Aviation Insurers (IUAI) used the same point to issue grim warn-
ings of increased insurance premiums and inequity to small carriers. See ICAO,
An Aviation Insurance View of the Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
for International Carriage by Air, at 4, DCW Doc. No. 28 (May 13, 1999), in MC99
DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 155, 158.
320 See infra notes 324–30 and accompanying text.
321 The U.S. Delegate had questioned this at the Montreal Conference. ICAO,
Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra note 212, at 11, in
MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 108. He asked how it was that, “given the small
number of instances in which recourse would be made to the fifth jurisdiction,
insurance rates would increase.” Id. In fact, the United States noted the drop in
aviation insurance rates during previous years and concluded that the insurance
rates argument was overblown. Id. However, this was not a view shared by the
IUAI, which stated, as a matter of fact, that “[t]he cost of insurance will, in the
long run, be determined by the degree of exposure to risk and the level of claims
paid.” ICAO, An Aviation Insurance View of the Draft Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, at 2, supra note 319, in MC99 DOCU-
MENTS, supra note 239, at 156. The IUAI predicted that the proposed Convention
would likely result in a larger number of claims and higher level of damages, so
an increase in insurance rates, in the long term, was to be expected. Id. at 4, in
MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 158. Time has now proven the United
States correct; the feared increases in insurance premiums from the introduction
of the fifth jurisdiction did not materialize, and it is widely accepted that the
general impact of the fifth jurisdiction has been modest.
322 For discussion of a small number of cases in which jurisdiction was estab-
lished on the basis of the fifth jurisdiction, see VII SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT: AIR
LAW, supra note 246, § 441.1, at 220–23.
323 See ICAO, Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France), supra note 308, at
3, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 197.
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based on the deliberate misperception—made purely for rhe-
torical effect—that the fifth jurisdiction was nothing more than
what France called a “true jurisdiction of nationality.”324
This challenge to the legality of the fifth jurisdiction was disin-
genuous. As argued by the United States, a fifth jurisdiction was
a feature of GCP325 and is provided under the Athens Conven-
tion.326 Even more damning to the French argument is the sim-
ple fact that the fifth jurisdiction is not (and never was) based
solely on nationality. This misconception had dogged the fifth
jurisdiction from the start of the MC99 drafting process. Despite
the text of the proposal itself327 and the clarifications given,328
the irrational suspicion and fear remained that the fifth jurisdic-
tion was a blatant attempt to bestow a jurisdictional privilege on
the “wandering American.”329 The text of the jurisdiction clause
before the MC99 Conference and the comments submitted by
324 See id.
325 See ICAO, Article 27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by United States of America),
supra note 301, at 6, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 106. Doubts regard-
ing the precedential value of these instruments were raised by some States. The
Delegate from Madagascar noted that GCP had only provided for the fifth juris-
diction in the context of an unbreakable limit on liability. See ICAO, Minutes of the
Eighth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra note 212, at 8, in MC99 MIN-
UTES, supra note 212, at 105 (speaking on behalf of the fifty-three African Con-
tracting States). In addition, it was noted that GCP had never come into force. Id.
(comment from France).
326 ICAO, Article 27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by United States of America), supra
note 301, at 6, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 106. The United States
invoked the Athens Convention that governs the carriage of passengers and lug-
gage by sea, which also provides for a basis of jurisdiction similar to the fifth
jurisdiction. See Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
Their Luggage by Sea art. 17(1)(c), Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 U.N.T.S. 19.
327 The fifth jurisdiction had, at least from the SSG draft of September 1996,
required more than mere domicile; it had always required some territorial con-
nection between the carrier and the State of jurisdiction. For the proposed text,
see ICAO, Progress Report on Modernization of the “Warsaw System,” at 1 app. at A-12,
ICAO Doc. C-WP/10470 (Sept. 20, 1996), in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra
note 217, at 27, 42.
328 Early on, the United States pointed out that the fifth jurisdiction would be
seldom invoked and that it would be limited to situations where the carrier had a
place of business in the passenger’s State of domicile or permanent residence. See
ICAO, Report of the 30th Session of the Legal Committee, supra note 292, at 4-19, in
MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 177; see also ICAO, Article
27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by United States of America), supra note 301, at 7, in
MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 107.
329 Mendelsohn observed this sentiment:
IATA and others seem to say that they will not accept the fifth fo-
rum—first because it is illegal, second because it might cost too
much money, and third because we do not like to be pushed into
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the United States with regard to the fifth jurisdiction clearly evi-
dence that the proposal for a fifth jurisdiction actually on the
table was not one based solely on nationality; it accepted that
limiting, connecting factors (for both plaintiff and carrier) to
the fifth jurisdiction would be required.330
The valid underlying objection was not so much a matter of
legality as of legitimacy. The real concern was to ensure that
there were sufficient connecting factors between the defendant
carrier and the fifth jurisdiction to justify exposing the carrier to
litigation of claims in that forum. Indeed, a constant issue
throughout the drafting history was how to define the necessary
connecting factor in sufficiently robust terms.331 Therefore, the
third category of objections should be considered from the
point of view of the legitimacy of the fifth jurisdiction as a forum
for resolution of claims against carriers.
The presentation of opening positions and the discussion
thereof took place over the first week of the Conference and
then gave way to more intense deliberations on the core pack-
age of provisions within the FCG. Initial French opposition to
the inclusion of the fifth jurisdiction ended up being a damp
squib. By the time the FCG came to discuss the fifth jurisdiction,
France had acquiesced to its inclusion and preferred instead to
draw battle lines over the applicable conditions to be satisfied
before it could be relied upon.332 The pressing concern was how
to allay the fears expressed by a number of States, some of which
the Chairman described as being “purely imaginary.”333
It is often said that it was the fear of forum shopping that was
at the heart of opposition to the fifth jurisdiction. It is submitted
that this was not the case and that it is vital to appreciate the
the fifth forum as its only purpose is to protect the famous “wander-
ing American.”
Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Warsaw Convention and Where We Are Today, 62 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1071, 1077 (1997).
330 See ICAO, Article 27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by United States of America),
supra note 301, at 1, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 101.
331 See ICAO, Final Report of the Special Group on the Modernization and Consolida-
tion of the “Warsaw System,” supra note 233, at 2-7 to 2-8, in MC99 PREPARATORY
MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 243–44.
332 See Mercer, supra note 237, at 465.
333 “As in most of the issues raised during the Group’s discussions, it was not
sufficient to deal with fears which were real—it was necessary to provide comfort
levels even in respect of fears which sometimes were purely imaginary.” ICAO,
Minutes of the Third Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group, at 2 (May 19,
1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 147, 148.
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nuances involved. The theme of forum shopping arose at nu-
merous points in the discussions of the fifth jurisdiction within
the FCG, as well as within the Conference in general. It is curi-
ous how the question of forum shopping only emerged with re-
spect to the fifth jurisdiction. In fact, at no point did anyone
raise a concern about forum shopping under the existing four
jurisdictions. This suggests that it was not forum shopping per se
that worried the delegates but rather some other aspect of the
fifth jurisdiction. This factor, it is argued, was the purported lack
of a sufficient nexus between the carrier and the fifth
jurisdiction.
The existing four jurisdictions did not trouble the opponents
of the fifth jurisdiction because, as the Chairman noted in his
introductory remarks at the third meeting of the FCG, these
were accepted by all to be appropriate forums.334 It was the pos-
sibility that the fifth jurisdiction might operate to expose a car-
rier to litigation in a forum to which it had insufficient
connections that scared some delegates. The anxiety surround-
ing the fifth jurisdiction was based on concerns regarding the
basis for its application and the potential negative conse-
quences, foremost amongst which was the exposure to high
damage awards and also the practical inconvenience for a car-
rier being sued in a forum to which it had little (or no) connec-
tion. Much of this was rooted in the misperception of the fifth
jurisdiction as one of mere nationality or as one in which there
was lacking a sufficient nexus to the carrier to render litigation
in that forum justifiable. Could a sufficient nexus be defined,
then the concerns relating to forum shopping would have dissi-
pated (as indeed they did). It is submitted that it was this uncer-
tainty surrounding the application of fifth jurisdiction that was
the paramount concern and not forum shopping. Unfortu-
nately, rather than focusing on defining this nexus, the FCG
meetings got sidetracked by the notion of forum shopping and
how to control it. A collateral benefit of this was that it provided
the opportunity for FNC to emerge deus ex machina.
b. FNC: Deus ex Machina
In the paper it submitted to the Conference, the United
States raised a number of arguments that it expected would allay
334 Id. (“[F]rom all of the discussions which had taken place, that no view had
been expressed that those fora to which an action for damages could be brought
at the option of the plaintiff would not be appropriate.”).
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the fears expressed by States with respect to forum shopping.335
One point stressed by the United States was that the control of
forum shopping would be facilitated by the inclusion of the fifth
jurisdiction because, where a plaintiff sues in the United States
but has access to a home forum under the fifth jurisdiction,
there would be a greater likelihood of FNC dismissal.336 Indeed,
the United States spoke of FNC as providing “discipline against
unwarranted forum shopping.”337 In addition, the United States
provided synopses of two cases illustrating just how FNC was ap-
plied by U.S. courts.338 What is more, the French expressly rec-
ognized in their paper that U.S. courts applied FNC in Warsaw
Convention cases.339 From the outset, the drafters of MC99 were
fully aware of FNC.
335 See generally ICAO, Article 27–Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by United States of
America), supra note 301, at 1–9, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 101–09.
The U.S. report first noted that forum shopping was an inevitable consequence
of the existing regime with its choice of four jurisdictions. Id. at 8, in MC99 DOCU-
MENTS, supra note 239, at 108. Although the addition of a fifth would obviously
increase the potential for forum shopping, it was outweighed by the benefit of
ensuring that claimants with meager resources could sue in their home forum.
The United States also argued that the increased incidence of forum shopping
would be slight, given the restrictions that had been agreed on for the fifth juris-
diction. See id. Forum shopping in the United States would also be limited be-
cause a non-U.S. claimant, granted a home forum by the fifth jurisdiction, would
be more likely to elect to sue at home if possible. Id.
336 The U.S. report stated: “Furthermore, U.S. courts are far more likely to
dismiss lawsuits brought by non-U.S. residents on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens if a convenient homeland court is available to the plaintiff because of the
fifth jurisdiction.” Id. at 8, in MC99, supra note 239, at 108.
337 ICAO, Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 250, at 9, in MC99 MIN-
UTES, supra note 212, at 44. Prior to the Conference, during the Fourth Meeting
of the SSG in late January 1999, one member (almost certainly the United States)
spoke out in strong support of the fifth jurisdiction. See ICAO, Report of the Fourth
Meeting of the Secretariat Study Group on the Modernization of the “Warsaw System,”
supra note 296, at 1, 3, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 217, at 323,
325. This member attempted to allay fears of increased forum shopping by re-
minding the other members that the doctrine of FNC would continue to be ap-
plied. Id. at 3, in MC99 PREPARATORY MATERIAL, supra note 216, at 325.
338 ICAO, Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air: Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction: Two Cases Reflecting on United States Law on
Forum Non Conveniens (Presented by the United States of America), at 1–4, DCW
Doc. No. 27 (May 12, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 151,
151–54. The two cases are Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), and
Nolan v. Boeing Co., 762 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. La. 1989), aff’d, 919 F.2d 1058 (5th
Cir. 1990).
339 See ICAO, Article 27 – Fifth Jurisdiction (Presented by France), supra note 308, at
2, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 196 (“The creation of a fifth jurisdic-
tion would make it easier to reject claims submitted by foreign citizens in the
most generous countries. The judges in those countries would have fewer
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Later in the Conference, the Chairman of the FCG proposed
codifying the doctrine of FNC (or something similar) within
MC99 itself.340 It was thought that the fears that a fifth jurisdic-
tion would render the carrier subject to litigation in an inappro-
priate forum could be mitigated by a convention rule of FNC.341
In response, Australia put forward a proposal based on its own
version of the doctrine.342 A misunderstanding emerged at this
point. While the Australian proposal had been intended to ap-
ply to all bases of jurisdiction,343 the Chairman described it as
only being applicable to the fifth jurisdiction.344 The United
States was vehemently opposed to such an idea.345 The U.S.
Delegate stated, in defiant terms, that “the doctrine of forum non
conveniens would be applied to all five jurisdictions in his country
whether the Group prescribed that or not.”346 Indeed, the
United States is reported as having “described the doctrine of
[FNC] as it was currently applied in the Courts of the United
States to the existing four jurisdictions and as it would be ap-
plied to a fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth jurisdiction, if such juris-
dictions were created.”347 The United States made its position
clear, with no uncertain terms: it was currently applying FNC
and would continue to apply FNC to cases where jurisdiction is
established on the basis of the two Conventions.
scruples in using legal means (e.g., the theory of forum non conveniens, as set out
in Doc No. 27) which enable them to turn down a foreign claimant, on the
grounds of the existence of a competent court under the fifth jurisdiction in his
country of origin.”).
340 See ICAO, Minutes of the Third Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 333, at 2, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 148.
341 Id. at 2–3, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 148–49.
342 ICAO, Proposal to Amend Article 27 – Jurisdiction (Presented by Australia), at 1,
DCW Doc. No. 40 (May 20, 1999), in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 213,
213.
343 The Australian Delegate stated:
The Australian proposal was intended to introduce into the process
by which any Court considered the appropriateness of any jurisdic-
tion the issues of whether or not in all the circumstances the juris-
diction selected was fair and whether or not there was an
alternative jurisdiction among the five which was fairer.
ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group, at 8 (May
19, 1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 153, 160.
344 Id. at 6, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 158.
345 The United States demanded there be equal accessibility to all bases of ju-
risdiction; in its view, applying the Australian proposal to the fifth jurisdiction
would create obstacles above and beyond those applicable to the other four. See
id. at 7, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 159.
346 Id.
347 Id.
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The United States also had other concerns about codifying a
rule for FNC. The United States worried about the ability of the
new Convention to be ratified if it sought to impose the doctrine
on those States for which FNC was a foreign concept and that
had no desire to adopt it.348 Additionally, the U.S. Delegate
complained that codification of FNC by the FCG Group might
result in altering the preexisting jurisprudence in the United
States.349 For these reasons, the United States proposed amend-
ing the wording of the final paragraph of the jurisdiction article
to read: “Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of
the Court seised of the case[,] . . . including the doctrine of
forum non conveniens or other similar doctrines.”350 This addi-
tional wording was proposed in the name of giving comfort to
some States that feared their carriers would be exposed to high
U.S. jury awards.351 What is crucial to note is that the context for
the proposal was not to empower courts to apply FNC (or simi-
lar doctrines) but just to act as a form of comforting recognition
of the doctrine’s existing applicability.
The Observer from the International Union of Aviation Insur-
ers (IUAI) referred to, but did not name, an English High Court
case (presumably Milor Slr. v. British Airways Plc.) that had ren-
dered FNC a “dead letter” in England for Warsaw Convention
cases.352 He also noted that there were no reported cases of a
carrier being able to secure dismissal of a case from a U.S. court
by way of FNC.353 The relevance of these observations requires
closer inspection and clarification.
348 Id. This point had been made during the Ninth Meeting of the Commission
of the Whole when the Swedish Delegate had recalled some earlier talk of codify-
ing FNC, and he expressed enthusiasm for the idea but only on the proviso that it
would not be binding on all States. See ICAO, Ninth Meeting of the Commission of the
Whole, at 5 (May 19, 1990), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 140, 144. What
the Swedish Delegate had in mind was codifying FNC in such a way that it would
prescribe its application by those States which had, or wished to have, the doc-
trine but would not foist it upon those that did not. Id. The Delegate from Chile
also opined that his country and several other Latin American countries would
have difficulty harmonizing the doctrine of FNC with their countries’ legal sys-
tems. ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 343, at 8, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 160.
349 ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 343, at 7, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 159.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 See id. at 9, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 161 (referring to a “late
1998” English High Court case).
353 Id.
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First, the Observer did not say that there were “no cases” in
which FNC had been applied to a Warsaw Convention action.354
He said there were no “reported cases” in which a carrier had
been able to secure dismissal, i.e., had been successful in an FNC
motion. This is a different proposition. Where a motion is de-
nied, the doctrine is nevertheless applied. In fact, at the time,
there were several reported cases in which FNC was applied but
no dismissal granted.355 Furthermore, the Observer was actually
wrong. There was at least one reported case in which FNC dis-
missal was granted in a Warsaw Convention case;356 there were
also two unreported cases.357
Second, the Observer enigmatically suggested that the En-
glish High Court case might throw light on the reason why FNC
dismissals were non-existent in the United States.358 His implica-
tion was that U.S. courts did not dismiss Warsaw actions because
they thought, like the English court in Milor, that it had no place
within that Convention. If this is what he thought, then unless
he was reading into the future, he was wrong. Although a U.S.
court did eventually come to that position in 2002 with
Hosaka,359 at the time of the Montreal Conference, the one U.S.
court decision that had specifically made a finding on the issue
had actually held that FNC was available.360
The Chairman took the comments of the IUAI on board and
commented: “It would seem that if [FNC] was to play a role, that
354 It appears that the Chairman made this mistake. He is reported as having
said, in his summary of the Observer’s point, that “as indicated by the Observer
from the IUAI, there were no cases in the United States in which the principle of
forum non conveniens had been applied to Convention cases . . . .” Id. at 10, in MC99
MINUTES, supra note 212, at 162 (emphasis added).
355 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1168–69
(5th Cir. 1987); In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 210, 218
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Robert Bosch Corp. v. Air Fr., 712 F. Supp. 688, 692 (N.D. Ill.
1989); Intel Corp. v. Malaysian Airline Sys., 652 F. Supp. 1101, 1104–05 (N.D. Cal.
1987); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69, 73–74 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Mc-
Loughlin v. Commercial Airways (Pty) Ltd., 602 F. Supp. 29, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
Recumar, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 795, 799 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
356 In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. 1141, 1142–43, 1154 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
357 Lu v. Air China Int’l Corp., No. CV 92-1254 (RR), 1992 WL 453646, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1992); Byrne v. Japan Airlines, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 9162 (JFK),
1984 WL 1343, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1984).
358 See ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 343, at 9, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 161.
359 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2002).
360 That case was In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 213–14.
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would have to be clearly indicated, having regard to the jurispru-
dence which might or might not exist in some countries.”361
This comment has been read as proof that FNC cannot apply
unless specifically provided for in MC99.362 While this is sug-
gested by the immediate context provided by the IUAI Ob-
server’s comments, the full context shows that the better and
clearly intended meaning was otherwise. Let us recall that the
Australian proposal was vaguely formed, and it had been noted
by some States that they would have difficulty implementing it
into their legal systems.363 In other words, the courts of civil law
States would be unable to give effect to it, since they did not
have a doctrine of FNC or something akin to it. What the Chair-
man was recognizing was that if States were going to use FNC, it
would have to be explicitly provided for, i.e., courts of those
States would need to be empowered directly by the Convention.
In other words, this was not a matter to leave to national law to
decide, since that would not ensure its application, as evidenced
by U.K. jurisprudence and the purported practice of the U.S.
courts.
It is not clear that the significance of Milor was appreciated by
the Chairman or anyone else. Unfortunately, the Delegate of
the U.K. did not bring clarity to the issue. The Delegate noted,
in reference to the comments made by the IUAI Observer, that
FNC was unavailable in relation to the four Warsaw Convention
361 ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 343, at 10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 162. The Chairman
had also said:
If, as indicated by the Observer from the IUAI, there were no cases
in the United States in which the principle of forum non conveniens
had been applied to Convention cases, then it would indicate the
importance of dealing with that as an issue, certainly in relation to
the fifth jurisdiction.
Id.
362 This argument was raised by the Pierre-Louis plaintiffs from In re West Carib-
bean Airways in their appeal brief submitted to the Eleventh Circuit. See Appel-
lant’s Initial Consolidated Brief at 12, 27–28, Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584
F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-15828, No. 07-15830, No. 07-15902) (“[T]he
United States proposed amending paragraph 4 of the jurisdiction article (stating
that ‘[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the Court seised of
the case’) by adding the phrase ‘including the doctrine of forum non conveniens or
other similar doctrines.’ The United States delegate made this proposal in part to
give a ‘certain degree of comfort’ to those jurisdictions with the fnc doctrine,
suggesting that even he believed that without such language [FNC] might not be permitted
under the Convention.” (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
363 See supra notes 342–43 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions “as a result of implementing the Warsaw Conven-
tion into the national legislation of the [U.K.].”364 He then went
on to say that the Group would not really be “modernizing and
consolidating the Warsaw Convention” if it required plaintiffs to
fight for their choice of forum by leaving it open for the courts
to dismiss on FNC grounds.365 In his view, this could “introduce
litigation at a point where it did not currently exist”—except
presumably in those jurisdictions (e.g., the United States) that
applied FNC under the Warsaw Convention—and, furthermore,
it “could lead to the possible elimination of the plaintiff’s
rights.”366 In so doing, the Delegate of the U.K. was confirming
the gist of the Milor decision, and he hinted at its ratio by men-
tioning the possible elimination of the plaintiff’s rights.
Had the ratio of Milor been raised, i.e., the incompatibility of
FNC with the substantive right of plaintiffs to choose their fo-
rum, it is unthinkable that it would not have provoked comment
and debate at the MC99 Conference. It would have offered the
civil law States, for which the doctrine is anathema, a gilt-edged
opportunity to banish it from this new Convention entirely. The
absence of any such debate is the strongest proof that the consis-
tency of FNC with the Convention was never questioned.
Before the Group moved away from the topic of jurisdiction,
the Delegate from Singapore (a common law jurisdiction) sug-
gested that the words “at the option of the plaintiff” could be
read as providing the plaintiff with the initial choice of forum,
but that thereafter, the rules of that chosen forum would ap-
ply.367 Where available, the court would be entitled to apply
FNC to dismiss the case, and in such circumstances, the plaintiff
could bring the action in one of the other jurisdictions.368 What
is notable is that the Delegate made it very clear that the plain-
tiff may choose the forum, but that choice may be subject to
FNC (where applicable). Yet, no objection was raised!
The Chairman admitted to being in a state of confusion at
this point in the discussion.369 To the Chairman’s way of think-
364 ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 343, at 10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 162. Strangely, this
suggests that the U.K. Delegate did not wish to make the point that the source of
the nonavailability of FNC was the Warsaw Convention itself; rather, it was its
implementation into U.K. law.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 See id. at 10–11, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 162–63.
368 See id.
369 Id. at 10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 162.
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ing, the positions discussed were irreconcilable.370 In the U.K.,
the plaintiff’s choice was treated as final and FNC was not ap-
plied, but on the other hand, the U.K. argued that the fifth juris-
diction’s application should somehow be circumscribed.371 The
Chairman summarized the two available options: (1) single out
the fifth jurisdiction and circumscribe its application in such a
way as to address these issues; or (2) recognize that all the juris-
dictions would be subject to an FNC-like rule.372
The Chairman thought the latter option “would modify even
the existing Convention rules.”373 It could be argued that this
comment, taken in isolation, might be read as suggesting that to
make FNC available under MC99 would require modifying the
existing rules of the Warsaw Convention.374 In other words, the
status quo was that FNC was prohibited by the existing Conven-
tion. However, the Chairman’s words ought to be read in con-
text. First, the discussion centered on the inclusion of express
wording on the mandatory application of FNC, which would nat-
urally involve modification of the existing rules.375 As it stood,
FNC was not mandated, but it would be if codified. Second,
making FNC applicable to all bases for jurisdiction—rather than
just the fifth—would amount to a modification of the Warsaw
Convention’s rules for certain States, e.g. the U.K., whose posi-
tion has just been described.376 Third, aside from the possible
reference to the Milor case, at no other point had any doubt
been raised about the consistency of FNC with the Warsaw Con-
vention or the new Convention.377 The United States made sev-
eral references without any opposition to its availability, and
discussions had always preceded on the basis. Fifth, in the same





374 This argument was also raised by the Pierre-Louis plaintiffs from In re West
Caribbean Airways in their appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. See Appellant’s Initial
Consolidated Brief, supra note 362, at 29–30 (“The drafting history thus shows
that the drafters debated whether fnc should be permitted under the Convention;
that they believed that for it to be permitted it needed to be codified in some
fashion in the Convention, ‘modifying’ the Convention’s existing rules; and that
they explored various means of codifying it, but were unable to secure adequate
support for doing so.”).
375 See ICAO, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 343, at 7–10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 159–62.
376 See id.
377 See id. at 9, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 161.
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clarified,”378 a turn of phrase that demonstrates the Chairman
was not speaking authoritatively but speculatively. That he spoke
of clarification proves that for those States which did apply FNC,
the application of the doctrine by its courts would be clarified by
MC99; there would not be a change of rule. The issue came
down to whether the new Convention was going to mandate the
application of FNC (and if so, whether for the fifth jurisdiction
only or for all), or whether it would leave the matter of applying
FNC to national law. At no point was there a proposal to pro-
hibit FNC.
The FCG moved ahead with drafting the Consensus Package
that was then discussed at its fifth and sixth meetings. Yet again,
the fifth jurisdiction dominated the discussion. The draft Con-
sensus Package incorporated into the jurisdiction clause an
FNC-like test based on the Australian proposal.379 It applied only
to the fifth jurisdiction and expressly authorized the court to de-
cline jurisdiction (in favor of an alternative available forum) in
certain specified circumstances.380 The Chairman explained that
a convention rule had become necessary to ensure uniformity
because the doctrine did not exist in the legal systems of some
States.381 He did not say that it was necessary because the new
Convention would otherwise proscribe the application of FNC
by those States which had the doctrine. The FNC-like rule was
not mandatory; it was to be a permissive rule.382
378 Id. at 10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 162 (emphasis added).
379 See ICAO, Draft Consensus Package (Presented by the President of the Conference),
at 4, DCW-FFG Doc. No. 1, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 491, 494.
380 Id.
381 ICAO, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group, at 5
(May 20, 1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 167, 171. In introducing the
Consensus Package, the Chairman described the FNC paragraph of the jurisdic-
tion article:
Article 27, paragraph 4 now authorized the court to decline juris-
diction in certain specified circumstances, making it a rule of the
Convention. It was necessary to make it a rule of the Convention
because of the need for uniformity; whereas the doctrine of forum
non conveniens might well exist in some jurisdictions, it might not
exist in others. In much the same way that provision was being
made for unique circumstances of liability and a host of other mat-
ters in the Convention, so too it became necessary to ensure that
these elements would apply in whatever forum.
Id.
382 Id. Although permissive, the Chairman did explain that a court “would be
obliged to address its mind” to the issues stated under the rule in coming to its
conclusion, i.e., it was to be a quasi-permissive rule. Id.
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The proposed rule perplexed the United States, which re-
mained opposed to anything which would make reliance on the
fifth jurisdiction more onerous than the other four.383 Instead,
the United States proposed scrapping the rule and reverting to
its former proposal that would have maintained the text of Arti-
cle 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention (i.e., “questions of proce-
dure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of the
case”), and then adding to this the following clarification: “that
nothing here was intended to limit the ability of courts, in their
discretion, applying the law of the court seised of the case to
dismiss cases that more properly belonged in one of the other
jurisdictions.”384 This would maintain the status quo, which the
United States understood as meaning that FNC would apply to
all five jurisdictions for those States which had the doctrine
while leaving it open for other States to follow suit if they so
decided.385
The Delegate of Sweden voiced support for this proposal
(echoed by the Observer from the European Community) and
voiced concerns that the Convention FNC rule could block rati-
fication by many States of the civil law tradition.386 Of the U.S.
proposal, he observed: “States who at the moment applied the
principle of forum non conveniens could continue to do so.”387
The Delegate of Switzerland thought the problem of FNC was
not “a matter of substance, but of procedure,” that the Confer-
ence should focus on unifying substantive provisions, and that
the proposed FNC rule was “unclear.”388 Instead, he suggested
maintaining the wording from Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Con-
vention and deleting the remainder of the proposed text.389
This is what was done and how the text appeared in the final
draft of the Consensus Package,390 which was presented to the
Commission of the Whole on May 25, 1999, to grand ap-
383 ICAO, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group, at 6
(May 21, 1999), in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 175, 180.
384 Id.
385 See id.
386 Id. at 7, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 181.
387 Id.
388 Id. at 8, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 182.
389 Id.
390 See ICAO, Consensus Package (Presented by the President of the Conference), supra
note 239, at 3–4, in MC99 DOCUMENTS, supra note 239, at 273–74.
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plause.391 Notable by its absence was any provision attempting to
codify or affirm the application of FNC.
The Chairman’s summation of the sixth meeting of the FCG
suggests that the fate of the attempted codification of FNC into
the Convention had been defeated by concerns relating to im-
posing the doctrine on the legal systems of States for which it
was foreign, along with consequential issues of ratification.392 It
is also submitted, as already considered above, that the real issue
had been ensuring that a sufficient nexus existed between the
carrier and the fifth jurisdiction.393 This had been achieved by
requiring certain links to exist between the fifth jurisdiction and
both the carrier and the passenger. As a result, the French bo-
geyman of a fifth jurisdiction based on the sole criterion of na-
tionality had been exorcized. That said, there was no longer the
need—from the civil law State perspective—to codify a rule of
FNC, since the fifth jurisdiction had been so sufficiently circum-
scribed that it was regarded as an appropriate forum.
It can be argued that the fact that Article 33 of MC99 contains
neither the codified version of FNC nor the U.S. proposal af-
firming the doctrine demonstrates that the drafters did not in-
tend for FNC to play a role in MC99 at all. Insofar as this
argument is limited to FNC playing an explicit role, then it is
plainly correct and unobjectionable. However, if one wishes to
argue that this shows that the drafters thereby sought to pro-
scribe the application of FNC under le droit commun (i.e., where
available), then it is clearly wrong. The drafting history reveals
the availability of FNC under le droit commun was frequently af-
firmed by the drafters from start to finish. Although the Milor
case was averred to, its full significance was only hinted at but
not appreciated. At no point was the proposition explicitly
raised that FNC was not available under the Warsaw Convention
on the grounds that it was inconsistent with Warsaw’s substan-
tive provisions. Yet, this was the conclusion that the plaintiffs in
In re West Caribbean Airways sought to persuade the court to
reach with respect to MC99.
391 See ICAO, Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, supra
note 239, at 1, 7, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 199, 205.
392 See ICAO, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the “Friends of the Chairman” Group,
supra note 383, at 9–10, in MC99 MINUTES, supra note 212, at 183–84 (Chairman’s
comments).
393 See supra notes 324–30 and accompanying text.
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C. THE AVAILABILITY OF FNC UNDER MC99
1. Back to In re West Caribbean Airways
This brings us back to In re West Caribbean Airways and the
overarching question of this Article: is the doctrine of FNC avail-
able under MC99? Although the author ultimately agrees with
the position reached by Judge Ungaro (i.e., that FNC is available
under MC99), he disagrees with the ratio upon which that deter-
mination was made. In addition, there are several issues with the
court’s opinion that need to be addressed, as they may provide
grounds for future challenges. Judge Ungaro’s opinion was thor-
ough, and the court’s approach to treaty interpretation correct.
For that reason, it will be convenient to follow the same struc-
ture in this Article as in the opinion.
a. The Text
Commencing with the text of Article 33, Judge Ungaro found
it to be “unambiguous and dispositive” in providing that ques-
tions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the forum.394
Although FNC was not explicitly mentioned in the text, the
court held that because FNC was so firmly established as a rule
of procedure in the United States at the time of the drafting of
MC99, the text “by implication” clearly covered it.395 Unlike
other courts that had addressed the same issue, the court in In re
West Caribbean Airways based its textual interpretation on the
whole text of Article 33 and not simply on the Article 33(1) or
33(4) provisions.396
It is glaringly obvious that the court’s conclusion that “the text
unambiguously permits application of the [FNC] doctrine in
Montreal Convention cases”397 conflicts with the conclusions
reached in Hosaka and Milor. In both of those cases, the courts
had regarded the text of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention to
be ambiguous.398 Naturally, this was something the plaintiffs in
In re West Caribbean Airways were eager to point out, given that
the relevant texts of Article 33 of MC99 and Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention are substantially the same.399 The key distin-
394 In re W. Caribbean Airways, S.A., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla.
2007).
395 Id.
396 See id. at 1311.
397 Id.
398 See supra notes 161–72, 176–99 and accompanying text.
399 In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1308–09.
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guishing feature is that in Hosaka and Milor, the courts had not
based their determination of ambiguity solely on a literal inter-
pretation of the text but had reached that view having inter-
preted the text in its context within the treaty and in light of its
purpose.400 Judge Ungaro’s opinion had begun with a purely lit-
eral interpretation.401 Thankfully, she did not stop there. De-
spite declaring the text “dispositive,”402 she accepted that the
interpretative task did not end with the text, and she acknowl-
edged that the court had the “responsibility to interpret Article
33 consistently with the shared expectations of the contracting
parties” and that this obliged recourse be had to the other
means of interpretation.403
b. Historical Context
While there exists shared textual identity between the Warsaw
Convention and MC99 in relation to rules of procedure being
governed by the law of the forum, Judge Ungaro was quick to
identify the difference in historical context.404 The decisions in
Milor and Hosaka could be distinguished from In re West Carib-
bean Airways because, in the former cases, the courts had been
concerned with the interpretation of a convention concluded in
1929, “at a time when the [FNC] doctrine was rarely utilized, its
contours were undeveloped and its ‘procedural’ character was
unsettled.”405 However, by 1999, FNC was firmly established and
frequently utilized, so any confusion relating to its doctrinal sta-
tus as a rule of procedure, rather than one of substance, had
been resolved by the U.S. courts.406 It was also noted that Hosaka
had not yet been decided and that the only current U.S. author-
ity directly addressing the issue had found FNC to be availa-
400 Id. at 1309, 1311–12.
401 See id. at 1309.
402 Id. at 1310.
403 Id. at 1311 (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167
(1999)).
404 Id. at 1311–14.
405 Id. at 1312.
406 In American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994), the Supreme
Court stated:
At bottom, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is nothing more or
less than a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement
of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions,
the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined. But
venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive
rights—determining which among various competent courts will
decide the case.
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ble.407 However, Judge Ungaro made no mention of Milor in this
context.
The consideration of the historical context boiled down to
the matter of the interpretation of the words “questions of pro-
cedure” in Warsaw Convention Article 28(2) and MC99 Article
33(4).408 Essentially, did the meaning of those words encompass
the doctrine of FNC? For Judge Ungaro, the varying historical
context between the Warsaw Convention and that of MC99 did
not compel the court to reach the same conclusion.409 Simply
put, Judge Ungaro’s view was that in 1929, the meaning of the
term “questions of procedure” could not be interpreted as in-
cluding FNC, whereas it could be in 1999.410 This line of argu-
ment is open to three criticisms. First, its historical accuracy is
questionable. Second, it is fundamentally wrong. Third, it mis-
understands the rationes decidendi of Milor and Hosaka.
In terms of its historical accuracy, it is clear from the history of
FNC that in 1929, the doctrine was far from firmly established in
U.S. or English law; in fact, it was still regarded as an oddity of
Scots law.411 What did exist was a vague doctrinal basis for a gen-
eral discretionary power of a court to decline otherwise valid ju-
risdiction.412 Even so, the relevance of the U.S. legal perspective
is weak given that the United States did not actively participate
in the drafting of the Warsaw Convention. More relevant is the
fact that, at Warsaw, the British Delegate had made a proposal
to include wording to provide for a discretionary power to de-
cline jurisdiction, but he had not insisted upon it for reasons
unknown.413 Thus, while the drafters of the Convention may not
have known of FNC by name, they certainly knew that some-
thing similar was a feature of the common law landscape at the
407 In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1312–13 (citing In re Air Crash
Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1161–62 (5th Cir. 1987)).
408 Id. That this was the court’s viewpoint is clear from its statement that “there
is little, if any evidence, reflecting that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention
then understood that the inclusion of the language ‘[q]uestions of procedure
shall be governed by the law of the court seised of the case’ encompassed forum
non conveniens.” Id. at 1312 (alterations in original).
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 For some history of FNC, the reader is directed to David Cluxton, Getting
FNC Back on the Right Track: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Federal Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 72, 76–86 (2018). See generally RONALD A.
BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and
Future Under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2007).
412 Cluxton, supra note 411, at 87.
413 See supra notes 106–08, 141–46, 189–93 and accompanying text.
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time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting. The situation was not
as clear-cut as Judge Ungaro’s opinion appears to have assumed.
The veracity of the line of argumentation may be challenged
on the grounds that it is irrelevant whether the delegates were
aware of FNC or whether they did (or would have) regarded it
as covered by the term “questions of procedure” in Article
28(2). Such a broad term was deliberately used in order to avoid
the need to catalogue or make express provision for each and
every rule of procedure. The cardinal purpose of the Warsaw
Convention was to achieve uniformity of certain rules.414 Rather
than seek the impossible (i.e., exhaustive unification), the scope
of unification was limited to essential matters. They intended to
leave much to le droit commun, with questions of procedure being
one such example. All of which is to say, by way of a hypotheti-
cal, that if a Contracting Party to the Warsaw Convention had
decided to create an entirely new rule of procedure in 1935, the
compatibility of such a rule with the Convention could not be
challenged solely on the basis that it was not specifically within
the contemplation of the drafters in 1929.
The question that can legitimately be posed in the context of
the distinctive historical background to the Warsaw Convention
and MC99 is not so much a matter of the comparative meaning
of Warsaw Convention Article 28(2) and MC99 Article 33(4),
but one of Article 28(1) and 33(1), respectively. Did the drafters
of Article 28(1) intend to create a substantive right making a
plaintiff’s choice of forum absolute and exclusive such that the
meaning of Article 28(2) had to read as excluding FNC? Hosaka
and Milor had both concluded that this was indeed the case in
Warsaw in 1929. This was the ratio decidendi in both cases. Judge
Ungaro’s opinion did not appreciate this. The court asked the
wrong question. It is not a question of whether FNC was contem-
plated by the drafters as one of the rules of procedure under
Article 28(2). The real question is whether Article 28(2) had to
be read as qualified by Article 28(1), i.e., as only including rules
of procedure to the extent that they do not conflict with the
substantive provisions of Article 28(1). Had the court addressed
itself to this question, then it would have to ask whether the an-
swer given in Milor and Hosaka held true in the case of Article
33(4) of MC99. This is the biggest failing in In re West Caribbean
Airways, and we shall return to it in the Conclusion.
414 See supra part II.A.1.
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c. Purpose
Judge Ungaro noted that the reasoning of the court in Hosaka
was based on the accepted purposes of the Warsaw Convention,
and the opinion correctly noted that it could not be assumed
that the purposes of MC99 are identical.415 Nevertheless, Judge
Ungaro did not disregard the relevance of the Warsaw Conven-
tion to the interpretation of the purposes of MC99. Instead, the
analysis in her opinion mostly reveals an appreciation of their
interrelationship and the continued relevance of the Warsaw
Convention. However, the analysis of the purpose of MC99
raises a number of issues.
As a preliminary observation, the court was not unequivocal
in defining the purposes of MC99. To begin with, in the authori-
tative statement as to the purposes of MC99, they are: (1) to
modernize and consolidate WCS; and (2) to ensure the protec-
tion of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air
and their need for equitable compensation based on the princi-
ple of restitution.416 Judge Ungaro based this on a mere reading
of the preamble to MC99 and thereby failed to appreciate that
the cardinal goal of MC99 remains, like that of the Warsaw Con-
vention, the pursuit of uniformity of certain rules. However, a
couple of paragraphs after this statement of purpose, the opin-
ion conceded that uniformity and predictability were amongst
the objectives of the drafters of MC99 but referred to them as
mere aspirations.417 This is simply wrong and substantially down-
plays the cardinal importance of uniformity within MC99. Ironi-
cally, later in the section of the opinion on the purpose of
MC99, she referred to “the predominant objectives” of MC99 as
being “the creation of a new uniform system of liability gov-
erning the international transportation of passengers and cargo,
and the balancing of the interests of the air carriers and passen-
gers.”418 This latter description is actually more accurate, but it
415 In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1314–15.
416 Id. at 1314 (“Plaintiff’s argument fails to take account of the fact that the
stated purpose of the Montreal Convention was to ‘modernize and consolidate
the Warsaw Convention and related instruments,’ and to ‘ensur[e] protection of
the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equi-
table compensation based on the principle of restitution.’” (alterations in origi-
nal) (footnote omitted) (citing MC99, supra note 14, pmbl.)).
417 See id. at 1315. The court accepted “Plaintiffs’ assertion that the drafters of
the Montreal Convention, like the drafters of the Warsaw Convention, aspired to
uniformity and predictability in the implementation of its liability scheme.” Id.
418 Id. at 1316.
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was not presented as the authoritative statement like the first
aspirational description was. These two “definitions” are not
fully consistent, yet the court never attempted to assimilate or
reconcile them, nor was one or the other stated in the conclu-
sion to the judgment.419 The resulting difficulty is that one can-
not be sure what the court’s understanding of the purposes of
MC99 was and thus how it informed its final decision. In addi-
tion to this, Judge Ungaro did not specifically address the ques-
tion of the object and purpose of the MC99’s jurisdictional
scheme.
Moving to the specifics of the court’s argument regarding
FNC and the purpose of MC99, as modernization of the Warsaw
Convention was one of the goals of MC99, Judge Ungaro
surmised that this supported the availability of FNC, as it would
accord with modern practice at the time of the drafting of the
Convention.420 At that point in time, in the only U.S. case to
address the question under the Warsaw Convention, the court
had found the doctrine to be applicable.421 Curiously, no men-
tion was made of Milor in relation to this point, despite it repre-
senting countervailing authority for the modern practice of the
English courts. In any case, aside from the fact that In re West
Caribbean Airways exposes a common law bias, since it assumes
the drafters intended to modernize the convention in the image
of common law practice, Judge Ungaro’s point is unpersuasive
for another more fundamental reason. That is, it assumes that
the object of modernization was intended to apply extensively.
This was clearly not the case and is demonstrated by the twin
object of consolidation. The drafters intended to consolidate
the Warsaw system; indeed, it might arguably be claimed that
this was preeminent in their considerations because they took
the text of the Warsaw Convention as their starting point. Hav-
ing done so, they made adjustments in the name of moderniza-
tion, e.g., the addition of the fifth jurisdiction. Other than that,
the specific jurisdictional provisions in question remained
419 See id. at 1328.
420 Id. at 1315.
421 See generally In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1153
(5th Cir. 1987). There were many U.S. cases that had applied the doctrine in the
context of the Warsaw Convention, and at least one foreign court decision could
be cited in support, such as a judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal. See
Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR 776,
777, [2]–[5] (CA) (Sing).
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largely unchanged. If anything, this suggests consolidation
rather than modernization.
Within the context of the second articulation of the purposes
of MC99, Judge Ungaro appeared to concede that FNC would,
at first glance, appear to be inconsistent with uniformity. How-
ever, since MC99 (like the Warsaw Convention) only sought uni-
fication of certain rules (i.e., not all rules), she was not prepared
to presume that the goal of uniformity necessarily meant that
FNC was inherently incompatible with MC99’s jurisdictional
scheme.422 That much is true, but it does not answer the ques-
tion of the inconsistency between FNC and the goal of uniform-
ity. To do this, Judge Ungaro referred to MC99’s travaux
préparatoires that showed that the delegates were clearly aware
that FNC was routinely applied by U.S. courts and that no pro-
posal was ever made to explicitly exclude the doctrine.423 While
proposals of various types were made with respect to codifying
FNC,424 the delegates had ultimately been unable to reach a
consensus on the issue for fear that codification would result in
mandatory application of the doctrine, even for those States
whose legal system did not currently have such a doctrine. In-
stead, the delegates decided to retain the existing wording for
Article 33(4). This suggested to Judge Ungaro that the delegates
had intended to maintain the status quo.425
Next, it was recognized that one of the predominant objec-
tives of MC99 was to achieve a balance between the interests of
the air carrier and the passenger.426 The reasoning adopted by
the courts in Hosaka and Milor had been to the effect that FNC
would interfere with this balance by subverting the substantive
right granted to plaintiffs to choose their forum from amongst
those available. In Milor and Hosaka, the courts had placed great
422 See In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
423 Id. at 1316.
424 See supra part III.B.2.b.
425 Judge Ungaro stated:
The absence of language articulating forum non conveniens princi-
ples in the final document, thus, suggests that the drafters intended
to maintain the status quo: that United States courts, as well as the
courts of other States recognizing the doctrine, would continue to
apply forum non conveniens in Montreal Convention and other cases,
while others would not.
In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
426 Id. at 1316 (“Like the Warsaw Convention, the predominant objectives of
the Montreal Convention were the creation of a new uniform system of liability
governing the international transportation of passengers and cargo, and the bal-
ancing of the interests of the air carriers and the passengers.”).
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significance on the consistency of their interpretation of Article
28(2) with the creation of what they viewed as a substantive right
of plaintiffs to choose their forum under Article 28(1)—so
much so that those courts’ determination that the application of
FNC was precluded under the Warsaw Convention was funda-
mentally premised on that understanding of the Convention’s
jurisdictional scheme. This was critical nuance to the reasoning
of those two decisions that was not adequately considered in In
re West Caribbean Airways. Judge Ungaro failed to appreciate that
the essence of the rationes decidendi in Milor and Hosaka rested on
the recognition of a substantive right under Article 28(1). In the
end, she dismissed them, stating: “The record also does not re-
flect that drafters of [MC99], assuming they understood [FNC]
to be a jurisdictional question, accorded the objective of formu-
lating a ‘self-contained jurisdictional code’ the primacy ascribed
in the Hosaka and Milor opinions to the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention.”427 This is weak judicial reasoning.
Turning to practicalities, Judge Ungaro could not see how the
doctrine would undermine the two purposes of MC99, i.e., uni-
formity and the balance of interests.428 Focusing on the latter,429
her opinion explained that the jurisdictional scheme of MC99
ensures that the forum selected by the plaintiff has a significant
connection to the carrier.430 She did not see FNC as being in-
consistent with this balance because FNC is not capable of pro-
viding grounds for dismissing a case in favor of the courts of a
State which does not have jurisdiction under MC99.431 In one
427 Id.
428 See id.
429 When it came to uniformity, Judge Ungaro had very little to say. She opined
that FNC actually promotes uniformity because it facilitates the consolidation of
multiple claims arising from an air disaster within a single forum State. See id. at
1317. FNC may well operate to reduce the multiplicity of claims where those
States with the doctrine exercise it uniformly and identify a single forum to which
the cases are transferred, but its success in consolidation will likely only be partial
in any given case. Regardless, this point is inconsequential. The consolidation of
claims in a single State was not a stated objective of MC99 and is arguably incon-
sistent with a scheme that nominates several possible forums and grants each
injured plaintiff the initiative to choose. The more reasonable understanding is
that the drafters appreciated that their jurisdictional scheme inherently mini-
mized the number of forums in which a carrier would be sued in respect to a
single disaster. They understood perfectly well that the carrier would face claims
in a number of different jurisdictions and more than likely saw this as a conces-
sion to the convenience of the claimant. Had the drafters wished to ensure con-
solidation, then they would have expressly provided for it.
430 See id. at 1316.
431 See id.
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sense, the worst that FNC can do is require that a plaintiff bring
proceedings in one of the other specified forums.432 In any case,
the eventual forum will be one of those envisaged by the draft-
ers. The effect of the operation of FNC would thus not be preju-
dicial to the balance of interests struck between passengers and
carriers.433 The obvious weakness in this argument is that it de-
pends on ignoring the substantive right argument. If the juris-
dictional scheme of MC99 intended to grant plaintiffs a
substantive right to choose their forum from amongst those
available under the scheme, then FNC undoubtedly interferes
with that right and therefore with the balance of interests. In
simple terms, FNC takes the initiative away from the plaintiff.
d. Drafting History
The drafting history of MC99 provides the strongest support
for the conclusion that FNC is available as a procedural tool
under Article 33(4), so it is unsurprising a large portion of the
judgment in In re West Caribbean Airways is taken up with re-
counting it.434 As it has been presented in the above subsection,
it will suffice for present purposes to note the conclusions
reached by the court. The drafting history showed that the dele-
gates were keenly aware of FNC and that it had occupied a good
deal of their discussions over the fifth jurisdiction.435 No propo-
sal was made that would have expressly excluded the application
of FNC.436 On the contrary, various proposals were made with a
view to either clarify its applicability or codify a version of it for
MC99.437 Judge Ungaro noted that the United States “actively
and persistently opposed the inclusion of any forum non con-
veniens language except to clarify its general applicability, all
while making it abundantly clear that United States courts
would continue to employ the doctrine in Montreal Convention
432 Id.
433 Judge Ungaro’s opinion also stressed that under the U.S. doctrine, a plain-
tiff’s choice of forum is entitled to deference such that the choice will only be
disturbed in circumstances where the alternative forum is shown to be more ap-
propriate. Id. at 1316–17. That the U.S. doctrine shows less deference to a foreign
plaintiff was only noted in an understated fashion, with Judge Ungaro merely
observing that a U.S. citizen or resident is entitled to “somewhat more deference”
than foreign plaintiffs. See id. at 1317 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 255 n.23 (1981)).
434 See id. at 1317–26.
435 Id. at 1317.
436 Id.
437 Id. at 1319.
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and other international cases.”438 These proposals were ulti-
mately not adopted, not because of a desire to exclude FNC but
rather to avoid the difficulty of mandating its application by
States for which the doctrine (or something similar) was not al-
ready a feature of their legal system.439 Judge Ungaro concluded
that the drafting history showed that “the delegates determined
to maintain the status quo.”440 States that employed the doctrine
would continue to do so.
e. Post-Ratification Understanding
Given how recently MC99 had been concluded, the parties
had little to work with in terms of post-ratification understand-
ing.441 However, the court had the benefit of a Statement of In-
terest (submitted as an amicus curiae brief) outlining the
position of the U.S. Executive Branch.442 It was the opinion of
the U.S. government that Article 33(4) meant that MC99 “defers
to the forum’s law on all questions of procedure and manifests
an intent by the drafters not to alter the judicial system of any
country on questions of procedure.”443 This position was seen as
being compliant with U.S. interests, especially in utilizing FNC
as a means of controlling forum shopping and managing docket
congestion.444 Breard v. Greene was cited in support of this view-
point, thereby invoking the principle that, absent express provi-
438 Id. at 1326.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs managed to argue that the Executive Branch
had made some representations supporting the view that ensuring the availability
of FNC was not a central concern and that the jurisdictional provisions of the
Convention gave the claimant an absolute right to pursue a claim in the chosen
forum. See id. at 1327. On examination, the sources quoted by the plaintiffs did
not support their contention and could not be understood as meaning that the
U.S. Delegation had dispensed with FNC during the Montreal negotiations. See
id. at 1326–27. Plaintiffs’ argument was based on ridiculously narrow inferences
from points made by certain members of U.S. governmental departments. See
Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens at 25, In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp.
2d 1299 (No. 06–22748–CIV). Judge Ungaro quickly dispensed with these im-
plausible arguments. See In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1327.
442 The brief was prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice with the assis-
tance of the Department of State and Department of Transportation. Statement
of Interest of the United States at 1, 5, In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d
1299 (No. 06–22748–CIV).
443 Id. at 3.
444 Id. at 1. The United States declared its interests to be: (1) the “proper inter-
pretation and operation of the Convention”; (2) its status as a third-party defen-
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sion to the contrary, the procedural rules of the State shall
apply.445 In other words, if MC99 does not expressly prohibit
FNC then it, as a well-established rule of procedure, is applica-
ble in MC99 cases.
The U.S. government’s Statement of Interest emphasized that
at the time of MC99’s drafting and negotiation, the Hosaka deci-
sion had not been issued, and U.S. courts were uniformly apply-
ing FNC under the Warsaw Convention.446 The delegates at the
MC99 Conference were aware of this fact and had been en-
couraged by the U.S. Delegation to expect this to remain the
case. If one overlooks the fly in the ointment that is Milor, it is
exceedingly difficult to challenge this factual conclusion. Al-
though Judge Ungaro only summarized the views of the U.S.
government and did not state the degree of weight or deference
actually afforded to them, it is clear that the arguments put
forth were received sympathetically.447 Given the binding au-
thority of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, it can safely
be assumed that the court gave “great weight” to the views of the
U.S. government in interpreting MC99.448
2. Appellate Review and Subsequent Decisions
The court’s decision in In re West Caribbean Airways was re-
viewed by the court of appeals under the name Pierre-Louis v.
Newvac Corp.449 The appeal raised nothing of striking signifi-
cance with respect to the availability of FNC under MC99; in-
stead it briefly reviewed and affirmed the district court’s
reasoning.450 While Judge Ungaro’s opinion had been lengthy
and comprehensive in its approach to treaty interpretation, the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was sparse and patchy. It claimed to
have considered the drafting history,451 but this is simply not in
evidence. Although obliged to consider the object and purpose
dant in aviation litigation cases; and (3) avoidance of “congestion and forum
shopping.” Id.
445 See id. at 3 n.3 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per
curiam)).
446 Id. at 2.
447 In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
448 See id. Under the Supreme Court authority of Avagliano, “[a]lthough not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agen-
cies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.”
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982).
449 584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009).
450 Id. at 1061–62.
451 Id. at 1058 & n.8.
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of the treaty when interpreting its terms, the court gave only
sparse consideration to this means of interpretation.452 The light
touch adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is no doubt credit to the
quality of Judge Ungaro’s opinion to which the appellate court
showed great deference. However, in the few areas in which it
did venture to do more than merely affirm, it committed new
errors.
Although Judge Ungaro’s opinion had begun with a literal in-
terpretation that it had described as dispositive, it had nonethe-
less taken the process of treaty interpretation much further than
this. The Eleventh Circuit focused on the constrained, literal ap-
proach. It found “no ambiguity or limitation in the express lan-
guage of Article 33(4),”453 and it endorsed the conclusion that
this covered all rules of procedure of the forum State, including
FNC.454 It is a requirement of customary international law that
“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object and purpose.”455 The Eleventh
Circuit did not do this. Unlike the district court, it took only the
literal text of Article 33(4) and interpreted it without consider-
ing its meaning in the context of Article 33(1).456 To find the
452 The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision on the grounds
of countering the plaintiffs’ argument that FNC was inconsistent with the pur-
poses of MC99. See id. at 1060 n.9. The plaintiffs’ brief shows two strands to this
argument, corresponding to the two purposes of MC99, i.e., uniformity and bal-
ance of interests. See Appellant’s Initial Consolidated Brief, supra note 362, at
20–24. The court of appeals acknowledged the plaintiffs’ concerns but opined
that the doctrine provided sufficient safeguards for its application under MC99
because in all cases of dismissal, the alternative forum would not only be deemed
more appropriate but would also have to be one of the forums specified under
Article 33(4). Pierre-Louis, 584 F.3d at 1058. The court did not specify whether its
point went to the question of uniformity, balance of interests, or both, and the
lack of further elaboration makes it difficult to surmise the details of its rationale.
453 Pierre-Louis, 584 F.3d at 1058 (“We therefore find no ambiguity or limitation
in the express language of Article 33(4), which states in no uncertain terms that
questions of procedure—which can only reasonably be read to include all ques-
tions of procedure—are governed by the rules of the forum state.”).
454 Id. at 1057–58 (“The district court reasoned that because the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is part of United States civil procedure, the Convention
unambiguously permits its application in accordance with the law of the forum.
The district court also concluded that the shared expectation of the states party
to the Convention was that those states which recognized the doctrine could con-
tinue to apply it. We find no error in these conclusions.”).
455 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 31(1) (emphasis added); see
sources cited supra note 208.
456 This is clear from the court’s statement: “We therefore find no ambiguity or
limitation in the express language of Article 33(4), which states in no uncertain
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text of Article 33(4) unambiguous is only tenable by neglecting
to consider it in its proper context.
Like the district court, the court of appeals undervalued the
persuasive value of Milor and Hosaka by excluding them on the
grounds that those cases involved interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention (rather than MC99) and because the status of FNC
had changed between 1929 and 1999.457 These are valid observa-
tions that ought to be taken into account, but with respect to
Milor and Hosaka, the courts’ decisions in those cases did not
hinge on the status of FNC in 1929 (although it was a factor).
The truth seems to be that the Eleventh Circuit did not under-
stand what the rationes decidendi actually were in Milor or Hosaka.
This failure to appreciate the ratio decidendi of Hosaka was also
evidenced in In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, one of the few
other cases to consider the availability of FNC under MC99.458
Again, the plaintiffs sought to rely on Hosaka to avoid FNC dis-
missal of their MC99 claim.459 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California distinguished Hosaka, explaining
that it did not compel the conclusion that FNC is not available
under MC99 for two primary reasons.
The court’s first primary reason boiled down to distinguishing
Hosaka on the basis of the change in status of FNC between 1929
and 1999,460 i.e., the same argument put forth in Pierre-Louis.461
terms that questions of procedure—which can only reasonably be read to include
all questions of procedure—are governed by the rules of the forum state.” Pierre-
Louis, 584 F.3d at 1058. This is even more clearly suggested by the footnote ac-
companying this statement, wherein the court, speaking of Milor and Hosaka,
stated that those two cases “do not, as Plaintiffs suggest, create an ambiguity in
Article 33(4).” See id. at 1058 n.7.
457 “Among other distinguishing factors, both cases involved interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention, a predecessor to the Montreal Convention drafted in
1929, at which time forum non conveniens, in its current form, was not recog-
nized under U.S. law.” Id. The court made reference to the uncertain status of
FNC in 1929 and distinguished this from the shared expectations of the parties to
MC99 that FNC would continue to be applied by those States which recognize the
doctrine. Id. at 1057–58, 1058 n.7.
458 See In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, 760 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
459 Id. at 839.
460 Id. at 840. The second “primary reason” amounted to nothing more than
an invocation of the authority of the Pierre-Louis and Khan cases. Id. at 841 (citing
Pierre-Louis, 584 F.3d at 1058; Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 10-CV-2080, 2010
WL 3210717, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010)) (“Second, the courts that have ad-
dressed this issue in the context of [MC99] have held that forum non conveniens is
available.”).
461 See id. at 840–41.
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However, the district court’s summary of Hosaka was at times
misleading462 and inaccurate.463 It suggested that at the time of
the drafting of the Warsaw Convention, the doctrine of FNC was
relatively new; therefore, it would have required some express
provision in the treaty to authorize its application.464 Since the
Warsaw Convention was silent on the availability of FNC, it was
not available.465 However, the court found this logic did not ap-
ply to MC99 because when it was drafted, the status of FNC was
substantially different.466 Against this “changed backdrop,” the
court deduced that express provision was no longer required to
authorize its application, ergo, it is available under MC99.467
This was not the reasoning of Hosaka. The court in In re Air
462 The court stated that the Hosaka court had “recognized that the Warsaw
Convention incorporated the forum state’s procedural law, which as a general
matter in this country includes the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Id. at 839
(citing Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2002)). This
statement is misleading because it suggests that the court in Hosaka had accepted
that FNC was incorporated into the Warsaw Convention by Article 28(2). Judge
Fisher’s opinion concluded that the existence of two plausible interpretations
demonstrated ambiguity, and it ultimately held that FNC was not expressly incor-
porated into the Warsaw Convention. See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 1002.
463 The district court stated: “[T]he [Hosaka] court noted that the doctrine of
forum non conveniens conflicted with the purpose of the Warsaw Convention—
allowing plaintiffs flexibility in choice of forum—and ‘would undermine the
goal[s] of uniformity [and balance].’” In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, 760 F.
Supp. 2d at 839–40 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Hosaka,
305 F.3d at 996–97). This is an inaccurate reproduction of the Hosaka statement
on the purpose of the Warsaw Convention. It stated very clearly the view that the
Warsaw Convention had the dual purpose of uniformity and balance; there is no
mention of the Convention having the purpose of “allowing plaintiff’s flexibility
in choice of forum.” See id. at 840. What the court did note in Hosaka (referring
to Tseng and Milor) was that in limiting the potential forums available and giving
the plaintiff the initiative to choose, the delegates were striking a balance be-
tween the interests of carriers and passengers, which would be undermined by
FNC. See Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 997. However, this was clearly stated in subordinate
relation to the broader context of the second purpose of the Warsaw Convention,
i.e., balance of interests, whereas in In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, the dis-
trict court elevated it to the level of the purpose of the Warsaw Convention per
se. In so doing, the district court was exaggerating the importance of the claim-
ant’s choice of forum.
464 In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (citing Hosaka,
305 F.3d at 1002) (“At the time of the Warsaw Convention’s drafting in 1929, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was relatively new. Thus, the Warsaw Conven-
tion’s silence on the availability of forum non conveniens dismissal meant that it was
not available absent a clear statement to the contrary.”
465 Id.
466 Id.
467 Id. (“Against this changed backdrop, reaffirming (as the MC did) that a
state’s procedural law applies suggests that forum non conveniens dismissals are
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Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic either failed to realize this or chose to
ignore it.
That the court entirely missed the point of Hosaka is also clear
from its dismissal of the plaintiffs’ second line of argument.
Plaintiffs argued that FNC was inconsistent with the purpose of
the fifth jurisdiction, which they claimed was to provide passen-
gers with a forum in their home State.468 The court understood
this as essentially arguing that FNC would render a plaintiff’s
right to choose the fifth jurisdiction “meaningless.”469 Taken at
such a blunt level, the court was right to regard such a bald pro-
position as objectionable.470 However, just as Lord Justice Phil-
lips in Milor had not intended his statement that to give a
plaintiff a choice is to give him nothing, so too did the plaintiffs
in In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic not intend to be taken so
literally. It seems abundantly clear that they were invoking the
line of argument first raised in Milor and then endorsed by
Hosaka, that FNC was inconsistent with the purpose of MC99 to
achieve an equitable balance of interests. The court dodged this
argument, but it shall be addressed in the Conclusion.
In Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York came close to examining the true
ratio of Hosaka in the context of MC99.471 The court initially de-
termined that the literal text of Article 33(4) of MC99 “clearly,
and without limitation” provides that questions of procedure are
governed by the court seized of the case and that this unambigu-
ously includes FNC.472 It based this finding solely on the text of
Article 33(4), but the plaintiff was able to persuade the court
that the Hosaka decision had not been limited to the text of Arti-
cle 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention; that court had interpreted
available.”). The court cited the U.S. government’s Statement of Interest, submit-
ted in In re West Caribbean Airways, and Breard as support. Id. at 840 & n.5.
468 Id. at 839.
469 Id. at 841.
470 See id. The court explained that the fact that a plaintiff’s choice of the fifth
jurisdiction should remain subject to the procedural law of the forum State in the
form of FNC merely demonstrates the operation of the scheme of Article 33 and
reflects the delegates’ intention to leave the choice of forum subject to the proce-
dural law of the forum. Id.
471 Khan v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 10-CV-2080, 2010 WL 3210717, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010).
472 Id. The court explained that it “needs only to look to the text of the treaty
itself to conclude that the Montreal Convention unambiguously provides for a
district court to employ its own procedural rules, which include the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.” Id. (citing Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052,
1058 (11th Cir. 2009)).
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it in light of Article 28(1), and this court should hold likewise
for MC99 and Article 33.473 This allowed the court to acknowl-
edge the core reasoning of Hosaka, i.e., that reading Article
28(2) as including FNC would conflict with the substantive right
to choose one’s forum under Article 28(1).474 Nevertheless, the
court distinguished Hosaka on the basis that it decided the issue
for the Warsaw Convention, while also noting that the changed
status of FNC between 1929 and 1999 did not mandate the same
conclusion for MC99.475 The laziness of the court’s distinction is
unfortunate because there is substance there that will be fleshed
out in the Conclusion.
3. The French Connection
It will be recalled from the Introduction that directly after
Judge Ungaro’s FNC order was granted in January of 2009, the
plaintiffs had commenced proceedings in Martinique whereby
they petitioned the Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) of Fort-
de-France to declare itself without jurisdiction to hear the
claim.476 The plaintiffs maintained that they had not chosen the
TGI as their forum and only appeared before it because they
were forced to do so by the FNC dismissal of the U.S. district
court. It was their view that, under Article 33(1) and Article 46
of MC99, jurisdiction could only vest in a court by act of the
plaintiff’s choice, and regardless of Article 33(4), this choice of
forum cannot be checked by a rule of internal procedural law.477
Since they had chosen the U.S. district court and not the TGI,
the latter thus had no power to assume jurisdiction over the dis-
pute itself. The TGI rejected the plaintiffs’ request, which was
then affirmed by the cour d’appel.478 As a last cast of the dice,
473 See id. at *3.
474 Cf. id.
475 Id. (citing Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 1001 n.17, 1003
(9th Cir. 2002)) (“However, at the time the Warsaw Convention was drafted in
1929, unlike today, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not firmly estab-
lished as a procedural doctrine in the majority of the signatory countries. This
was a key factor in the Hosaka court finding an ambiguity in the treaty and reach-
ing the conclusion that it did.”).
476 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
477 See Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32, at 8.
478 The cour d’appel held:
[G]iven that among the fora competent under the Montreal Con-
vention is the court of the place of destination of carriage, namely
that of Fort-de-France, the court can only record that the [TGI],
the competency of which could not be disputed under cover of lack
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the plaintiffs requested review of the decision by the Cour de
Cassation in Paris, France.
On December 7, 2011, the Cour de Cassation found in favor
of the plaintiffs and quashed the decision of the cour d’appel.479
The Cour de Cassation’s holding with respect to Article 33(1)
and Article 46 of MC99 is as follows:
Whereas the choice of jurisdiction raised by the appellant
through the abovementioned text is contrary to a dispute being
decided by an equally competent jurisdiction other than the one
that it has chosen; whereas, in fact, this choice, which has been
accompanied by a restrictive list of competent forums in order to
reconcile the different interests present, implies, in order to sat-
isfy the objective of foreseeability, security and standardization
sought by the Convention of Montreal; whereas the plaintiff, and
he alone, has the choice of deciding before which jurisdiction
the dispute will in fact be decided, without an internal rule of
procedure leading to contradicting his imperative choice being
able to be enforced on him.480
The thrust of the judgment of the Cour de Cassation was that
the scheme of Article 33(1) and Article 46 provides a limited list
of forums from which the plaintiff has the right to choose in
which to have the dispute decided, and it would be inconsistent
with this choice, once made, if another court were to hear the
dispute.481 This scheme was adopted in order to satisfy the pur-
poses of predictability, certainty, and uniformity. Interestingly,
the Cour de Cassation did not hold that the Martinique court
lacked jurisdiction but rather that it was “currently unavailable”
given the plaintiffs’ choice of a U.S. forum.482 By assuming juris-
of jurisdictional power, is then the sole court with jurisdiction of
the dispute between the plaintiffs and the air carriers.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Fort-de-France–Martinique, June
25, 2009, 10/239 (Fr.), translated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32,
Ex. F, at 9.
479 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Dec.
7. 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 1201 (Fr.), translated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra
note 32, Ex. H, at 5.
480 Id. Ex. H, at 4.
481 See Adeline, supra note 44, at 317–18. One French commentator summa-
rized the holding as follows: “The plaintiff has absolute freedom to select the
court of his or her choice, as the Montreal Convention ousts the forum non con-
veniens defence. It grants the plaintiff a mandatory and exclusive choice that may
not be challenged.” Id. at 320.
482 Cour de cassation, 1e civ., Dec. 7, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 1201 (“DECLARE
l’indisponibilité actuelle du for français”), translated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier,
supra note 32, Ex. H, at 5, 15 (first quoting the English translation and then
quoting the original French text) (“DECLARES the current unavailability of the
2020] FORUM NON CONVENIENS UNDER MC99 97
diction under the circumstances, the court of Martinique vio-
lated the terms of MC99.483
The Cour de Cassation judgment was made with express refer-
ence to Articles 33(1) and 46 of MC99; while Article 33(4) was
cited as part of the plaintiffs’ grounds for appeal,484 it is not
clear if it featured in the Court’s reasoning. It is nowhere refer-
enced directly. If one were being charitable, it could be sug-
gested that consideration of Article 33(4) was implicit in the
Court’s reference to an “internal rule of procedure.”485 How-
ever, in these circumstances, the decision of the Court must be
French venue”). Adeline observed the unusual concept of “currently unavaila-
ble,” stating:
“Current non-availability” is an unusual concept, enshrined here
for the first time by the Cour de cassation, on an equal footing with
the concepts of lack of jurisdiction and authority. It suggests that a
French jurisdiction will have to deal with the case if US courts insist
on their staying a case, thereby avoiding the denial of justice and
securing the sovereignty of foreign courts. No doubt that the
phrase “non-availability” was selected to refer to the “available fo-
rum” principle, which is a prerequisite to the granting of a forum
non conveniens motion. Except for situations where another foreign
forum is “more convenient,” the only option left to US courts about
to be removed from a case will be to proceed with it.
Adeline, supra note 44, at 322. The affidavit submitted by the defendants contain-
ing the declaration of a French legal expert suggested that the French forum
remained a viable forum for the litigation in circumstances where no alternative
forum exists anywhere else in the world. See Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra
note 32, at 12–13. In such circumstances, a French court may accept jurisdiction
(even where it would not otherwise have jurisdiction) in order to prevent the risk
of a denial of justice. See id. at 12. This supports the view that the French Court
may have intended “currently unavailable” to keep the door open in case the U.S.
court refused to change its mind.
483 Cour de cassation, 1e civ., Dec. 7, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 1201, translated in
Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32, Ex. H, at 4.
484 See Observations à l’appui du pourvoi n° Q 10-30.919 [Remarks in Support
of Appeal No. Q 10-30.919] (Bapte Plaintiffs Brief Cour de Cassation), 1e civ.,
Dec. 7, 2011, Bull. civ. I. No. 1201 (Fr.), translated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier,
supra note 32, Ex. G, at 8.
485 See Cour de cassation, 1e civ., Dec. 7, 2011, Bull. civ. I, No. 1201 (Fr.), trans-
lated in Declaration of Casati-Ollier, supra note 32, Ex. H, at 4. One commentator,
very much on the French side of the debate, holds to this interpretation:
In order to satisfy the foreseeability, certainty, and uniformity
objectives pursued by the Montreal Convention, the option implies
that the plaintiff alone has a right to decide which court will hear
the dispute, and no domestic procedural rule should be invoked
that might frustrate his mandatory choice. Here, the Court clearly
rejects the reasoning based on Article 33, paragraph 4, of the Mon-
treal Convention.
Adeline, supra note 44, at 318.
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taken at face value as having been based solely on Article 33(1).
In so doing, the Court failed to interpret Article 33(1) in the
context of Article 33(4), and this is contrary to the general rule
of treaty interpretation laid down by the Vienna Convention.
A further problem with the Cour de Cassation’s decision is
that it was given without any consideration of the drafting his-
tory (travaux préparatoires) of MC99; this is not surprising, given
the brevity of the Court’s judgment.486 While not mandatory
under customary international law—unless the general rule of
interpretation does not resolve the ambiguity—the travaux may
still be referred to in order to confirm the meaning arrived at
from application of the general rule.487 Even where convinced
of its interpretation, one would have hoped that in such conten-
tious and perilous circumstances, the Court would exercise its
common sense and at least refer to the travaux for confirmation.
Its refusal to do so, along with its error in failing to consider
Article 33(4), leaves the decision open to doubt.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Cour de Cassation’s intervention has given U.S.
courts some food for thought about how FNC might operate in
a case where the alternative forum is France, the position
adopted by U.S. courts on the fundamental issue of the availabil-
ity of the doctrine under MC99 still takes its lead from Judge
Ungaro’s opinion in In re West Caribbean Airways. It was cited ap-
provingly in 2016 by an Indiana district court in Dordieski v. Aus-
trian Airlines488 and in 2018 by an Illinois district court in Garcia
486 Mendelsohn and Ruiz levelled heavy criticism at the Cour de Cassation for
not carefully examining nor even mentioning the travaux, implying that this
amounted to an example of judicial irresponsibility. See Allan I. Mendelsohn &
Carlos J. Ruiz, US Court Rebuffs French High Court’s Attack on Forum Non-Conveniens
Doctrine, 37 AIR & SPACE L. 325, 330–31 (2012). It should not go without note that
Allan I. Mendelsohn was named among counsel for the defendants in In re West
Caribbean Airways. See In re W. Caribbean Airways, S.A., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301
(S.D. Fla. 2007). For similar criticism, see George N. Tompkins, Jr., The Continu-
ing Development of the Montreal Convention 1999 Jurisprudence, 37 AIR & SPACE L.
259, 261–62 (2012).
487 See Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 32.
488 Dordieski v. Austrian Airlines, AG, No 2:15CV180-PDS/PRC, 2016 WL
4437958, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016) (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens
applies equally to claims under the Montreal Convention brought in U.S. courts
as it does to cases brought in U.S. courts under U.S. laws.” (citing In re W. Carib-
bean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1316–17)).
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v. Aerovias de Mexico.489
It was noted above that Judge Ungaro asked the wrong ques-
tion in In re West Caribbean Airways.490 Instead of asking whether
the reference in Article 33(4) of MC99 to “questions of proce-
dure” was intended by the drafters to include the doctrine of
FNC, the question should be whether Articles 33(1) and 33(2)
of MC99 were intended to create a substantive right granting
plaintiffs the absolute and exclusive option to choose their fo-
rum from those available under MC99. If the answer to this
question is in the affirmative, then Article 33(4) must be read in
a manner consistent with that substantive right, i.e., as only in-
cluding rules of procedure to the extent that they do not con-
flict with the substantive provisions of Articles 33(1) and 33(2).
With regard to the Warsaw Convention, the courts in Milor and
Hosaka correctly determined that this was the correct under-
standing of the relationship between Article 28(1) and 28(2).
The question now is whether it remains the correct understand-
ing in the case of MC99.
Starting with the text of Article 33 of MC99, we have to con-
clude that the text is ambiguous because it is capable of yielding
two plausible interpretations. The option given to the plaintiff
to choose in which of the forums provided in Articles 33(1) and
33(2) to bring an action for damages is either to be regarded as
an absolute right of choice—such that the Article 33(4) must be
read as precluding the application of a rule of procedure (such
as FNC)—or, the option given is not an absolute right of choice
but is subject to the application of rules of procedure of the
chosen forum, even where they interfere with that right of
choice (e.g., FNC). While a purely literal reading of Article
33(4) would indicate the latter interpretation,491 this would not
be a legitimate interpretative approach under customary inter-
national law (as codified by the Vienna Convention).
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
489 Garcia v. Aerovias de Mex., S.A., No. 18 C 5517, 2018 WL 6570461, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2018) (“Article 33 does not provide . . . a selection mechanism
powerful enough to trump domestic rules of jurisdiction and procedure.” (citing
Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 2009)) (affirming
the district court’s decision in In re West Caribbean Airways)).
490 See supra part III.C.1.c.
491 See MC99, supra note 14, art. 33(4).
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context and in the light of its object and purpose.”492 In terms of
purpose, it is established above that there is great commonality
between MC99 and the Warsaw Convention.493 MC99 maintains
the twofold structure of the Warsaw Convention. Its cardinal
purpose remains that of avoiding conflict of laws through the
unification of certain rules relating to travel documentation and
air carrier liability. We have emphasized throughout this Article
that the purpose of uniformity is not all-encompassing but lim-
ited to certain (but not all) rules. These rules include the matter
of jurisdiction but do not extend, as shown by the language of
Article 33(4), to questions of procedure; these are left to le droit
commun. Yet, in pursuing a line of argument based on the pur-
pose of uniformity, all we really do is rehash the same points
that were raised with respect to the Warsaw Convention, which
are analyzed in Part II. In the end, it just leads to the same ques-
tion: Would the drafters have considered FNC as inconsistent
with the substantive right granted? If a different answer is going
to be found, then it will have to be found where MC99 differs
from the Warsaw Convention.
While the cardinal purpose of MC99 may be the same, this
Article concludes that the supplementary purpose has evolved
substantially from that of the Warsaw Convention.494 This Article
defines the supplementary purpose of the Warsaw Convention
as being furtherance of the public interest in the development
of air transport whilst striking an equitable balance of interests
between carriers, users, and plaintiffs.495 The balance of inter-
ests was fundamentally altered by MC99, most dramatically by its
recalibration in light of the interests of plaintiffs-qua-consumers.
Now, under MC99, this Article defines its complementary pur-
pose as assurance of an equitable balance between the interests
of consumers in international carriage by air, the need for equi-
table compensation based on the principle of restitution, and
the orderly development of international air transport.496 This
change is most strongly reflected in the alterations made to the
core liability regime, but it also impacted the jurisdictional
regime.
Like the Warsaw Convention, the key features of MC99’s juris-
dictional regime reflect two core policy considerations: (1) the
492 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 31(1).
493 See supra part III.A.2.a.
494 See supra part III.A.2.b.
495 See supra part II.A.3.
496 See supra part III.A.2.b.
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need to ensure legal certainty and predictability; and (2) the
desire to accommodate the interests and convenience of the
parties.497 Both policies were in evidence with respect to the ad-
dition of the fifth jurisdiction. While certainly a concession to
the interests of the plaintiff passengers, it was the need to bal-
ance those interests against the interests of carriers and consum-
ers in general that received most attention throughout the
drafting history.498 The fifth jurisdiction was fenced in so as to
ensure that it would be a predictable forum for carriers and to
minimize the risk of forum shopping, which was regarded as sy-
nonymous with increased cost to the industry and ultimately to
the consumer.499 It would be wrong to suppose that MC99’s ju-
risdictional regime was recast with the interests of the consumer-
qua-plaintiff as king. Although FNC is undoubtedly inimical to
the interests of plaintiffs, it can be seen as promoting the or-
derly development of air transport and the interests of consum-
ers generally (i.e., as distinguished from consumers-qua-
plaintiffs). For a time, a codified version of FNC was the favored
solution. The truth is that FNC falls on both sides of the plain-
tiff–carrier scales, and trying to divine the relative weight the
drafters would have assigned to its dual manifestation is likely an
impossible task. Thankfully, such a task is unnecessary given an-
other significant change between the Warsaw Convention and
MC99, i.e., that MC99 has its own drafting history.
As detailed above, in adding the fifth jurisdiction, the drafters
specifically turned their minds to the jurisdictional regime of
MC99.500 They engaged in lengthy and in-depth discussion dur-
ing which the reality of FNC was repeatedly acknowledged and
accepted. There was repeated insistence from the United
States—the most significant State in terms of aviation litiga-
tion—that it applied FNC to WCS cases and would continue to
do so under MC99. This was even recognized by other States
(including civil law States). When we consider what understand-
ing the drafters would have had of the substantive right granted
to plaintiffs to choose their forum under Articles 33(1) and
33(2) of MC99, then an inescapable conclusion imposes itself.
Not only was the exercise of the doctrine of FNC not inconsistent
with that right, it was plainly and openly contemplated by the
497 The reader is referred to the discussion of the purpose of the Warsaw Con-
vention’s jurisdictional regime, see supra part II.B.1.
498 See supra part III.B.2.a.
499 See supra part III.B.2.b.
500 See supra part III.B.2.
102 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
drafters. This is the key distinction between MC99 and the War-
saw Convention. With MC99, FNC was clearly within the con-
templation of the drafters; therefore, the substantive right
granted to the plaintiff under Article 33 was not regarded as
absolute in the sense that it would have been by the drafters of
the Warsaw Convention. Whatever the precise balance struck be-
tween competing interests, it was one struck on the shared un-
derstanding of the drafters that FNC may be applied.
By reframing the core interpretational question concerning
the applicability of FNC under MC99 onto the nature and ex-
tent of the substantive right granted to plaintiffs to choose their
forum, rather than on whether the term “questions of proce-
dure” referred to in Article 33(4) was intended to include FNC,
this Article reaches the following conclusion. The substantive
right under Articles 33(1) and 33(2) of MC99 grants the plain-
tiff the choice of forum (from those identified) in which to
bring an action for damages. In the case of MC99, the plaintiff’s
right to choose a forum is not inviolable and absolute. As per
Article 33(4), this right is subject to the procedural rules of the
court seized of the case, including, where available, a rule of
procedure that permits the court to reasonably exercise discre-
tion to decline jurisdiction in favor of one of the alternative fo-
rums. FNC is not prima facie inconsistent with that right.
Although the reasoning upon which that conclusion is
reached is different than that put forth in In re West Caribbean
Airways, it is essentially in agreement with respect to the out-
come. When it comes to the decision reached by the Cour de
Cassation, its failure to consider Article 33(1) in its context, spe-
cifically Article 33(4), is reason enough to discount it. Further-
more, it would beggar belief if the Cour de Cassation could
maintain its position in the light of full consideration of the
drafting history. The Cour de Cassation is, as a matter of law,
wrong.
Contracting States to MC99 undertook the obligation to make
their courts available to claims brought before them in accor-
dance with the jurisdictional regime of Article 33. We have es-
tablished that FNC is not prima facie inconsistent with that
regime. That being so, it is submitted that where a court de-
clines to exercise jurisdiction on grounds of FNC and that ac-
tion is then brought to one of the other forums permitted
under MC99, then that other forum cannot invoke the exercise
of FNC by the original court as justification for refusal to hear
the case itself. To do so, it is suggested, would amount to a
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breach by that State of its duty of good faith under customary
international law, unless of course that State could justify such
action on some other basis. For instance, it could be argued that
the application of the particular doctrine of FNC was in viola-
tion of MC99 or some other binding norm of international law.
Indeed, there is room to argue that certain versions of the doc-
trine in the United States discriminate between foreign and do-
mestic plaintiffs in a manner inconsistent with MC99.501
Even if—as has been proved—FNC is not the interloper to
MC99 that it is accused of being, there is still much wrong with
it, and we still stand in need for a better solution. Although be-
yond the scope of this Article, a number of points must be noted
about FNC that have been addressed by the author elsewhere or
will be addressed in articles to be published in the near future.
First, FNC is characterized by a lack of doctrinal uniformity on
an international level amongst States that apply it and even at
national levels within some of those States (e.g., the United
States). Second, FNC drives divisiveness between common law
and civil law systems due to the essential differences between
those systems with respect to jurisdiction; civilian lawyers’ con-
tempt for FNC should not be underestimated. It is unlikely civil-
ian States will find the resolution of the doctrinal conundrum
regarding the availability of FNC within MC99 to be a sufficient
reason to acquiesce to the employment of FNC by the courts of
common law States. Third, because the doctrine has become lib-
eralized in the past fifty years, the consequence is that litigation
over where to sue has become more and more prevalent, with
resulting social and economic costs. These do not portend a
happy future.
FNC and MC99, quo vadis? Before we attempt to answer this
question, we should first reflect further about where it is we
think we are. Things would have been so much easier had this
Article reached the conclusion that FNC is not available under
MC99. The issues noted in the previous paragraph would seem-
ingly disappear. So, is the answer simply to jettison FNC from
MC99 altogether? Whether this be done by amendment or by
judicial fiat, the express exclusion of the possibility for a court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction properly vested in it by MC99 is
certainly an option to consider. FNC is, after all, only a common
501 See generally Cluxton, supra note 411, at 73–91 (on the potential for certain
doctrines of FNC to discriminate against foreign claimants).
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law doctrine, and so many of the world’s legal systems appear to
do just fine without it.
Attractive as this solution might be, it fails to consider at least
one crucial factor. At this particular point in time, it is the com-
mon law courts, specifically those of the United States, which are
the primary locations for aviation litigation. That being so, FNC
plays an important role in keeping down the cost of aviation
accidents. This is clearly advantageous to the aviation industry,
the benefit of which is ultimately felt by the fare-paying public,
albeit at the expense of plaintiffs. However, do plaintiffs really
suffer by having their compensation assessed by the court with
the closest connection to, and greatest interest in, the accident
and its litigation? In the case of In re West Caribbean Airways, was
it not more equitable for all concerned that the courts of the
plaintiffs’ domicile (i.e., Martinique) assess the level of damages
rather than a foreign court?
The truth is that while FNC is a problem within MC99 litiga-
tion, it is not the problem. In truth, FNC is itself an attempted
cure to an underlying illness. In essence, it is just a doctrinal
mechanism for resolving a dispute between the parties to litiga-
tion over choice of forum. While it is plaintiffs who have the
initiative in choosing their forum under MC99, the defendant
can inject itself into the process through the use of FNC. FNC
just provides a litigational battleground for the parties’ disputes
over choice of forum. This is the real problem, i.e., choice of
forum. If we hope to find a solution to the manner in which
choice of forum is regulated by MC99, then we must conduct a
closer analysis of the competing interests involved, those of the
plaintiff passenger and defendant carrier. This is a subject for
another day, but it is submitted that when this interests analysis
is done, it reveals a bigger picture that goes far beyond WCS or
MC99 and far beyond the apparent two-party paradigm of plain-
tiff passenger versus defendant carrier upon which these Con-
ventions are built. WCS and MC99 are not hermetically sealed
systems insulated and protected from outside influence; they are
just parts of a larger aviation accident passenger compensation
system. Indeed, it is the very failure of MC99 to adapt itself to
the reality of its place within this larger system that is a prime
contributor to the discontent felt with respect to choice of fo-
rum. Successful solutions will only be found by engaging with
this bigger picture.
